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Preface 
THIS STUDY ATTEMPTS to set the development of the Free French 
movement in the Pacific , and Australia's cooperation with it, in the context 
of the contemporary political and strategic situation. Having, as a very young 
man, spent more than two years at Noumea between 1 940 and 1943 as 
assistant to the Australian government's representative there , I witnessed 
and on occasion participated in some of the events discussed . I have striven , 
however, to keep fallible memory in its proper, subordinate , place; the 
account now given is founded essentially on the extensive documentation 
now available to researchers in the Australian, British and United States 
archives and on such trustworthy French sources as I found accessible 
despite the 5 0-year rule still applied to French official records. 
The work has been written in the hospitable and stimulating environment 
of the Department of Pacific and Southeast Asian History in the Research 
School of Pacific Studies at the Australian National University. I could 
never express adequately my gratitude for the friendship , help and good 
counsel so generously given me, first as a Foreign Service officer on sabbatical 
leave and now a second time following my retirement, by all members of 
the academic and support staff of the Department. Among so many, I must 
mention particularly- Dr Deryck Scarr, who first welcomed me to the 
Department, and Mrs Jennifer Terrell, to whom my special thanks are due 
for her skilful and patient editing of the manuscript. I am grateful also to 
Dr Dorothy Shineberg of the Department of History, The Faculties ,  ANU, 
who was kind enough to read and comment helpfully on the draft of the 
first chapter. 
Canberra, October 198 1 
John Lawrey 
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Introduction 
ON A HILL overlooking Noumea stands a monument in the form of a tall 
Cross of Lorraine .  The date carved on its base - 19  September 1940 -
commemorates the overthrow of the Vichy government's authority in New 
Caledonia and the territory 's adherence to General de Gaulle's Free French 
movement. This ralliement to the French external resistance movement was 
precipitated by the action of a majority of the local French population and 
carried through by one colonial official from the New Hebrides, Henri 
Sautot , who at de Gaulle's instance placed himself at their head .  But it could 
not have happened had not the wartime Australian government become 
involved, 'unwillingly at first but with increasing zest ', as Paul Hasluck has 
said , in support of the Gaullist movement. This help was manifested by the 
presence in Noumea harbour during the critical days of an Australian cruiser, 
HMAS Adelaide. Her captain, H.A. Showers , after seeing Sautot landed, 
negotiated the withdrawal to Inda-China of the Vichy sloop Dumont 
d 'Urv£lle and of officials professing allegiance to P�tain, thus putting an end 
once for all to the Vichy presence in the Pacific . Finally Showers - in 
consultation with the Australian government's official representative at 
Noumea, B .C.  Ballard , and the honorary British consul , W .A . Johnston -
crowned his conduct of his mission by confronting the local de Gaulle 
committee and giving them a stiff warning against any action that might 
upset the peaceful solution agreed between himself and the Vichy 
commander. 
This resolution of a problem left in Australia's immediate vicinity by the 
fall of France marked the beginning of a phase of cooperation between 
Australia and Free France which set the scene for the part later played by 
New Caledonia in the first American counter-offensive in the Pacific Ocean 
war. It was , no doubt, a small affair but ,  if the complications caused by a 
'neutral ' Vichy r�gime in the French West Indies are considered, it was not 
unimportant, and this rare success by a Commonwealth country in dealing 
with Vichy made a contrast with the Dakar fiasco which was happening 
almost simultaneously . The bloodless outcome of the operation was the 
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more astonishing, and the greater credit to the handful of Anglo-Saxons 
participating in it on the ground ,  in the light of the scanty knowledge of 
the French Pacific with which it was undertaken . It is my purpose here to 
examine the background and consequences of the ralliement .  
1 New Caledonia under the Third Republic 
IN 1941  THE Australian journalist Wilfred Burchett wrote , in the intro­
duction to a lively book on New Caledonia, 
For many years this island has been but a name to most of us. In Australia 
it was a name that featured once or twice a year as the goal of a tourist cruise 
to the South Seas ; in America a name that appeared on the schedule of Pan­
American Airways' Trans-Pacific Air Service ; in the rest of the world the name 
New Caledonia - if it suggested anything at all - vaguely recalled the site of 
a particularly odious convict prison. 1 
Doubtless he had in mind mainly the English-speaking world, but in France 
too this remote Pacific colony was now little known and little regarded . 
New Caledonia had been annexed in 1853  by Napoleon III's government, 
'which had long desired to possess localities overseas capable if need be of 
accommodating penal stations' .2 The first convicts did not arrive in the new 
colonly until 1 864, when problems had been encountered in French Guiana, 
the site of the first attempt to apply the then widely held theory of the 
merits of penal colonization . The experiment as carried out in New 
Caledonia cannot be called a success, though hopes of success were 
obstinately cherished for some time in the light of inaccurate judgements 
of the foundations of Australia's growing prosperity . Henri Riviere , the 
vigorous naval officer who played a leading part in the suppression of the 
Melanesian uprising of 1 878 ,  had Australia very much in mind when in 1 88 1  
he  drew a utopian picture o f  the prospects o f  convictism in New Caledonia 
if its aims were properly and whole-heartedly pursued . He admitted that 
things were not going well : he calculated that the number of free colonists 
in 1 8 7 7  was still only 2 ,752 ,  occupied largely in providing for the needs of 
a 'relatively unproductive population' of 3,032 military and civil personnel ,  
3 ,836 deportees (the Paris communards whose passage left little trace in the 
colony) and 6 ,000 convicts. Nonetheless , he thought, it was a foundation 
on which a prosperous colony could be developed if time-expired convicts 
were unequivocally restored to full civil rights and given scope to develop 
'that individualism which alone is powerful and fruitful in the early stages 
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of a society '. Free colonists should be limited to people with capital ready 
to make a place for themselves through their initiative and intelligence, not 
poor folk pursuing the mirage of distant wealth . Perhaps in such circum­
stances the free settlers could be brought to adopt vis-a-vis the freedmen 
'that philosophical indifference which the British have in everyday life ' and 
drop their attitude of smug superiority. The convict population for its 
part would be morally elevated by dealing with the free element on a basis 
of friendship and equality . This prediction, he thought, was justified by what 
had happened in Australia.3 
All this was a counsel of prefection from Captain Riviere 's ever fluent pen 
and incidentally one more example in the large collection of distorted 
French perceptions of Australia . ( It is hard to avoid the impression that there 
has frequently been a touch of cargoism in the admiring envy with which 
the French looked at Australia from New Caledonia.) New Caledonia never 
had its Governor Macquarie , though the last of the naval governors, Pallu 
de la Barriere ( 1 8 82 -84) , strengthened at first by support from Paris , made 
a shortlived attempt to play a rather similar role and make the penitentiary 
a means to the end of free colonization .  His downfall was followed by a 
period of hesitation and timidity as memories of the 1 8  7 8 revolt slowly 
faded .  
Until transportation was ended in the last years o f  the l 9th century the 
Penal Administration remained an over-mighty subject ,  bloated and corrupt , 
self-serving but living in a symbiotic relationship not so much with the 
Administration properly so-called as with commercial firms to which it 
provided a ready-made clientele and with capitalists like John Higginson 
and above all the Compagnie du Nickel exploiting newly discovered mineral 
resources, to whom it purveyed convict labour. As Pierre Gascher has said 
of this distorted economy , 'with the State 's aid a kind of economic enclave 
having no real links with the country had been set up ' . Gascher sums it up 
very well in the conclusion of his study of New Caledonia in the late 1 9th 
century : 
In l894, after 50 years of the French presence ,  the colony had not realized 
the hopes placed in it . The penal system had been the worst of the evils it had 
had to suffer. No one had been aware that it deserved better than this poisoned 
gift . .. However strong the Governor, his action was constantly hindered by the 
Director of Transportation who, sure of support from home, did just as he chose 
in promoting the interest of his own service . How could the representative of 
the State work effectively when there existed a huge fief over which he was 
denied any oversight. No enterprise of any great scope was possible, and in this 
regard the fall of Pallu is very significant. Through what aberration were things 
allowed to go from bad to worse , when so much evidence existed of the dangers 
of penal colonisation? Crime was making a kingdom for itself. 
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Certainly, the Penitentiaire was not solely responsible for the colony's 
lethargy. . . But its invasive and irreducible presence disturbed the 
Administration's activity at every point. New Caledonia was being eaten up by 
this ulcer in its side.4 
A new doctrine of free settlement from France was preached with some 
effect by a young and energetic governor, Paul F eillet, whose term lasted 
from 1 894  to his death nine years later. Feillet 's efforts brought about the 
ending of transportation and the settlement on the land of some 500 French 
families .  An authoritarian ruler, he made many local enemies in the course 
of his campaign to develop a rural (white) democracy, and much of his 
action remains controversial. But he radically changed the character of the 
colony . Although in 1 9 0 1  there were only 8 ,200 free Europeans compared 
with 7 ,800 convicts and time-expired convicts , this proportion reversed the 
convict predominance which had existed in the first years of his pro­
consulate , and a new vigour had been imparted to life in the 'bush ' - a term 
which in New Caledonia includes everything outside Noumea. 
For nearly four decades after Feillet 's departure New Caledonia remained, 
however, a less than dynamically developing colony of settlement . The 1 1  
years before the first World War saw a resumption, with nine governors and 
acting governors in rapid succession, of the valse des fonctionnaires which 
had similarly marked the decade between 1 884 and 1 894.  Agriculture did 
not prosper, and the most notable development took place in the 'economic 
enclave ' mentioned by Gascher .  Nickel, of which New Caledonia was the 
world's second source (after Canada) , began to be smelted in the colony 
which thus acquired a metallurgical industry of growing importance , unique 
in the Pacific islands .  (In 1 8 70s and 1 880s John Higginson and the 
Societe Le Nickel had established foundries, but these soon failed as a 
result of technical obsolescence and new competition from Canada, and 
from 1 89 1  New Caledonia had been merely a quarry from which ore was 
carried to France in the huge subsidized sailing ships of the period . )  In 
1909 the great trading firm of Ballande set up the Hauts-Foumeaux de 
Noumea and three years later Le Nickel followed suit with a new foundry 
near its mine at Thio on the east coast . Modem New Caledonia was 
beginning to take shape, though slowly .s 
The 1 9 1 4- 1 8  war,  during which more than a thousand French citizens 
from New Caledonia fought in Europe ,  and the following years of economic 
depression were a period of stagnation . Farming, stock raising, mining 
and metallurgy all suffered from the economic climate and the slackening 
of development efforts .  In 1 9 2 3  the main west coast road still did not extend 
beyond Paya, barely half way from N oumea to the far north of the Grande 
Terre , which was linked to the capital only by small coastal steamers . 
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Retrospectively but convincingly the ethnologist Jean Guiart has drawn a 
stark picture of the isolated and neglected poor-white population of this 
northwestern area. 
After the failure of a copper-smelting enterprise at the mouth of the Diahot 
River N oumea left the north to its loneliness. The penal farming centre at 
Ouegoa, established to provide food supplies to the mines, was abandoned. With 
the closing of the mines the market was gone and decadence set in among a tiny 
European society ( 49 concession-holders in 1 884) subject to the authority 
neither of gendarme nor of priest, but rather to the law of the jungle, totally 
illiterate and ostentatiously promiscuous. The only common factors were 
contempt for the natives and a passion for racehorses . . .  It took three quarters 
of a century until, with the opening up of roads after the war, these people 
came to themselves, took advantage of the disappearance of social discrimination 
against them, could go to the doctor, and thought of being married by the 
missionary at Bonde.6 
A new turning point was reached in 1 9 25 with the arrival of another 
notable governor , J can Guyon, who at once set on foot an ambitious and 
basically sound development plan . It all took time . The novelist and 
academician Pierre Benoit , who visited New Caledonia in 1928 ,  gives a 
depressing portrait of Noumea : 
Noumea! A small town so deeply asleep that it seems dead. For three years its 
governor has been trying to rouse it from its lethargy. Will he succeed in 
awakening what it would be ironical to call a sleeping beauty? Nothing, in 
truth, could be uglier than poor Noumea. 
Whose fault is it? As soon as we come ashore we meet not only the piles of 
rubble on the wharves but a serious problem of colonial responsibility. This is 
an island of undoubted beauty . After the flatness of Australia it looks like an 
earthly paradise. But what a contrast there is between this natural splendour and 
the squalid civilization that has been brought to it. Once again, who is to blame? 
Let us reply bluntly, metropolitan France. I am not setting out to eulogize 
the New Caledonian French in terms by which they themselves would be 
surprised. The older among them have no faith in the country's future. The 
young aspire only to bureaucracy . But the mother country is responsible for 
this state of affairs. Her new-born daughter received only one appalling gift -the 
convict prison. No attempt has been made since then to help her to rise above 
h�r beginning. 
What a town it is - no sewers, a decayed port, no street lights except a few 
gaslamps which on moolit nights are left unlit for economy's sake . And yet it 
would be easy to relieve this poverty and give N oumea the role for which it is 
so suited - that of one of the main harbours in this Pacific where the fate of the 
world will be decided. A great governor, M. Guyon . . .  is devoting himself to this 
task . Will he receive a hearing in France when he seeks the 50 million francs 
needed to carry it out? Will the Parliament, in which New Caledonia is not 
represented, be listening? For the first and I hope for the last time I regret 
the absence of a deputy . 7 
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In the event the funds for Guyon's plan were voted,  and on his departure 
in 1 932 he left the colony the richer by 300 kilometres of main roads and 
various other new facilities including those whose absence Benoit had 
deplored . In the process he had caused some anxiety to private interests ,s 
and indeed the circumstances of his sudden retirement , discussed briefly 
in the recently published Memorz'al Caledonien , remain rather mysterious .9 
His plan was never completely carried out , but his objective of bringing the 
bush settlers out of isolation had been achieved .  For the rest, the remaining 
years before the outbreak of war in 1 9 39 were marked notably by the 
striking development of the metallurgical industry , now concentrated in 
the hands of the Societe Le Nickel, itself controlled by a spectacular 
constellation of big banking and financial interests in France and Belgium.1 0 
Whether Le Nickel's contribution to the colony 's economy , through export 
taxes and otherwise , compensated adequately for the lack of a consistent 
policy of balanced development is another matter. 
However that may be,  the relationship between metropolitan France 
and her scarcely-wanted Pacific daughter, Tahiti's ugly sister, was still in 
1940 redolent of an ever-simmering family quarrel. No real attempt had 
ever been made to integrate this distant, ethnically French , group of 
'Caledoniens ' ( 1 7  ,OOO in 1 936) into the mainstream of French life . They 
were out of sight and mostly out of mind . The colony was still unrepresented 
in Parliament , though since 1 886  it had local representative institutions in 
the form of a General Council and municipalities in the towns . Expatriation 
to New Caledonia had brought this French group under the decree-regime of 
the colonial possessions among which New Caledonia was unique and uneasy . 
Demands for greater autonomy - for the local white population - were 
voiced recurrently , but vainly . 
In 1 940 Andre Bayardelle , Colonial Secretary of New Caledonia, spoke 
of the root causes of the Metropolitan-Caledonian malaise in a paper 
submitted to General de Gaulle after the ralliement ( though from internal 
evidence it seems that it was originally destined for readers at Vichy) .  
Discussing an autonomist manifesto circulated by a small group just after 
the 1940 armistice, he says 
The news of the metropolitan collapse set afoot a movement demanding 
administrative, financial and economic autonomy, a movement having its roots 
in long-standing aspirations springing from a consciousness of the colony's 
economic servitude and the excessively strict administrative tutelage imposed 
by the metropolitan power. This unjustifiable servitude took no account either 
of geography or of the legitimate interests of a white population conscious of 
the sacrifices it had to make for the imperial economy. The colony was too 
much subjected to the [Ministry of Colonies) whose initiatives were frequently 
untimely and cancelled out the best efforts of governors to organize the colony . 1 1  
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Bayardelle recognizes, however, that the auto no mist idea 'found no deep 
echo in the population' and was rapidly superseded by a movement in favour 
of adherence to the Free French cause. In fact, the predominant feeling, 
overcoming longstanding resentments, was one of loyalty to 'a certain idea 
of France'. 
IN 1 940 New Caledonia and its adjacent dependencies of the Loyalty Islands 
and the Isle of Pines contained 30 ,000 descendants of the Melanesian in­
habitants on whose country the French colony had been superimposed nearly 
a century before. They form a background to wartime events but, in the 
atmosphere of that time, not much more. At the end of a century of 
incomprehension between whites and blacks, the latter lived a life apart 
on the native reserves from which they could emerge only with the specific 
permission of the Office of Native Affairs. They were not French citizens 
but subjects living under the regime of the native code established formally 
in 1 8 8 7  and prolonged each decade until 1 928 .  Decrees taken in that year, 
in 1 9 32 and in 1 9 3 7  mitigated the terms of the native code without changing 
its fundamentally coercive character. In the words of the expose des motifs 
of the relevant decree of 1 90 7 ,  'By this regime the New Caledonian native 
has been placed and remains outside the common law. He is subjected to 
the discipline of the colonial Administration.'12 
The native code not only regulated the employment of Melanesians by 
European employers but incorporated a system of compulsory employment 
on roads and public works, and provided for the payment of a head tax. 
All in all, it reflected an increasingly outmoded conception of the indigene 
as an auxiliary of colonization, and a very unsatisfactory one. 
The first phase of this century of misunderstanding is discussed by Henri 
Riviere who, in May 1 878 ,  was ordered by the new governor, Captain Olry, 
to take his corvette on a tour of the New Caledonian coast and the outlying 
islands and to 'pay attention to the Canaques'. 'This instruction surprised 
me. During my two years in New Caledonia there had been so little mention 
of the Canaques that I might have thought that they did not exist, or 
existed no longer,'13 They certainly did exist. The greatest rebellion in New 
Caledonia's colonial history broke out with a massacre of gendarmes and 
settlers in the La F oa valley, a hundred kilometres up the west coast from 
Noumea, on the day La Vire arrived in Teremba Bay at the mouth of the La 
Foa River. Riviere was soon in action ashore. When the revolt had been 
suppressed he reflected on its origins. Expropriation of native lands and the 
ravaging of what was left by the colonists' cattle had no doubt been 
contributing factors, but basically, he thought, there was only one cause, 
namely, what he saw as the eternal antagonism between conquerors and 
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conquered. The latter must be absorbed or disappear. Now, the black races 
of Oceania would not be absorbed by a white civilization for which they felt 
an ineradicable repugnance: the Canaques would submit and revolt in tum, 
but it would always be possible to contain such movements and meanwhile 
in normal times it will be humane and politic to leave the Canaques in peace 
on the territories to which they will increasingly withdraw. They will not hinder 
colonization by not taking part in it, any more than they would assist it if we 
sought to involve them in it . 14 
For 15 years after the 1 8  7 8 insurrection, indeed, there was not much 
further enc;roachment on native lands, but from 1893 ,  with an apparently 
declining Melanesian population occupying more land than it was thought to 
need, a new policy began to emerge. From 189 7  Governor Feillet, the 
enthusiastic apostle of white colonization, carried through a general and 
systematic programme of 'cantonnement '  - delimitation of reserves to 
which the whole Melanesian population would be confined. In this operation 
the total area of the reserves appears to have been reduced from 320,000 
hectares (in 1 895) to 1 20 ,000 hectares (in 190 1 ) . 1 5  Thus the indigenous 
population of the Grande Terre was confined to less than one-tenth of the 
island. (White settlement has never been permitted on the outlying Loyalty 
Islands and Isle of Pines containing some 200 ,OOO hectares.) Frequently the 
clans had been uprooted, by punitive measures after the 18 78  rebellion and 
by Feillet's programme, from ancestral lands to which they were mystically 
attached. 
A recent historian of the Melanesian land question, Alain Saussol, regards 
Feillet as bearing a heavy share of responsibility for what remains one of the 
territory's major problems. 
No doubt the prejudices of the period may have had an anaesthetizing effect, 
as did the prevailing certainty that the reserves would be the last refuge of a 
people destined to die out. Nothing, however, could be more paradoxical than 
this governor's policy, if it be set against the intentions of a man who aspired 
to 'civilize '  the Melanesians, who constantly proclaimed that he would work to 
improve their material and moral condition - and in whom this desire was 
probably not devoid of sincerity. On 6 November 1 899 he made a significant 
speech , reflecting at once his ambitions and his ignorance of Melanesian realities: 
'F ar  from being a despoiler of natives', he said, 'I am trying to be a civilizer of  
barbarians. The Canaques, I say confidently , feel affection for my best assistants 
and for me because those who know me well are aware of the affection which I 
feel for them.' . . . 
This prototype of the administrative technocrat had one failing, which he 
shared with almost all his contemporaries - ignorance of the social and political 
realities of Melanesian life, which he likened to a feudal system.  Hence the 
aberrations of his native policy . Thus, he said on 3 June 1 9 01,  speaking of the 
Melanesians, 'Having made clear to them henceforth the extent of their territory, 
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we shall teach them to make better use of it . It is that, above all, that I call to 
civilize. ' But he did not understand that in confining these precolonial societies 
he was breaking their mainspring.�6 
It is difficult to dissent from Saussol's conclusion that Feillet's pursuit of 
his major objective, the promotion of intense white colonization, helped 'to 
make a gulf between the two ethnic groups, inflicting a trauma on one, guilt 
on the other, and bequeathing to future generations a burdensome legacy' .1 7 
At the same time it is well to remember that the pioneer missionary and 
ethnologist Maurice Leenhardt, a contemporary of Feillet and never an 
apologist for colonialism, spoke towards the end of his life of the 'irony' 
of denouncing Feillet for 'spoliation' of the Melanesian population who in 
some cases at least had actively welcomed the demarcation of their 
boundaries.is More recently still, his son Pastor Raymond Leenhardt has 
written favourably of Feillet's handling of the so-called Paya war of 1901 , 
when the Governor, returning from leave in France, found the Administration 
preoccupied with what was thought - probably because of misunderstandings 
- to be an incipient rebellion among the northern tribes over head tax 
payments. For bidding precipitate military action, he resolved the incident 
by an undoubtedly courageous confrontation, alone and unarmed, with the 
Melanesian chief Amane. 
This peaceful settlement by direct man-to-man contact was very much in the 
pattern of Feillet 's grand design: the development of New Caledonia through 
the participation of the Canaques and of carefully chosen settlers. He had turned 
off the 'tap of dirty water ', the convict system which put the Blacks in contact 
with the worst of the Whites . He had established the head tax which encouraged 
the natives to work for the Whites in order to settle good farmers brought from 
France on the lands thus released: in this - like all his western contemporaries -
he failed to understand native agriculture , in which the land had to lie fallow for 
six years out of seven, and thought that the Canaques could only gain from 
contact with well chosen settlers who would bring them civilization. 19 
One conclusion does not necessarily exclude the other. Feillet seems to 
have been, with all his faults, essentially a man of goodwill, but the very 
limited success of his agricultural colonization, on which he had counted 
for the development of a practical if inevitably unequal cooperation between 
white and black, made it inevitable that the negative consequences of his 
activity, based as it was on familiar misconceptions of Melanesian life, would 
prevail in the years following his departure. 
Leenhardt protested consistently against the reduct£o ad absurdum of 
the Feillet system as it was applied, first during the 1 0  years of administrative 
instability following his departure and then under the active Governor 
Auguste Brunet ( 1 9 1 2- 1 4) ,  the author of plans for 'reform' which, had 
they not been rendered abortive by the outbreak of war, would have imposed a 
12 THE CROSS O F  LORRAINE IN THE SOUTH PACI FIC 
harsher system of forced labour administered through Melanesian chiefs 
serving as instruments of the colonial authority. In a letter of March 1 9 1 4  
to contacts in France who he hoped would oppose 'this monstrosity' he 
wrote: 
you will meet strong resistance . You will be told about the ruin facing settlers 
deprived of labour, about the natives '  inconstant character, about their lack of 
civilization which m akes it necessary to apply exceptional rules to them. People 
will even try to defeat you on grounds of humanity and morality by proving that 
the system of labour contracts was instituted in the Canaques' own interest, in 
order to guarantee the payment of their wages and secure to them the morally 
beneficial interest of their employers. That is all nonsense ,  designed to mask 
the real motive of material interest . . .  
The supposedly inconstant native in fact does not leave people in the lurch 
if they do not exploit him, and those who speak of the danger of exposing 
natives to unhealthy influences beyond their employers' control may be asked 
where the Canaques have acquired a taste for drunkenness and prostitution­
in their villages or in the employ of masters who pay them with alcohol and 
traffic in their women. 
I am sure you will agree that it is unworthy of France - which led the world 
in freeing slaves and which first advanced the principle that no human being may 
QC appropriated, even temporarily , by another - to tolerate any longer the 
abuses [inherent in the labour contract system] or the regime by which the 
natives are represented by the Administration alone. 20 
These anomalies of colonialism endured, however, to the end of the 
Third Republic. The lack of communication between the colonial regime 
and its subjects on basic matters is summed up in Leenhardt's story of 
an early 20th century governor and the chief Mindia. 
The chief is the Word [le verbe] of the clan. This definition is not my own. I 
heard it on the lips of an authentic chief, Mindia, one day when a governor, 
curious about their spectacles , had asked to watch a chief give one of those 
harangues 'which inflame the people '. Now this governor, careless where native 
traditions were concerned, had previously sanctioned a series of intrigues of the 
kind sometimes favoured by a colonial situation. He had reduced to a minimum 
the chieftainship of B ig Chief Mindia, of authentic lineage , in favor of certain 
newcomers out for titles and spoils. Invited to give their harangues, these 
pseudo-chiefs, who had been capering on horseback around the chief magistrate , 
excused themselves one after the other. And at the insistence of the magistrate , 
they finally said, 'Only Mindia can speak' .  
He  went to  Mindia. And Mindia replied, 'These nobodies say they are chiefs : 
let them prove it ' .  
And shrugging his shoulders in pity for the pretenders, he added, 'The chief 
is the word of the clan '. 
I translated 'the Word of the clan'. Mindia refused to besmirch the word, 
for, as he later explained , 'How could I still harangue my people if they knew 
that I made light of the word of the clan? ' 
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The word is as sacred in the mouth of the chief as the altar is sacred in the 
care of the sacrificer. The word of the harangues and the rites of the altar can 
not be profaned. The Melanesian needs both to insure his stature. 21 
Such subtleties were not for the average settler or colonial official. Pre­
dominant was the view of a Noumea newspaper quoted elsewhere by 
Leenhardt in 1 9 1 3: 
The canaque is a man of inferior mentality. Many years will be needed to change 
this mentality , which is a mixture of childishness and barbarity .  He is lazy , like 
all primitives, because nature has made it possible for him to live with little 
effort: if he is not constrained to work he will not seek it. He is inconstant . . .  22 
This simple view of the lazy and backward native was still to be met with 
as late as 1941  when a white Public Works foreman, undertaking to answer 
a banal question by an Australian newcomer as to 'what sort of people' 
the natives were, remarked briefly and definitively, 'You have to make them 
work'. 
The dilemma confronting a conscientious heir to the French liberal and 
scientific tradition working in the context of a seemingly permanent colonial 
situation is evident at every point of the career of Maurice Leenhardt, to 
which any observer of 20th century New Caledonia must constantly refer. 
It is to be seen in a more generalized or abstract form in the words of the 
Secretary General of his own Societe des Missions Evangeliques de Paris 
in 1906: 
The very fact of colonial conquest poses a singularly difficult problem. On the 
European continent we protest against the right of conquest. A day will surely 
come when our consciences become more sensitive and rebel also against the 
application of this method to overseas territories . . .  Through contact with our 
literature , with our daily press, the native mind gradually becomes imbued with 
the idea of France, the daughter of the Revolution. Already natives who know 
French reflect on the meaning and scope of the three words of the Republican 
device to be read on our monuments and official letterheads ; when a substantial 
number of Blacks or Annamites come to speak French fluently who can tell 
what reflections they may be led to make? . . . Under the influence of that spirit 
of which our language is the vehicle , natives will feel themselves becoming more 
and more our compatriots, our brothers , and the day will come when they will 
ask why they should not be our equals. 
Should we be alarmed at this prospect? I do not think so , provided that 
things are done wisely and cautiously. 
We shall have carried out our full duty to the natives of our colonies only on 
the distant day when we have made them our equals in freedom. 23 
This ambiguous statement, remarked the Protestant scholar who quoted 
it in 196  7 ,  ushered in a period when a modus vivendi was established 
between the French colonial regime and the formerly more than slightly 
suspect Protestant missions, with the latter 'inculcating in the overseas 
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territories the duty of obedience to magistrates forming part of the Christian 
ethic, and collaborating with the French administration on the basis of a 
liberal standpoint which no doubt left plenty of room for "caution" '. In 
New Caledonia by 1940 caution seems to have won the day. The 
'indigenophile ' Leenhard t had by now been cast from the official fold and 
a Protestant pastor, Lehnebach, mobilized as a reserve lieutenant, was a 
close confidant of the Vichy Governor Pelicier before transferring to Saigon 
with the group of Vichy adherents in October 1940. He has been accused 
of offering to ferment pro-Vichy agitation among the ProtestantMelanesians. 
Jean Guiart, writing in 1959 , thought this an unlikely story, such as might 
have found its origin in accusations by Gaullist partisans who were at the 
same time reactionary colonialists. There seems little doubt, nevertheless, . 
that it happened. There is Bayardelle's chapter and verse,24 and a good deal 
is known from other sources about this unusual pastor's conduct, especially 
from the testimony of Andre Surleau, a colonial official who saw Lehnebach 
in action under Admiral Decoux's strange wartime regime in Indo-China.2s 
And just before New Caledonia's ralliement to Free France the local Vichy 
strong man, Commander Toussaint de Quievrecourt of the Dumont d 'Urville, 
was telegraphing to the Naval Ministry: 'New Caledonia situation still 
difficult. Main danger in natives armed by bush settlers. '26 
Quievrecourt's professed fears were not justified by events, since the 
rallz'ement  was effected by armed white bushmen, but he did not err in 
suspecting the existence of a certain bonne entente between white and 
black New Caledonians at this stage. 
Here is the heart of the matter, at least for the purposes of the wartime 
story. It is clear with hindsight and the benefit of postwar scholars' 
publications - and not least from the picture still being developed of 
Maurice Leenhardt's work and thought, that Gogol's cloak from which 
modem scientific observation of New Caledonia has emerged - that the 
century before 1940 had been marked by misunderstanding, injustice and 
destablilization of the indigenous society. Nonetheless, in the 20th century 
at least, cheerfulness keeps breaking through. By 1940 the mid-point of the 
phase defined by Saussol as that of Melanesian renewal was close. 
Once the traumatic shock of the cantonnement had been surmounted, a rebirth 
of the Melanesian group was achieved in one generation,  from 1925 to 1956.  
It took place on three levels: demographic ,  . . .  economic, with the introduction 
of coffee-growing in the reserves,  and finally political, with access to responsible 
citizenship. 
By its implications, this peaceful revolution was probably the most important 
phenomenon to have taken place in New Caledonia since the arrival of  
Europeans. A page was being turned, a new reality was being asserted, bringing 
profound changes which would gradually call into question the supremacies 
installed by colonization.27 
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Again, 1925 appears as a turning point. Governor Guyon, mindful of more 
liberal ideas held in France, was resistant to reactionary pressures from those 
of the local whites who saw the Melanesians as barbarous nuisances or at 
best a source of inefficient day-labour, and he energetically promoted 
indigenous cash-cropping which brought the Melanesians for the first time 
into substantial contact with the money economy. Guyon's new roads 
facilitated the extension of health services and education. The Melanesian 
population, so long and obstinately regarded as irreversibly declining, was 
clearly seen to be vigorous and increasing in number. Aspirations to equality 
of citizenship would come later. Maurice Lenormand wrote in 1953: 
Throughout the Melanesian world - in the New Hebrides, the Solomon Islands 
and New Guinea - there were , after the war, neo-pagan mythic movements, 'cargo 
cul(s ', coloured by political and social aspirations and marked by an ardent 
desire for access to European culture and wealth ,  in the guise of a revival of 
ancient myths. 
In New Caledonia the indigenes, for the most part Christians and in 
possession of a certain French education, were not prone to such movements ,  
nor did they see any necessity for them, since the 1 946 Constitution satisfied 
their latent, more or less defined aspirations . . . 2s 
Lenormand seems to have been writing a deliberately low key in the 
course of his campaign to secure further political advancement. But there 
is much in what he says. Politics, for Melanesians as for Westerners, is in any 
event the art of the possible, which all too frequently is synonymous with 
making the best of a bad job. In 1940 when colonization - or colonialism 
- was a generally unquestioned fact of life, that is essentially what they 
were doing, without chafing unduly under the unequal relationships with the 
colonial masters. White and black New Caledonians, though still far from the 
mutual acculturation advocated by Maurice Leenhardt, had learned to rub 
along together fairly well. Leenhardt himself cites 'an old colonist who had 
seen the recovery of the village of Oudjo [near Kone on the west coast] 
[and who] said in 19 39, "Today I would no longer dare to think of these 
people what I thought 40 years ago" ' .29 
It is worth noting also that in the 20th century the unskilled labour force 
had been · augmented by the introduction of contract labourers from abroad. 
In 1936 there were 2,228 Inda-Chinese, 4,342 Javanese and 1,430 Japanese. 
A 1943 report by the senior intelligence officer in the American command 
said 'The treatment of Asiatics by the French population and employers 
is inferior to that given Melanesian natives'.3o The availability of alternative 
candidates for laborious toil was clearly beneficial to the Melanesians, in 
at least a negative way. 
The Melanesians accepted unquestioningly the change of French leadership 
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accomplished over their heads in September 1940 and for the remainder of 
the war they were, from an Allied viewpoint, 'loyal', friendly and frequently 
eager to volunteer, like their fathers in 19 1 4- 1 8 , for the interesting experience 
of military or naval service.31 Burchett and others have remarked on the 'old 
digger' or ancien combattant spirit of native veterans of the first war. 
Australian wartime observers occasionally heard complaints about the 
alienation of land, but there was no sharp protest . Rather there was an eager 
observance of, and participation in, the exciting novelties of the American 
'occupation' . 
STILL another dimension of ignorance is encountered if we recall the 
Australian perception of New Caledonia in 1940. The French colony was 
only 1 ,500 kilometres from the Australian coast, but such were the 
centripetal tendencies of the British and French empires that its image 
was dimmer in most Australian minds than that of Toulon or Tilbury docks 
on the Orient Line's route to London. So far as it was perceived at all 
it suffered from its legend as a sort of French Botany Bay on a cannibal 
island. Popular books such as J ulian Thomas's Cannibals and Convz'cts 
( 1 886) ,  J ames Griffith's In an Unknown Prison Land ( 1901 ) and Beatrice 
Grimshaw's Isles of Adventure ( 1930) (containing a chapter entitled 'New 
Caledonia, Land of the Lost ') presented a gloomy version of French Pacific 
colonization to the Anglo-Saxon reader. Wilfred Burchett's more enticingly­
titled and sympathetic Pacific Treasure Island did not appear until 1941 , 
under the stimulus of the colony's ralliement to Free France. In 1930 
the Australian historian Stephen H. Roberts published a History of French 
Colonial Policy , packed with standard Anglo-Saxon prejudices and offering 
English-speaking readers a grotesque and misleading stereotype of New 
Caledonia and its inhabitants. A serious first hand account of New Caledonian 
traditional society, Maurice Leenhardt's Gens de la Grande Terre, had 
been published in 19  3 7 ,  but it was the work of a still obscure French 
ethnologist, and it had not been translated into English. 
Lack of interest in the colonial possessions of a country which since the 
first World War had come to be taken too much for granted as a natural ally 
in time of trouble was a comparatively new phenomenon. In the l 9th 
century Australian colonial statesmen had been spasmodically stirred to 
frenzy by the extension of French imperialism to the Pacific, accompanied 
as it was by the establishment of a new 'convictism' in our region. The 
effervescence which in the 1 8 80s had prevented any Anglo-French 
accommodation over the New Hebrides and which led to the conclusion 
of the Anglo-French condominium there had faded away, however, with 
Prime Minister Alfred Deakin, to be succeeded by inward looking apathy. 
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A measure of bad feeling persisted. Though by 1920 the head of the Pacific 
Branch of the Prime Minister's Department in Melbourne could write 'There 
is little public interest now in the New Hebrides except amo�g the 
Presbyterians', 32 opinion at Noumea remained morosely conscious of 
Australian influence as an obstacle to the fulfilment of what was often seen 
as the manifest destiny of the New Hebrides to become French. As late as 
1974 a Noumea historian was to comment that the 'abandonment' 
represented by the 1922 arrangement on the New Hebrides would have 
aroused a stronger protest than it did if public opinion in the colony had not 
been wearied and depressed by the gloomy economic situation from which 
it was suffering. 
The Caledonian and Hebridean economies are complementary and, quite apart 
from some people's hopes of profitable land speculation, it would have been 
preferable, from the point of view of the populations of both archipelagoes, 
to see the New Hebrides '  natural and human resources united to those of  New 
Caledonia, so that the New Hebrideans would have enjoyed a nationality and a 
status making possible their acculturation.33 
Overt Australian government interest in the New Hebrides Condominium 
was muted in the interwar period, but it had not been discarded. As late 
as 1937,  at the Imperial Conference of that year, Australia offered, with 
New Zealand concurrence, to assume responsibility for the British share 
of the condominium - but withdrew the proposal in the following year.34 
It was never put to. the French government, which in view of past history 
would have had serious reservations about it. In the event the New Hebrides 
formed in 1940 no more than a quite minor irritant in Australian-French 
relations, though Australian missionaries and planters there continued to 
complain about French expansion and British neglect. 
Before the French armistice of June 1940 Australia's official interest in 
New Caledonia itself was slight indeed. Australia supplied the coal and coke 
to fuel the nickel smelter at Noumea, and was thus a major participant in 
the colony's modest external trade, but with the exception of this major 
item Australian exports were tiny (total exports were £A27 1,000 in 
1938 -39) and there was no special effort to promote them. In 1936, when a 
Franco-Australian trade agreement embodying mutual tariff concessions 
was negotiated, it did not apply to New Caledonia. A further agreement 
concerning commercial relations between Australia and the French colonies 
was contemplated, but this was never negotiated.JS Even after the advent 
of wartime import licensing and the interruption of communications 
between France and its Pacific colonies local discontent was caused, as 
Bayardelle remarks, by the continuing obligation placed on New 
Caledonian importers to order such everyday commodities as flour from a 
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mother country 20,000 kilometres away. This distorted trade situation was 
not rectified until special wartime arrangements were made following the 
ralliement. (More permanent tariff revisions were negotiated only in 194 7 .) 
Nor did New Caledonia and other South Pacific islands figure significantly 
in Australian defence thinking or planning in the interwar period when 
attention was concentrated on the Singapore base.36 Even the idea of an 
aerial reconnaissance system in the nearby islands was still new, and it would 
not become operational until 1941. 
This 20th century detachment reflected a striking change from earlier 
times, when the Australian colonies had interested themselves in New 
Caledonia in several ways. The French annexation of the neighbouring 
island was distasteful to colonial opinion, and on 2 November 1853 the 
Sydney Morn£ng Herald lamented that 'by the laxity of the British 
government . . .  the opportunity of colonising that fine group [had] been 
lost'. This development was the more to be regretted in that it seemed 
likely that the withering curse of convictism, so recently shaken off by 
the Australian colonies, was about to be reimposed in Australia's immediate 
neighbourhood by a powerful foreign nation. 
In a commercial point of view, the colonisation of New Caledonia, even by the 
French , may appear at first sight advantageous to the interests of this city, but 
such a consideration is entirely secondary in importance, and sinks into in­
significance by the side of the moral, social, and political consequences attached 
to the occupation of one of the most splendid islands in the Pacific by a rival 
nation, whose aims and objects are so dissimilar, not to say opposite ,  to those 
which have for many years been earnestly contemplated by the most intelligent 
colonists of Australia and of New Zealand. 
The Australasian colonists, however surly about French activities in the 
Southwest Pacific, never seriously questioned the permanency of French 
sovereignty over New Caledonia. The commercial advantages hinted at 
in the Herald 's chauvinistic editorial were already being felt when it was 
written. From 1842 Australian sandalwood traders had included the Isle 
of Pines and shortly thereafter the Grande Terre itself in their operations. 
Merchant venturers like James Paddon and Robert Towns of Sydney and 
Edward Woodin of Hobart Town traded to the east and west coasts and 
had explored most of New Caledonia's long coastline by the end of 1849. 
Their flourishing trade with the coastal New Caledonians left its mark in 
such forms as the widespread use of Pidgin English ( b£che-la-mar) as a 
lingua franca and the suspicion with which the French colonizers regarded 
the people of Hienghene on the east coast, whose chief, Bouarate (or Basset) , 
had visited Sydney and carried on mutually profitable relations with the 
sandalwooders. 37 
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The sandalwood trade died out from the early 1850s, but by that time 
Paddon had established himself at a permanent base at what is still called 
Paddon Cove, on an island off Noumea, where he played an import�t part 
in the founding of the new colony and in its developing trade with New 
South Wales. 
In its first years as a French colony New Caledonia indeed, as Jean-Paul 
Faivre has said, 'gravitated into the Australian orbit . . . Australians introduced 
cattle, the methods and the vocabulary of cattle-raising . . .  The exploitation 
of mineral wealth was originally Anglo-Australian (though the ore had been 
discovered by Frenchmen) .'38 Men like Hanckar, Tully and Higginson were 
prominent in the mining industry in the 18 70s and many less known and less 
successful prospectors from Australia took part in the nickel, chrome and 
cobalt rushes of that decade. In 1884 Charles Lemire expressed surprise 
at finding as much English as French spoken at Noumea.39 
By 1940 direct contacts with Australia had declined to a modest level, 
and only the sudden collapse of France jolted Australia into a new 
consciousness of its French island neighbour. 
2 From the French armistace to the ralliement of New Caledonia 
ON THE MORROW of the French capitulation the first spontaneous reaction 
of many political and military leaders throughout that great empire, where 
important forces remained intact and uncommitted, was to continue the 
struggle. Typical was General Order No. 27 issued at Damascus on 21 June 
by the French High Commissioner in the Levant, General Mittelhauser. 
Its conclusion, written in Mittelhauser's own hand, read 'Whatever happens, 
the Army of the Levant, with the support of the Franco-British fleet and 
at the side of the British, will carry out its mission with fierce energy'. 
Less than a week later Mittelhauser had tamely made his submission to 
the armistice regime which, though not distinguished for firmness or 
determination, was firmly determined on one objective - to take the whole 
French empire out of the war. What had happened? The lamentable battle 
of Oran had been fought, but that was far from the whole story. General 
de Larminat, a leading Gaullist who was then serving as Mittelhauser's Chief 
of Staff, puts it as concisely and correctly as possible: 
Darlan had deliberately chosen to keep 'for himself' his intact and undefeated 
fleet in order to draw the greatest profit from it on the day when it became 
possible to tell who would win . . .  This defection struck a fatal blow at the 
spirit of the resistance .  At once Nogues at Rabat, Pages at Algiers, Peyrouton 
at Tunis submitted 'with death in their souls '. Of course the death of the soul 
is the least unpleasant to endure . 
As de Larminat said, it was all a matter of timing. Mittelhauser, according 
to the standards that soon came to be applied, was clearly committing an 
act of rebellion in issuing his General Order No. 27 . He could have been 
court-martialled, but instead he was soon issuing court-martial charges 
himself, for he had not remained 'rebellious' beyond 27 June. On the other 
hand the officers of the North African Army, who on 8 November 1942 
'rebelled' against the Marshal 's government, themselves despised the Free 
French because the latter had been 'rebels' before 8 November. It was all 
a defiance of French logic or, in de Larminat's phrase, a triumph of French 
casuistry .1 
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One by one the defiant voices faced out, as their owners made their peace 
with Vichy, and soon only an acting brigadier, self-exiled in London, 
remained as a focus of resistance. The present writer heard an ex-Vichy naval 
officer at the end of the war explaining to some Australian hearers that 
they seemed to have got their facts wrong. What had happened in 1942, 
he said, was that 'the Free French rallied to us ' .  But in 1940 the triumph 
of casuistry was still in the future. In those last days of June talk of 
resistance 'jusqu 'au bout '  was to be heard on many lips, including those of 
the Governor of New Caledonia, Georges Pelicier. On 24 June, in his opening 
speech to a special session of the New Caledonian General Council which 
unanimously adopted a resolution in favour of staying in the war, he 
declared that, in agreement with all the chief civil and military functionaries 
of the colony, he had decided to continue the struggle and would refuse 
to carry out any contrary instructions.2 He was in fact less resolute than 
his words suggested. But for the moment he had no instructions and New 
Caledonia was in a special situation. Neither the psychological nor the 
economic conditions existed for a breach with Australia. The Council's 
resolution was telegraphed to London, Canberra and Wellington, where it 
caused much premature rejoicing, and PClicier engaged in a friendly exchange 
of telegrams with the Prime Ministers of Australia and New Zealand. The 
attractive idea that the temporary disaster which had befallen metropolitan 
France need not prevent a satisfactory practical modus vivendi between 
Australia and New Zealand on the one hand and the French Pacific 
territories on the other was now dominant, but it was based on an illusion -
the illusion that such an arrangement would not necessarily put the 
Commonwealth countries on a collision course with the Vichy government. 
Australia at this time was in a quasi-colonial situation, locked firmly -
and voluntarily - into the British imperial system. Rather than a foreign 
policy of its own it had a recognized but sparingly exercised right to 
comment on the policies developed by the United Kingdom on behalf 
of the empire as a whole. In war even more than in peace Australian 
policies had to be harmonized with those of the United Kingdom. 
Britis� policy toward France following the military capitulation was 
confused and ambiguous. The debacle had been so sudden, so traumatic, 
that its full scope and consequences could scarcely be perceived all at once. 
For the whole British empire, and not least for Australia, it was as if a 
known and valued world had come abruptly to an end. Even those who 
were conscious of the tragi-comedy of French politics in the 1930s were not 
aware of its full significance. 
The landmarks on the road to disaster are depicted clearly enough in a 
paper prepared in the Department of External Affairs at the end of 1940 
22 THE CROSS OF LO RRAINE IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC 
as part of Prime Minister Menzies's brief for his forthcoming visit to London. 
Looking back on the first six months of the war, it is evident now that too 
little effort was made to appreciate either French popular sentiment or the 
difficulties of the Dalaclier government in holding civilian morale. . . It was 
overlooked that for years there had been a steady infiltration into French 
opinion of ideas leading away from association with Britain and tending rather 
to emphasise France 's position in Continental Europe .. . 
So far as contact between governments was concerned, Anglo-French relations 
showed more harmony after M. Reynaud came into office in March 1940 . . . 
It is known now, however, that M. Reynaud's highly personal administration 
covered dangerous disagreements among the French military and political 
leaders. It was enabled to stand only so long as external pressure did not bring 
these antagonisms to the surface . . .  on the fall of Reynaud we found that we 
had to deal with men of very different outlook . . .  
During the period immediately following the Franco-German Armistice 
British policy towards France was based on three main points� 
(a) That a formal and complete rupture with Vichy should be avoided ; 
(b) That on no consideration could the French fleet be permitted to pass into 
enemy hands ; 
(c) That every effort should be made to enable the French Colonial Empire to 
continue the prosecution of the war. 
Point (b) was to some extent disposed of by the operations at Oran and 
Dakar. Between (a) and (c) however, there is a latent contradiction in objectives 
which has not yet been satisfactorily resolved . . . 3 
The contradiction just mentioned is neatly illustrated by the words of 
a British Colonial Office official who wrote on 26 June: 
The relations between Sir Harry Luke as High Commissioner for the Western 
Pacific and the French High Commissioner who lives at Noumea in New 
Caledonia are very friendly, and there is every reason to think that in that area 
the French will carry on cheerfully with ourselves, whatever a French govern­
ment in France may do.4 
Australia's policy towards New Caledonia in the period immediately 
following the armistice involved a similar latent contradiction - soon to 
come to the surface - since it aimed, in the words of the paper just quoted, 
at 'co-operation with an administration owing nominal allegiance to Vichy, 
but prepared in practice to co-operate as far as possible with the British 
empire' . In reality there could be no such things. As a favourite French 
saying has it, a door must be either open or shut. Unless action was taken -
and in practice only Australia could take it - to embrace New Caledonia 
firmly in the Allied system, Vichy would draw it into a more or less 
malevolent neutrality presenting obvious openings for the insidious Japanese 
influence already at work in Indo-China. The contradiction was to be sorted 
out to the benefit of the Allies and eventually of France, though not without 
difficulties and misunderstandings. 
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As negotiations for a Franco-German armistice began, press reports 
suggested that Germany might insist on a privileged position for J apan 
in New Caledonia and the New Hebrides as part of the peace terms. These 
reports were unfounded, but they had the effect of focusing the Australian 
War Cabinet's attention on the French Pacific. On 18 J une War Cabinet 
considered measures to be taken against the eventuality of a J apanese 
occupation of New Caledonia and the New Hebrides. The main possible 
courses of action which presented themselves were: 
to seek to move the United States Administration to issue a declaration 
designed to deter J apanese action,  as it had done in the case of the Netherlands 
East Indies ;  
or 
to effect a preventive occupation of the French Islands by Allied forces. 5 
Over the next few days these possibilities were canvassed with the United 
Kingdom government. When War Cabinet met again on 25 J une it was 
aware that the United Kingdom had already tried and failed to secure an 
American deterrent declaration. Neither government favoured a preventive 
occupation of the islands, in view of the limited resources available to them 
at the time and of the possibility that such an occupation would serve the 
J apanese as a pretext for action against the Netherlands Indies. In the 
circumstances War Cabinet confirmed its cautious policy of seeking a modus 
vivendi with the existing French authorities in the islands. Prime Minister 
Menzies had already sent a friendly acknowledgment of Governor Pe!icier's 
telegram, adding 'We would be glad to know of any way in which we could 
render you practical cooperation at this time'. 
On 26 J une Pe!icier telegraphed again, thanking Menzies and asking for 
the release, which was quickly arranged, of four French ships loading 
supplies in Australian ports. 6 The prudent and limited holding operation 
on which the Australian government was embarking appeared to have some 
prospects of success. Pe!icier, for his part, was clearly satisfied that he had 
kept the Australian government effectively in play while postponing any 
awkward decisions about his own relations with Vichy. 
Had the Australian government been more closely informed about the 
personalities directly involved in the New Caledonian situation it would 
scarcely have faced the immediate future with equanimity. Governor 
PHicier himself was merely playing out time until the end of his term, which 
he hoped would be short. Meanwhile, he was on bad terms with his civilian 
deputy, Secretary-General Andre Bayardelle, and with the elected General 
Council. He lived in isolation, surrounded by a small clique of military 
confidants including notably the elderly and ineffective Military Commander, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Denis, and the mobilized Protestant pastor Lieutenant 
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Lehnebach, whom he had put in charge of censorship. Even as he spoke in 
buoyant terms (but 'haltingly ' according to Bayardelle) to the General 
Council on 24 June some of his hearers had good reason to suspect that 
his intentions were far from firm. He was not a man to take any dynamic 
action. Bayardelle, for his part, in close touch with the Japanese consul and 
with two General Councillors who were directors of Japanese-controlled 
mining companies, was planning a post-armistice trade arrangement by 
which Japan would be given access to New Caledonian nickel matte in 
return for supplying a market for the colony 's coffee and copra. After a 
private talk with one of these two Councillors he had already suggested to 
Peiicier that the latter should seek from the Minister of Colonies a virtually 
unlimited delegation of authority to govern the colony 'in the vital interests 
of the country '. The Governor, after consulting his own cronies, decided 
to take no such action. He believed, not unreasonably, that his wily deputy 
was offering him enough rope to hang himself. Bayardelle's exact motivation 
is not entirely clear, but it seems likely that he saw himself in the role of 
a Pacific satrap collaborating with the Japanese as Admiral Decoux was to 
do in Indo-China. 7 
The General Council itself, a predominantly conservative assembly of 
1 5  representatives of mining, commercial and farming interests, was also 
stronger in word than in deed. Governor Sau tot was later to write 
In June 1 9 40 the General Council seemed to have taken a clear position in 
favour of non-submission and continuing the struggle alongside our British 
. Allies. It was in that sense that it adopted a unanimous motion at its famous 
session of 24 J une . But that motion seemed more theoretical than practical, 
for when it cam e  to the point of a decision to rally to General de Gaulle, the 
fine unanimity of 24 June fell to pieces . . .  When on 1 9  September I achieved 
the ralliement of the colony with the support of the population I found the 
local assembly far from inclined itself to rally to the leader of the Free French. 
A number of its members remained in sympathy with the old Marshal . . . 8 
At this point a self-constituted man of destiny stepped on to the scene. 
His name was Michel Verges, a notary ·of Noumea and a man of marked 
eccentricity and unbridled ambition. ( 'Psychologically the man is not quite 
normal', Governor Tallec wrote in 1 945 .)9 He was known to have autonomist 
sympathies, and on the day of the General Council's historic meeting of 24 
J une he produced a 'manifesto to the population' signed by himself and two 
associates which called in effect for the establishment of a sovereign 
assembly to take over the Governor's powers for the duration of the war. 
In this turgid and ill -drafted document there was no mention of General 
de Gaulle and there can be no doubt that at this stage Verges saw himself 
as the territory 's war leader. 
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On 2 7 June Verges showed his 'manifesto' to Bayardelle who, far from 
discouraging him - for it suited his own purposes well enough - advised 
him to gather public support that would give more weight to it than if it 
were simply the product of two or three people with no special mandate. 
Next day Bayardelle informed PClicier of Verges's 'programme', affecting 
to believe that 'its terms could not be considered aggressive toward either 
the Administration or the General Council'. Pelicier thought otherwise, 
and was in fact furious, but he did nothing about it. Verges set about 
collecting signatures for his 'petition' in Noumea and up-country. 
The first half of July was marked, in Bayardelle's words, by 'un calme 
ple£n de menaces ' .  Tensions were building up. The Australian government, 
ignorant of these local complications, began to develop plans for economic 
cooperation with New Caledonia. The first step was to provide a safe market 
for the colony's main export, nickel matte. In mid-July the local director 
of the Societe Le Nickel (SLN), Paul Vois, visited Australia and made 
arrangements for an initial sale of 5 ,400 tons of matte per year - sufficient 
to ensure the continued operation of the Doniambo smelter. 
Nickel was, of course, a strategic metal, of increasing importance to the 
Japanese armament industry, but even more urgently needed by Germany. 
From the moment of the Franco-German armistice the British government 
expressed anxiety lest New Caledonian nickel might reach Germany via 
Japan and the Soviet Union. At this stage no one in the British empire, 
and least of all A�stralia, wished to provoke Japan by denying to it a 
reasonable supply of nickel for its own use, but there was the additional 
complication of the 'moral embargo' already being applied by the United 
States against the export to Japan of a wide range of strategic materials. 
The world's leading producer of nickel was the International Nickel 
Company of Canada (INCO), a company registered in Toronto but having 
a large participation of American capital. The United Kingdom and Canadian 
governments thought it politically inadvisable to facilitate any export of 
nickel to Japan that was not favoured by the State Department, and in 
1939 arrangements had been made to cut off shipments of North American 
nickel to Japan as well as the Soviet Union. In 1 940 Japan was no longer 
receiving nickel from any source except New Caledonia, from which it was 
importing low grade nickel ore at the rate of about 40 ,OOO tons a year. 
That was of no great importance, but the severance of communications 
between France and New Caledonia opened up new possibilities of procuring 
the matte (with a content of 7 7  per cent nickel) of which New Caledonia 
produced more than 7 ,OOO tons a year for refinement at Le Havre. That 
was a very different matter. The British authorities, concerned that the 
sale of the New Caledonian matte should be in harmony with their blockade 
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policy, developed an ingenious scheme whereby INCO would be asked to 
buy and refine the matte from Noumea and return a 'safe' quantity (perhaps 
2,000 tons per year) to the SLN for sale to Japan. Q apan itself possessed no 
suitable refineries.) INCO, in the event, declined to carry out this plan 
because of the 'moral embargo', and no New Caledonian matte ever reached 
Japan. (A shipment of 600 tons which had reached Suez at the time of 
the armistice was diverted by Vichy to Japan but for some reason did not 
get beyond Saigon.) The export of nickel ore continued into 1 94 1  when 
it was finally suspended. The Japanese, of whose reactions much had been 
apprehended, took it all fairly calmly. 
When the INCO plan proved impracticable the British government fell 
back on the idea that the SLN might contract to sell not more than 2,000 
tons a year directly to Japan, securing guarantees that it would not be re­
exported. As for the remaining production, they hoped that it would be 
possible for Australia to build up a strategic reserve, and the United 
Kingdom would itself consider the possibility of a pre-emptive purchase. 
Fortunately - it would be unjust to say fortuitously, but security against 
Japan was not the primary motive - pre-emptive action had already been 
taken by Australia.10 
When Paul Vois visited Australia in July, the Commonwealth government 
had itself no urgent need for New Caledonian nickel ; it could be used only 
as a contribution to a British empire strategic stockpile. Nor was Australia 
confronted by any apparent need to take independent action to limit 
supplies of nickel to Japan. It rather had in mind the objective of keeping 
New Caledonia in the Allied orbit by providing necessary support for its 
economy - and that meant buying nickel, New Caledonia's most important 
export and source of foreign exchange. It was a matter of enlightened self­
interest - New Caledonia had to depend on somebody's support, and better 
Australia's than that of some ill-disposed power - but goodwill was not 
lacking and in fact shows conspicuously throughout the Australian 
authorities' proceedings. The government's prudent and limited action did 
not reflect a conspicuously anti-Japanese or even specifically anti-Vichy 
stance. The agreement with Vois was made in the context of its continued 
efforts to collaborate with Governor Pelicier, the fatal ambiguity of whose 
attitude had not yet become clear. To that end it had decided on 1 1  July 
to send a representative of its own to Noumea to handle Australian aid and 
cooperation on the spot. 
Throughout July the New Caledonian population was increasingly 
conscious and resentful of the Governor's paralytic attitude, typified by 
his decision to hold no ceremony to mark the national holiday of 14  July. 
On that day an unofficial ceremony was in fact held, but when a procession 
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appeared before Government House and sang the Marseillaise Pelicier had 
absented himself, obviously to avoid having to make any public statement. 
Finally the General Councillors, 'tired of waiting for the Administration 
to take the initiative', exercised their right to demand a special session of 
the Council, which opened on 22 July. On the previous day the Governor, 
to his intense embarrassment, had received from Vichy a telegram instructing 
him to promulgate in New Caledonia Petain 's new 'constitutional laws' 
of 1 0  July. This was the death knell of republican government, and Pelicier 
did not dare to sound it in public, before the General Council . Instead he 
put the instruction aside, and at the opening of the Council session repeated 
in misleadingly firm terms the line which he had taken on 2 4 June: 
From a political standpoint the situation is unchanged. It is as you know it -
continuation of the alliance with Great Britain and with the great Dominions 
which are our neighbours. This cooperation has been fruitful . I take pleasure 
in paying tribute to the Prime Ministers of Australia and New Zealand and to 
the British High Commissioner in the Western Pacific , Sir Harry Luke , for the 
efficient help which they have constantly given us in difficult circumstances. 
I should like them and Her Brittanie Majesty 's Consul to accept the expression 
of our gratitutde . 
Mr J ohnson [ the British Consul] has authorized me to state that he is in 
complete agreement with me concerning our relations with our neighbours. 
Moreover he has informed me that an Australian official is to come here soon 
to discuss our commercial exchanges with the Commonwealth . 
As for me , my position is clear. France has formally entrusted me with 
responsibility for the destiny of New Caledonia. In that I shall not fail. I will 
defend the interests of New Caledonia to the end. I consider myself responsible 
for the Colony , and I assure you that I shall do nothing that might run counter 
to the interests which it is my duty to protect. 1 1  
What Pelicier did not say to the Council was that, having been informed 
of the Australian government's proposal to dispatch a representative to 
Noumea to discuss aid and cooperation, he had requested that the 
representative's arrival be delayed until after the end of the Council's regular 
session on 1 5  August. He feared that the Council would insist on a personal 
appearance before it of the Australian representative, and this he was un­
willing to contemplate. Curiously, this request, transmitted through Luke, 
does not seem to have caused any serious misgivings in Suva or Canberra. 12 
For the moment the General Council was prepared to give Peiicier the 
benefit of the doubt. 
The Governor quickly had cause to regret his brave words, for later on 
the same day he received a circular telegram from the Vichy Minister of 
Colonies, M. Lemery, warning him against just such action as he had been 
proclaiming: 
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Information reaching me from certain colonies shows that some governors, 
through intolerable slackness, have not carried out or have not personally 
supervised the strict application of government 's instructions concerning breach 
of Franco-British diplomatic relations. Such slackness will be punished most 
severely. Acknowledge by telegram . 
In reply he protested that the maintenance of commercial relations with 
Australia was the only possible means of averting 'famine and grave 
disorders leading to foreign interference and loss of colony to France'. He 
added, doubtless at Bayardelle's instance, that the colony's isolated situation 
might lead him to 'develop commercial relations with other adjacent 
countries'. But from that moment, according to Bayardelle, he became 
increasingly concerned to avoid open defiance of Vichy while trying to meet 
the wishes of the population - 'an impossible acrobatic feat', as Bayardelle 
says. 1 3  
The General Council devoted the rest of its extraordinary session to an 
examination of Verges's programme, which had now been submitted to it 
as a petition with 1 , 1 00 signatures. On 26  July it unanimously adopted a 
resolution calling for the creation of a representative assembly whose 
composition and powers would be settled by a referendum. This decision, 
like that of 24 June, was beyond the Council's competence, and logically, 
being now in no doubt of Vichy's attitude, Pelicier ought to have annulled 
it. Instead he reported it to Lemery, who replied predictably forbidding 
any such measures. 
An ordinary session of the General Council followed immediately on the 
extraordinary session and provided the occasion for the sharpest confron­
tation so far between the Governor and the population. Pelicier attempted 
to limit the discussion to economic affairs, but himself made this impossible 
by publishing in the Journal Officiel of 29  July an order promulgating the 
Vichy constitutional laws. He had made the worst of both worlds, since 
several Councillors were well aware that he had had this measure on his 
desk for a week but had refrained from consulting the Council or making 
any public statement of his position. On 2 August the General Council 
passed unanimously and without debate a resolution by which it expressed 
disapproval of the Governor and noted 'the contradiction between his state­
ments and his actions'. It concluded: 'The General Council, in order to 
confirm its position of 24 June and to avoid any confusion, decided to get 
in direct touch with General de Gaulle'. 
In  this sudden acknowledgement of General de Gaulle's position as 
the focus of French resistance the Council was merely reflecting a rapidly 
evolving New Caledonian opinion which was soon to take matters out of 
its hands. As it was meeting an angry crowd was demonstrating against 
the promulgation of the Vichy constitutional laws. 
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This day of turbulence marked a turning point. A vague plan for autonomy 
and a representative assembly had been all very well in the post-armistice 
confusion at the end of ] une, but it was already clearly outmoded.  The 
Verges petition had gathered a large number of signatures - many of them, 
doubtless, given lightly enough - but to those who looked carefully at it, 
especially in the quiet bush districts, it seemed more and more to be 
irrelevant. For them it was no longer a question of metropolitan exigencies 
and New Caledonian aspirations, but rather of a choice between the pseudo­
government of Vichy and the genuine patriotism which de Gaulle, and de 
Gaulle alone, seemed to represent. A contemporary account by one of 
them, Georges Baudoux of Houanou, gives the tone: 
Having read and re-read [ the manifesto] and weighed every sentence , we 
perceived that it was not consistent with our Gaullist ideas. Indeed, General de 
Gaulle , whom we already regarded as our leader, was not mentioned at all. .. 
We learned that Noumea was in turmoil over the famous manifesto . We 
followed the local news on the radio, but of the outcome we were looking for -
official ralliement to General de G aulle - no sign appeared. Finally we came to 
speak with indifference of these manifestations. . . We understood that all the 
fuss meant nothing, that it was the work of a few agitators, partisans of the 
plan for disorder dreamed up by the man Verges. 14 
The Council itself - or rather a majority of it - was less resolute than it 
had sounded on 2 August. The dispatch of its telegram to de Gaulle was 
delayed from day to day as the Councillors continued to argue over its 
exact terms. On 9 August ] ohnston reported to Luke that he felt sure it 
would not be sent. Nor was it. The Councillors could not bring themselves 
to make a final break with Vichy. 
There was, however, one man who was not prepared to hesitate. He 
was Raymond Pognon, an elderly but vigorous and widely respected former 
president of the Ge�eral Council. So far he had been quietly observing 
events, but on 3 August he wrote direct to General de Gaulle in London 
suggesting that the time had come to start afresh by forming a de Gaulle 
committee to organize the colony's rall£ement to Free France. This letter 
was to play its part in forming de Gaulle's attitude, and it is memorable as 
the first direct move to bring about the rall£ement. Pognon was an unob­
trusive man, but he was an extraordinarily sharp judge of people and events 
and was to be the brain of the de Gaulle committee hastily formed in 
September. He spoke excellent English, was unfailingly helpful to Australian 
and Allied representatives, and was sometimes accused of being a paid 
Australian agent. He was nothing of the sort but he played a part which 
deserves to be remembered. 
The specifically Gaullist body of opinion mentioned by Georges Baudoux 
was still leaderless and unorganized, but it was rapidly growing stronger. 
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PCiicier's censorship kept news of de Gaulle from the local press and radio, 
but short wave radio news from abroad redressed the balance. Though 
already an object of suspicion to Vichy, he wrote on 5 August a conciliatory 
letter to the President of the General Council proposing the creation of a 
Consultative Assembly, on a corporative basis, to deliberate on all important 
matters falling outside the Council's own competence. On the same day 
Lemery sent him a telegram contammg a minatory message to be 
communicated to the population of the colony. Any attempt by a distant 
colony to continue the war, it warned, would be treason. After some 
hesitation Pelicier had Lemery's message read to the General Council, which 
received it without comment. It adjourned on 7 August after deciding to 
put to further strudy the Verges plan which it had approved on 26  July. 
Nothing further was heard of this plan - the author of which was already 
preparing to place himself at the head of the Gaullist movement in the 
colony. The Governor retreated into an uneasy silence. On 1 8  August a 
stick of dynamite exploded harmlessly but ominously in the garden of 
Government House. Thenceforth Pelicier was receptive to the suggestion 
that his life was in danger and that his departure from the colony was the 
only possible means of avoiding worse incidents. Before abdicating his 
increasingly untenable position, he passed the buck for the last time by 
asking Vichy to send a warship to Noumea. It may be that Vichy had already 
decided on this measure to shore up its visibly shaky regime in New 
Caledonia, for the sloop Dumont d 'Urville 1 s  arrived remarkably promptly 
from Papeete, on 23  August, and her commander began at once to play an 
active part and to correspond with Vichy by radio. The local power situation 
was now radically altered and the possibility of a peaceful transition to a 
Free French regime was drastically reduced. The Dumont d 'Urville was a 
small but useful ship with a well-trained and disciplined crew, and 
Commander Toussaint de Quievrecourt, unlike Pelicier and Denis, was a 
resolute man prepared to go to great lengths to uphold the Vichy power. 
Meanwhile the J apanese had been intensifying their efforts to obtain 
from New Caledonia supplies of nickel to replace those now unobtainable 
from Canada. On 2 August the Australian High Commissioner in London 
reported that the J apanese government was understood to have instructed 
its consul at Noumea to try to secure the whole New Caledonian output 
of the metal.16 It was presumably equally active at Vichy, since on 25 
August the Minister of Colonies instructed the Governor that all production 
of nickel matte and metal ores should be reserved for Japan .  Pelicier passed 
this instruction to the acting head of the Mines Department, George Dubois, 
who in tum consulted Albert Rapadzi, now director of the SLN in New 
Caledonia.17 These two men were New Caledonians, close friends, comrades 
F RENCH ARMISTICE TO THE RA LLIEMENT O F  NEW CALEDONIA 3 1  
of the first World War where they had served together at Verdun - and 
convinced Gaullists. They had, as Rapadzi recalled later, no intention of 
collaborating in the execution of Lemery's instruction - and in any event 
the latter had overlooked the point that the Doniambo smelter, if deprived 
of Australian coal, had no alternative source of supply. Pelicier did not press 
the matter. But as news of the Vichy instruction leaked out it helped to 
harden local opinion. It had no other effect, though as late as 17 September, 
on the eve of the ralliement, Quievrecourt was reporting to Vichy that 
arrangements were 'under way with Japan to export nickel and chrome 
under favourable conditions'. (This can hardly be explained unless as an echo 
of his conversations with Bayardelle . )  
On 25  August Quievrecourt issued an Order of the Day asserting that the 
'unhealthy agitation' to be observed at Noumea was the work of a very 
small group of people subsidized by foreign powers and that by a happy 
chance he had acquired proof of its real aim - annexation of New Caledonia 
by Australia. New Caledonia, he continued, had been given to France by the 
Navy, whose duty it was to preserve it for her. He warned the crew against 
attempts to suborn them and appealed to their good sense in helping him 
to fulfil this task. t a  This document was soon circulating ashore, where 
generally it had no effect beyond strengthening popular hostility to 
Quievrecourt and the Vichy Administration. Meanwhile Quievrecourt was 
reporting to Darlan that the Dumont d 'Urville 's presence had not brought 
about any change favourable to Vichy - rather the contrary. The Governor's 
attitude, he went on, was weak and equivocal. He had failed to annul 
pro-de Gaulle decisions of the General Council, although he had power 
to do so. He was visibly letting things slide .19 
The Ministry of Colonies was now finally disenchanted with the Governor, 
and on 28 August a Vichy decree appointed Lieutenant-Colonel Denis 
Acting Governor in his place . On the same day the General Council, by now 
subject to strong pre�sure from the local 'movement' which was about to 
eclipse it, had met, together with Verges and his two co-signatories of the 
June manifesto, and adopted a lengthy resolution demanding the Governor's 
departure, failing which it threatened to resign. Later in the day Pelicier 
told Bayardelle, Quievrecourt and Denis that he was drafting a telegram 
asking to be recalled. But apparently Vichy had already acted to remove 
him. On 4 September Pelicier left N oumea for San Francisco and oblivion 
by the Pan American Airways flying-boat. 
On 5 September Quievrecourt reported to Vichy that the situation 
in New Caledonia was 'still difficult'. The Acting Governor's policy, continued 
Quievrecourt, was cautious but slack and inadequate . He suggested that 'an 
eminent Catholic personality, if possible an admiral', should be sent out by 
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air to take over the government.20 It was an intelligent suggestion, thoroughly 
in keeping with the spirit of the time. At Vichy there was no lack of shore­
bound admirals, and it is quite conceivable that, had Quievrecourt's proposal 
been accepted, one of them might have played in the South Pacific a role 
similar to that of Admiral Robert who later made things so difficult for the 
Americans in the Caribbean. He would certainly have been able to divide 
and confuse local opinion. Vichy, however, took no action, presumably 
because New Caledonia was not high enough on its scale of priorities at 
this stage. The record of a brief and low keyed discussion of New Caledonia 
in the Franco-German Armistice Commission a few days later seems to 
betray a sense of resignation about the possibility of New Caledonian 
adherence to the Allied cause. The Germans showed no special interest 
in the colony and Vichy was apparently leaving it to its men in the field 
to do what they could with their own resources. 
To such an extent had local action become concentrated on the immediate 
aim of getting rid of Governor Pelicier that his departure was followed by 
a momentary detente at Noumea. The last thing the General Council wanted 
was any unpleasantness, and it relapsed into inactivity. The population at 
large was ready to wait and see how Lieutenant-Colonel Denis handled his 
new and astonishing appointment. The apparent calm was misleading. 
N oumea, under the vigilant surveillance of Commander de Quievrecourt 
with his direct line to Vichy, was in the eye of a storm that was bound to 
break soon for, throughout the island, pressure was continuing to build 
up in favour of rall£ement to de Gaulle. 
On 7 September Noumea's two newspapers published an appeal for 
the creation of a de Gaulle committee signed by Pognon, who had now 
received an encouraging telegram from the General. (After this message 
had been held up for several days by the censor - Lieutenant Lehnebach 
was still at his post - news of its arrival had leaked out and Denis, irresolute 
as ever, had handed it over to Pognon on 6 September. ) At last, direct 
contact had been established with de Gaulle, and the groundswell of 
Gaullist sentiment began to look more like a tidal wave that would sweep 
the Vichy partisans away. As Bayardelle put it: 'By mid-September the 
rall£ement of the Colony had become inevitable. Its execution was now 
conditional only on the resistance that could be made by the Governor with 
the forces at his disposal. '21 
There was the rub. The Gaullists were an overwhelming though still 
amorphous majority, but Governor Denis's forces were by no means 
inconsiderable. There was a body of pro-Vichy regular officers with a 
certain hold over the garrison; there was the gendarmerie; above all there 
was the Dumont d 'Urvz'lle and her intransigent commander, Vichy's watchdog. 
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Noumea was on a narrow peninsula with land access by one road only, and 
a determined defender could make an attempted coup de force a very 
unpleasant business. If things reached a point where French blopd was 
being spilled - and the possibility was not to be excluded; a few days 
later a Vichy sub-lieutenant fired on de Gaulle's parlementaires at Dakar -
no one could foretell the consequences. The balance of force, however, 
was about to be decisively redressed. 
Events in the Anglo-French Condominium of the New Hebrides had 
increasingly highlighted the anomalous situation prevailing in New 
Caledonia. At the moment of the French armistice, as we have seen, 
contemplation of the friendly relations between the two High Commissioners 
at the head of the Condominiums's bizarre administration, Sir Harry Luke 
and M. Pelicier, had given much pleasure in Whitehall, but in international 
relations such formal friendships are fragile, and this one was not to stand 
the test of time. Of more practical significance was the fact that the British 
and French Resident Commissioners at Vila, R.D. Blandy and Henri Sautot, 
were both men of goodwill and on excellent terms with each other. Sautot 
was to become the spearhead of Gaullism in the Pacific and to take over 
the administration of New Caledonia in an operation distinguished by his 
own courage and Blandy's clearheaded cooperation. But first Sautot set 
about achieving the ralliement to de Gaulle of the French element in the 
New Hebrides. 22 
At first sight no one was less like a spearhead than Henri Sautot, and no 
one could have had less apparent affinity with the austere and dedicated 
de Gaulle. He was small, fat and jovial, with an impressive ginger moustache 
which had earned him the nickname 'Pommes-paille '. He was not a romantic 
or seemingly heroic figure. But even today it is not easy to think without 
emotion of his steadfastness in 1 940 . No one shared more instinctively and 
surely de Gaulle's 'certaine idee de la France '.  A Lorrainer, born in 1885 ,  
he had been French Resident Commissioner in the New Hebrides since 1 9 33 .  
Although he spoke no English he had a sense of the entente cord£ale unusual 
in the Pacific islands and was liked and trusted by nearly everyone in the 
tiny but turbulent bi-national community of Vila. He was not given to 
deep thought and did not need it. He as an old fashioned, utterly sincere 
and devoted French patriot. When he heard de Gaulle's appeal he answered 
it unhesitatingly. 
On 24 June, after consulting several leading members of the French 
community at Vila, Sautot called a meeting of all 400 French residents 
at which he proposed adherence to the movement launched by de Gaulle 
in his famous broadcast of 1 8  June. He received unanimous support, but 
it was agreed that before telegraphing to de Gaulle in London he would 
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await the decision of the French High Commissioner at Noumea who, his 
compatriots at Vila hoped, was about to announce the ralliement of New 
Caledonia to de Gaulle. ·  (In fact, no one in authority in New Caledonia had 
so far given a thought to de Gaulle's Free French movement as such.) On 
learning of Sau tot's action, Pelicier instructed him to proceed to Noumea for 
consultation by the Messageries Maritimes' inter-island steamer Polynesien, 
then at Vila. Sautot flatly declined either to go to Noumea or to allow the 
Polynesien to leave New Hebridean waters. He then organized a second 
meeting, this time gathering all the French residents of the New Hebrides, 
which was held on 20 July . Of the more than 600 people present only three 
- the French j udge of the Joint Court, M. Doley, the clerk of the French 
Court and a French lawyer, M. Gomichon des Granges - declined to support 
the de Gaulle movement. (These three were later transported via Australia 
to Indo-China, whence des Granges later returned disillusioned.) On 22 
July Sau tot telegraphed to de Gaulle to inform him of the French 
population's 'unshakable commitment to fight with him until final victory'. 
A few days later de Gaulle replied warmly welcoming the adherence of the 
French population of the New Hebrides and confirming Sautot as Resident 
Commissioner. 
In informing his superior officer, High Commissioner PHicier, of the 
French Administration's adherence to de Gaulle, Sautot concluded: 'In 
the event that you do not consider it necessary to follow our example, 
I regret that I shall no longer regard myself as your subordinate'. On 26 
July Pelicier replied that he had reported Sautot's action to Vichy and was 
now instructed to inform him of his dismissal from the French Colonial 
Service. Three days later he demanded the names of all French officials in 
the New Hebrides rallying to 'a seditious person'. 
Blandy had, in all good faith, given Sautot to understand that officials 
who cooperated with the British would be protected from hostile action by 
Vichy and would suffer no loss of salary or pension. Such was the sense 
of earlier Colonial Office instructions. Blandy telegraphed to London for 
confirmation of these assurances and Sautot held a referendum of the 42 
French officials in the New Hebrides, of whom 2 1  proved to be for de 
Gaulle, seven against and 1 4  'ambiguous'. The seven opponents included 
several senior officials and it appeared, as Blandy noted, that Doley and 
des Granges already had a following. Second thoughts were having an 
insidious effect. It was therefore with 'the greatest consternation' that 
Blandy received the Colonial Secretary's reply and Luke's instruction to 
transmit it to Sautot, for it was in effect a repudiation of earlier British 
assurances (on the grounds that 'the Administration had not come in as 
a whole') and thus, in Blandy's words, 'a death sentence to the de Gaulle 
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movement in the New Hebrides (and probably in New Caledonia also) and 
indeed to any possibility of future good relationship between British and 
French'. He protested vigorously to London, and on 1 5  August was 
authorized· to assure Sau tot of the British government's support for co­
operating officials. In the meantime Sautot had been confirmed by de Gaulle 
as Resident Commissioner and asked to do what he could toward the 
rall£ement  of New Caledonia. For the moment he could not do much, since 
he had no secure means of communication with the neighbouring colony 
and the Gaullist movement there had not taken shape. But the first step 
to the rall£ement of the French Pacific had now been taken. In cooperation 
with the Australian authorities the Condominium administration now under­
took modest defence measures, including notably the development of a 
flying-boat base at Vila which was later to be extremely useful . 
Until the early days of September, the only Australian and British 
officials to gain any real insight into the complicated New Caledonian 
situation were Ballard, who had arrived at Noumea on 23  August, and 
Blandy at Vila. The Australian and British governments were, until the 
eleventh hour, in disagreement as to the policy to adopt, and both were 
basing their attitudes on misunderstandings. Much hard work and hard 
talking by Ballard and Blandy, reinforced finally by Luke, was needed 
before the Australians were induced to yield to British urgings that they 
provide support for a coup de force . The British obstinately maintained 
their over-optimistic assessment that such a coup could be accomplished 
with the same ease as was counted on in French West Africa. 
The evolution of Australian (and British) policy is amply documented.23 
Here it is necessary only to mesh the developing Anglo-Australian-Free 
French policy with the action taken at Vila and Noumea by the men charged 
with its execution. 
On 9 August Luke, conscious of growing unrest at Noumea, suggested 
to the British Colonial Office that it would be well for de Gaulle to take 
some positive action, such as the dispatch of a French warship with officials 
to take over the administration. 'Otherwise the influence of the Petain 
Government may prove too strong.' The Australian government vigorously 
opposed this suggestion - not because there were no means for carrying it 
out, but because it believed that the local disturbances were probably 
'the work of a few extremists', and that the Governor desired 'to move 
in same direction as population'. It preferred to wait until Ballard arrived 
at Noumea and submitted a considered report.24 
The United Kingdom government made no further move until the last 
days of August, and then at the instance of General de Gaulle himself, 
who had meanwhile received Pognon's letter, had become aware of the 
36 THE CROSS OF LORRAINE IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC 
disturbing presence at Noumea of the Dumont d 'Urville and had decided 
that it was time to intervene. De Gaulle suggested specifically that Sautot 
might be conveyed from Vila to Noumea in a British warship to deal with 
the situation. The British War Cabinet, which considered de Gaulle's request 
on 29 and 30 August, was disposed to help in the way he had suggested. 
Since, however, New Caledonia was within the boundaries of the Australian 
naval station, it was necessary to invoke the cooperation of the Australian 
government and ask it to make available one of HMA ships for the operation. 
British ministers rightly foresaw that the Australian government was likely 
to be unwilling to make an overt breach with the Vichy government,. but 
they were anxious to press forward.2 s 
The joint operation against Dakar was in the final planning stage and there 
were high hopes in London of important secessions from the Vichy empire. 
These hopes were to prove unjustified, but the United Kingdom was right 
in assessing that direct action in New Caledonia would not in itself seriously 
increase the risk of conflict with Vichy. Moreover it was well informed 
concerning the Dumont d 'Urville 's communications with Vichy and feared 
that drastic measures might shortly be taken to remove New Caledonia from 
the reach of British and Allied influence. On 30 August it suggested to the 
Australian government that HMAS Adelaide, understood to be the only 
ship in the area sufficiently powerful to overawe Dumont d 'Urville, should 
go to Vila to embark Sautot and proceed thence to Noumea with 
instructions to bring about as quickly as possible the return of Dumont 
d 'Urv£lle to Papeete .26 
Meanwhile the Australian government was instructing its representative at 
Noumea in a very different sense. The last thing the Commonwealth 
government desired, Ballard was told on 29 August, was a local revolution or 
the overthrow of the French Administration by extremists. It believed the 
best solution to be an administration owing nominal allegiance to Vichy 
but sympathetically inclined to the wishes of the local populace in regard 
to continuing the war effort. Ballard was instructed to try to induce the 
leaders of the local 'movement' to accept this view.2 1 
This highly conservative instruction formed the basis for Ballard's 
discussion of the situation with Luke, who at noon on 30 August arrived 
at Noumea in the Western Pacific High Commission yacht Viti in response 
to an invitation which he had elicited from a somewhat reluctant Pelicier. 
The overt purpose of his visit was to talk with his fellow High Commissioner 
about measures for the maintenance of the New Hebridean economy, but 
of course he wished also to make the best assessment possible of the 
increasingly bewildering local situation in New Caledonia. On his arrival 
he found that Pelicier had that morning handed over his powers to Denis 
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HMAS Adelaide (RAN photograph) . 
Vichy French sloop Dumont d 'Urville (reproduced by permission of J ane 's A nnals ) .  
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who, as Luke rightly assessed, would give unquestioned obedience to the 
Vichy government . The outgoing and incoming governors jointly received 
the High Commissioner with the outward forms of civility. A strange dinner 
party took place at Government House in what Bayardelle describes as an 
'icy' atmosphere. (Ballard later recalled the occasion as one of scarcely­
restrained hysteria.) On the following morning a delegation of General 
Councillors called on Luke, with the approval of Denis and PCiicier, and 
outlined vague plans to ask Vichy to authorize new local elections. Luke 
sailed away to Vila still unaware of his government's new forward policy 
and himself unconvinced that any urgent British action was necessary. 
The British government's request for 1™AS Adelaide to be made 
available was received coldly in the Australian Department of External 
Affairs, which on 2 December was proposing to return a negative reply. 
At this point , say the editors of the Australian documents, 'there appears 
to have been some disagreement about Australian policy' .2s That is perhaps 
an understatement. In any event, options were kept open. On the same 
day the captain of HMAS Adelaide was instructed to proceed to Vila, 
arriving there on Saturday 7 September. The 'present intention', Showers 
was told, was that he should embark Sautot and convey him to Noumea, 
but the situation might alter before his arrival, and he was to get in touch 
with Blandy 'for latest information and instructions' .29 
When Luke reached Vila on 3 September there awaited him a request for 
advice from the Australian Prime Minister, in terms which clearly invited 
a negative reply.3o He at once suggested to Canberra that action be deferred 
if possible until he had time to report more fully on the New Caledonia 
situation. A copy of this warning telegram in the External Affairs file bears 
the significant minute by the Minister, John McEwen: 'See that P.M. Knows 
of this before he re-drafts cable I handed him' .3 t On the following day Luke 
added that he deprecated the conveying of Sautot to Noumea unless he 
went there on appointment by de Gaulle as Governor. 
I understand that de Gaulle has this appointment in mind when New Caledonia 
has openly and formally declared for him but it is in my opinion important that 
Sautot should not be taken to Noumea in a British man-of-war without 
credentials from de Gaulle .  
On the same day he repeated to Canberra his reports to the Colonial Office 
on his visit to Noumea. They were not calculated to precipitate any urgent 
action.32 
There was some further slight hesitation in Australia. Late on 4 September 
it was known in the Department of External Affairs that Menzies, who 
was in Melbourne, was still not satisfied with the draft message submitted 
to him and would take no decision until he knew more of Luke's 
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appreciation.33 On 5 September, however, after consulting the Minister for 
the Navy, A.G. Cameron (his coalition partner and McEwen's Party leader) ,  
he called off the operation, though with the proviso that the original 
instructions to Showers might 'possibly' be reinstated in the event of 
Sautot's appointment by de Gaulle as Governor of New Caledonia.34 
Meanwhile the United Kingdom High Commissioner at Canberra, Sir 
Geoffrey Whiskard, was asking the Dominions Office whether he was to 
press the Australians to adopt the forward policy advocated by the United 
Kingdom on 30 August or whether London acquiesced in Luke's apparent 
view that there was no hurry. He remarked that it was difficult to get or 
keep in touch with Ministers engaged in an election campaign (a general 
election was to be held on 2 1  September) and that the attitude of the 
Department of External Affairs was dominated by fear of affording Japan 
an excuse for intervention.3s In fact, he was not called on to intervene. 
The British government reacted sharply, by direct telegram to the 
Australian government. It had 'reliable' information (in fact, as it revealed 
a little later, intercepted Vichy telegrams) indicating that the idea of a 
nominally pro-Vichy but actually pro-British regime was quite impracticable ; 
de Gaulle was ready to notify Sautot's appointment to him; there was no 
advantage in deferring a decision.36 
The Department of External Affairs remained obstinate. On 8 September 
its Secretary, W.R. Hodgson, found the British insistance 'completely 
inexplicable' . 'At the moment', he telegraphed to Stirling, the External 
Affairs liaison officer in London, 'position in New Caledonia is satisfactory 
from our point of view, and to stage a de Gaulle revolution on lines indicated 
is just playing into hands of J apanese without benefiting Allied cause' .37 
Once again the Department's view - and, one must presume, that of its 
ministerial head, J ohn McEwen - did not prevail. Within the next 24 hours 
Winston Churchill's personal assistant, Major Desmond Morton, had strongly 
reaffirmed the British view to Stirling;3s Luke, now back at Suva, signified 
support for the proposal,39 under the influence of new (and, as it proved, 
unduly optimistic) reports of local Gaullist plans, and the Commonwealth's 
own repr.esentative on the spot , Ballard, had sent a report very much in tune 
with British thinking. He feared that the hope of obtaining a complaisant 
Vichy governor could not be  realized .40 That was enough to tip the scale. 
On 9 September the Australian government concurred in the plan to  
instal Sautot at Noumea. It had arranged for the governor-designate himself 
to travel to Noumea in SS Norden, a Norwegian tanker then at Vila, and 
made Adelaide available to escort him.4 1 It is evident that this decision was 
taken personally by Menzies, in the light of the three reports just mentioned. 
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Now at last Free French headquarters and the British and Australian 
governments had agreed on a policy . The task of carrying it out was 
passed to a handful of men in the field . 
3 The ralliement and its aftermath 
CAPTAIN SHOWERS, SAILING Adelaz'de to Vila in the first week of 
September, was a real-life Horatio Hornblower precipitated into a hazardous 
detached mission by a policy decision taken in ignorance of the actual 
situation where he would be operating. 
HMAS Adelaz'de was the oldest cruiser in the Australian Navy, built to 
a 1 908 design and launched in 1 922 .  She was the first of her class to be 
built as an oil burner, her archaic design having been modified somewhere 
along the line , with rather unsatisfactory results. Her main armament 
comprised six-inch guns which, as one of her wartime officers said later, 
were 'one stage removed from muzzle-loaders'. While more modern 
Australian cruisers were being employed in the Mediterranean and Atlantic 
she alone had been kept in home waters on convoy escort and trade 
protection duties. She was nothing to wonder at, but she was the only 
available warship capable of meeting the Dumont d 'Urvz'lle on at least 
equal terms.  Showers himself was of the first generation of graduates of the 
Royal Australian Naval College to reach the rank of Captain and perhaps 
of the last generation of senior officers trained and brought up to consider 
themselves as Australian and at the same time British . His admirably agile 
tactical sense was to be seen in his day to day handling of the difficult 
situation awaiting him at Noumea and particularly in his direct confontation 
with Commander de Quievrecourt of the Dumont d 'Urvz'lle, when he was 
able to prevail without any armed collision. Quievrecourt, unwilling to have 
any dealing with French 'rebels', was obliged to recognize Showers as an 
z'nterlocuteur valable, the qualified representative of British power, and 
Showers was equal to the occasion. 
Arriving at Vila on 7 September , Showers found Blandy gloomily 
contemplating the prospects of the adventure into which he would probably 
have to launch his French friend and colleague, Henri Sautot . 1 
Blandy, coming to his Vila post from Noumea on 3 September, had 
been startled to learn from Canberra of the British government's wish 
to proceed at once with the operation to overturn the Vichy regime in 
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New Caledonia. He had received at the same time the text of the first version­
of Showers's instructions which, as he noted, ' showed a most faulty 
appreciation of the irue position', since so far as could be seen the Vichy 
authorities were by no means in so weak a position as to be brushed aside 
by the peaceful confrontation envisaged in London and Canberra. Soon a 
ketch flying a Cross of Lorraine flag brought to Vila representatives of 'the 
de Gaulle committee'  - which in fact existed only in name - with accounts 
of absurd plans to 'capture ' the Dumont d 'Urville. Blandy was sceptical, 
fearing that nothing had been carefully organized locally , but the call for 
support for the Gaullist movement had its effect on Luke and helped to 
strengthen London's determination. 
At this stage Sautot himself knew nothing, since despite his many 
excellent qualities he was notoriously unable to keep a secret and Blandy 
determined to consult him only at the last moment. That moment came 
quickly enough. During the weekend of 7-8 September it became 
increasingly clear from the telegrams flowing in to the British Residency 
at Vila that neither the British government nor High Commissioner Luke 
were to be deterred by any practical balancing of tactical probabilities .  
The operation was to go ahead, subject only to the Australian government's 
concurrence. Sautot was accordingly informed and, as Blandy had expected, 
his courage and devotion proved as reliable as his indiscretion. He readily 
agreed to play the role allotted to him by de Gaulle, but he was as readily 
brought to agree that careful preparation on the spot was essential. Blandy 
telegraphed to London in this sense . 
On Monday 9 September the Australian government informed Blandy 
that it agreed to the proposed operatio n, and had arranged for the 
Norwegian tanker Norden to go to Vila to fuel Adelaide and to convey 
Sautot to Noumea. Blandy at once telegraphed again to the Colonial Office 
and to Luke in Suva emphasizing the need to secure in advance the active 
cooperation of the New Caledonian Gaullists. Neither the London authorities 
nor the High Commissioner thought it necessary to take any action on his 
recommendation. Luke sent Blandy another message suggesting that the 
moral effect of Adelaide 's presence and the favourable feeling of the 
population were sufficient guarantees of success. 
By now, while the problem of securing a safe bridgehead for Sau tot 
at Noumea remained untouched, and Showers for his part was determined 
not to land Sautot there unless the latter's Gaullist supporters were in a 
position to send out a boat to pick him up, a new and compelling reason 
for quick action had emerged . On 9 September the officials at Vila learned 
that the Vichy sloop A miral Charner, a sister ship of Dumont d 'Urv£l�e, was 
believed to be on her way from Saigon to Noumea and would arrive in a 
Captain H.A. Showers, RAN. B.C. Ballard, 
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week or so . In consultation with Blandy ,  Showers therefore drew up a 
detailed operational plan which was approved by Sautot subject to his 
receiving credentials from General de Gaulle. It was telegraphed in naval 
cypher to the British consul at Noumea for the de Gaulle committee there -
whose potential for effective action was of course quite uncertain . The 
main features of Showers's plan were that the de Gaulle committee should 
notify Vila of the date on which it would be ready �o receive Sautot -
having secured its position ashore by force - and that it should send a boat 
to a named point off Anse Vata, near Noumea, at 9 a.m. on the appointed 
date to rendezvous with Norden, which with Adelaide would have entered 
through Boul·ari passage south of N oumea, keeping at maximum distance 
from the shore batteries . This 'de Gaulle boat' was to establish its identity 
in the following homely manner : when 300 metres from Norden it was to 
throw overboard two kerosene tins, and when 200 metres from the ship 
it would throw overboard two more tins and break out the Cross of Lorraine 
flag. Showers had decided on kerosene tins as marks of recognition since 
they were articles of current use in the islands, especially in motor launches, 
and would adequately reflect the sun. 
On 1 3  September the de Gaulle committee signified its approval of 
Showers's plan , and two days later it set Thursday 19 September as the 
date for its execution . On the same day General de Gaulle confirmed his 
instructions for Sautot, while specifying that the operation was to be 
conducted as a French operation in form and manner, with merely 
contingent support from Adela£de, and that there must be no bloodshed . On 
the evening of 1 6  September Sautot embarked in Norden which sailed for 
Noumea accompanied by Adelaide. 
As Adela£de and Norden were preparing to sail from Vila, the de Gaulle 
partisans at Noumea set about mobilizing the local support needed for a 
coup de force . Who were these Gaullist leaders? General de Gaulle 's 
accredited representative was Raymond Pognon, who only a few days before 
had, with the General 's approval, set on foot measures to form a real de 
Gaulle committee. But it was not yet a reality . For the moment, the notary 
Verges was equally prominent. Having seen that the Gaullist bandwagon 
was now beginning to roll , he characteristically determined to occupy the 
driving seat . No one was in a mood to stop him , and a group of men of 
goodwill including Georges Dubois, Edouard Mouledous , and others who 
would not normally have recognized Verges as a leader, cooperated with 
him for the immediate good of the cause. In all fairness to Verges it must 
be said that his finest hour had now struck and that all that week his manic 
energy was deployed to good effect. The first plan was for a group of picked 
men to kidnap Acting Governor Denis during the night of 1 8- 1 9  September, 
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leaving a vacuum which could be filled promptly by Sautot when he arrived 
at Noumea on Thursday morning 19  September. Inevitably , since nearly a 
hundred people were privy to the secret, it did not remain secret long. The 
town was full of rumours of Sautot's imminent arrival . Colonel Denis , in 
constant consultation with the commander of the Dumont d 'Urville , began 
to take steps to meet the trouble that was obviously brewing. He drew up 
a black list of unreliable elements and prepared to impose a state of siege . 
In mid-week, therefore , the conspirators decided to organize a mass 
demonstration in Noumea designed to force the resignation of the irresolute 
Colonel . For this the support of the bush was essential . There was no longer 
any question of secrecy . The word was spread throughout the up-country 
villages on the night of 1 7 - 1 8  September. Though the scepticism of officials 
in Vila had been justified , Gaullist feeling in the interior had by now reached 
such a pitch that no detailed planning was necessary : only a spark was 
needed for it to take fire . A contemporary narrative by Georges Baudoux 
reflects the feverish atmosphere of the ensuing 24 hours. He was at Houailou 
on the east coast . 
All day Wednesday I hasten to & fro. I telephone the Public Works drivers to 
make sure that they will take as many men as possible on their trucks. One of 
them asks, 'Who 'll pay for the petrol? ' I reply, 'F ill up , de Gaulle will pay ! ' 
The bushmen begin to move off, ill-shaven men with huge moustaches .  They are 
off to Noumea to kick out Denis and install Sautot . I see them passing on the 
road with their rifles and full cartridge pouches. At 7 .30 p .m .  all my men are in 
readines s. Happily we go off to meet our fate. We arriv e at La Foa [on the main 
west coast road to Noumea] at 1 1  o 'clock. A v ast crowd. There are bushmen 
from every corner of the east & we st coasts. All are men of fierce aspect, dressed 
in dungarees, unbuttoned coats, collarless shirts, big boots and wide-brimmed 
felt hats, crowns pinched in front. These are the bushmen - resolute men, 
bold men, real Frenchmen, patriots. The land is awake and stirring. Drink 
heartens them further. Everyone is talking at once in the overcrowded bar. You 
can hear nothing. I say to myself that the game will be won by the strength of the 
bush . 2  
All night hundreds of bushmen streamed toward Noumea. Assembling 
in the small hours of Thursday 19  September at Paita, 30 kilometres from 
the capi�al , they learned that Denis had ordered the arrest of their leaders 
and had set up a roadblock five kilometres outside Noumea. Verges,  showing 
on this occasion remarkable commen sense, suggested that as a first step 
they should leave their weapons behind and seek to pass the roadblock 
unarmed by en masse . The leaders would remain for the moment at Paita 
to avoid being arrested individually . It was so decided, and the gambit 
was successful . Baudoux and his friends arrived at the head of a convoy of 
100 trucks and cars at the roadblock, where they found some 20 gendarmes 
backed by troops .  They were searched but allowed to proceed. By 8 a.m. the 
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bushmen were swelling a cheerful but determined crowd in the centre of 
Noumea, where they were met by Pognon and Paladini, who had . some­
how escaped arrest. Adelaide and Norden were already reported off Noumea. 
The situation was still in the balance . The Vichy authorities had not 
been neutralized . The roadblock was still in position at the fifth kilometre 
post .  It was clearly unsafe for Sautot to come ashore . But the next two 
hours were decisive . It is impossible to sort out the exact sequence of events 
but it seems that a rumour that Verges and other leaders had been held 
up at the fifth kilometre resulted in a mass exodus from Noumea to the 
roadblock, where Pognon (who was on Denis 's black list) was arrested 
by its commander, Lieutenant Perraud. This was too much . Surrounded 
by a menacing crowd , Perraud sent a message to the Governor, who ordered 
the roadblock to be dismantled . Verges and the leaders of the popular 
movement proceeded to Noumea and confronted Colonel Denis in his 
office , insisting that he either rally to General de Gaulle or resign . Finally 
Denis agreed that Sautot could come ashore . It was now nearly 1 1  o 'clock. 
Adelaide was still standing by. 
Showers had been asked through the British consul to arrive if possible 
by 7 a.m. on 1 9  September and , although a squall had obscured the leading 
marks , he was able to enter Boulari passage in company with Norden at 6 . 1 5 .  
As the de Gaulle boat was not in sight, h e  closed Noumea harbour and was 
hailed at 7 .30 by a boat which was recognized as belonging to Dumont 
d 'Urville . (He subsequently learned that the shore batteries had already been 
given orders , which they did not carry out, to open fire on Adelaide . )  Having 
closed Norden to make sure that she was not boarded by the Dumont 
d 'Urville party , he approached the inner harbour more closely and sighted 
Dumont d 'Urville moored stem to the wharf with guns trained fore and aft .  
The shore signal station, puzzlingly , flew the de  Gaulle ensign but a t  the 
same time displayed the signal 'You must not enter harbour'. 
Under the existing plan Norden was to sail at 9 . 1 0  a.m. , but Showers 
decided to delay her departure until the arrival of a boat which had been 
sighted coming from the shore . It proved to bring a message from the de 
Gaulle committee that the Vichy element was still in control of the 
port, the town and the approach road. Showers decided to stay at Noumea 
until 4 p .m. in case the situation should change , but since it was desirable to 
delay Norden no longer, he transhipped Sautot to Adelaide at 1 1  a .m.  
Considerations of discretion were now secondary, and indeed one of Sautot's 
prized possessions from that time was a photograph of himself standing on 
Adelaide 's deck wearing a British-type tin hat. Norden proceeded to sea, and 
almost at once a launch approached from Noumea wearing the Cross of 
Lorraine and giving the crude recognition signal . By this time, as we know, 
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Governor Denis had yielded to the force which the Gaullists had finally 
brought to bear upon him. Sautot transferred to the de Gaulle committee 
launch from which he landed at the main quay and proceeded on foot through 
the town to Government House accompainied by a large and enthusiastic 
crowd singing the Marseillaise . For the remainder of the day and the following 
night Adela£de continued to patrol off the harbour entrance 'with the object 
of inspiring confidence ashore , exercising restraint on Dumont d 'Urv£lle and 
maintaining mobility if Am£ral Charner arrived '. 
Ashore , all was confusion, as Ballard and Johnson told Showers when 
they visited Adela£de on 19 September. The mass of the population was 
clearly with Sautot, who peacefully superseded Denis at 3 p .m. , but the 
town was full of armed bushmen who were feeling their oats after breaking 
the state of siege , and the possibility of unfortunate incidents seemed very 
great . Fortunately nothing untoward happened , partly no doubt as a result 
of the prudent restraint displayed by the captain of the Dumont d 'Urv£lle 
who, with his force intact and well-disciplined , kept it out of harm's way . 
The night having passed quietly , Showers found an anchorage near Ile 
Nou from which he could keep Dumont d 'Urv£lle under observation and 
despatch landing parties if necessary . During the morning of 20  September 
he received a request from Sautot that Adela£de remain at Noumea for a 
further 48 hours in view of Dumo nt d 'Urv£lle 's continued presence . On the 
following morning he received a letter from Quievrecourt protesting against 
his presence in French territorial waters , which was asserted to be a violation 
of the Thirteenth Hague Convention of 1907  (regulating the duties of 
belligerent warships in relation to neutral countries) .  Showers at once 
replied that the provisions of the Hague Convention were not applicable and 
declined to receive the protest, which Quievrecourt then reaffirmed, as he 
was bound to do.  
Showers was now , entering on the most delicate phase of his mission . 
In the small hours of 2 1  September the Australian Naval Board instructed 
him to inform Dumont d 'Urvz'lle that she could not be allowed to influence 
the free decision of the New Caledonian inhab itants ; that if she attempted 
to use force , it would be answered by force , but that she would be accorded 
facilities · for fuel and supplies if she were to proceed to Inda-China. At 
8 .20 a.m. B allard and J ohnson came on board Adela£de and told Showers 
that Sautot himself had as yet no plan for dealing with the Dumont d 'Urv£lle . 
He accordingly arranged to see the new Governor ashore , and submitted 
for his approval a draft letter to Quievrecourt offering the latter provisions 
and free passage provided he proceeded to sea that day en route for Indo­
China. Sautot agreed and sent the letter, but Quievrecourt refused to receive 
it . Showers himself, however, took advantage of a visit by an officer from 
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Gaullist demonstration, 19 September 1 940. 
Governor Sautot flanked by members of de Gaulle committee, 19 September 1 940 . 
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the Dumont d 'Urville bearing one of Quievrecourt 's protests to inform him 
that the latter would receive a friendly welcome if he cared to call on him 
on the following morning; that force would not be used except in reply to 
force ; and . that under certain conditions an attempt would be made to 
arrange for the supply of provisions to Dumont d 'Urville. The offer to 
call was accepted and Showers, having now found an apparent basis for 
discussion with Quievrecourt and having received a signal indicating that 
A miral Charner could not arrive for another week, shifted berth to the 
outer harbour north of Ile Nou, a position threatening Dumont d 'Urv£lle 
less directly . Quievrecourt, having called on Showers and heard his 
conditions at first hand, moved the Dumont d 'Urville to an anchorage in 
the inner harbour out of direct touch with the shore . From this point it 
seemed clear that Quievrecourt 's main concern was to obtain safe conduct 
from New Caledonia for the remaining Vichy adherents and that he had 
practically abandoned any idea of forcible intervention. On 22 September 
he reported Showers 's conditions to Vichy adding that in his opinion any 
incident would result in an attack by Adelaide on Dumont d 'Urv£lle. He 
therefore proposed to try to gain time to 'arrange the situation of the 
career officers ', but requested urgent instructions . In another signal sent 
next morning he reported his impression that even in the event of successful 
Vichy intervention 'Great Britain ' would be prepared to retake by force 
any colony seeking to rally to de Gaulle. It would accordingly be necessary 
to deploy strong Vkhy forces .  He pointed out that he himself was short of 
provisions . 
Ashore , however, the situation was still precarious . Sautot's first thought 
had been to intern the dissidents temporarily on board the Messageries 
Maritimes liner P£erre Loti, which was immobilized at Noumea with engine 
trouble . But the Vichy adherents on board the Pierre Loti were not 
effectively prevented from communicating with the shore, and during the 
weekend of 2 1 -22  September a plot was hatched ,  apparently under the 
leadership of Denis 's former deputy Captain Michel whom Sau tot had 
rashly retained as acting O .C. troops ,  to release Denis from internment 
outside Noumea and kidnap Sautot himself. Inevitably news of this project 
leaked out ,  the counter-revolution was easily suppressed and Captain Michel 
was sent to j oin his friends on board the Pierre Loti. But careful reporting 
of events by Showers and Ballard had caused apprehensions in Canberra, 
still preoccupied with the supposedly impending arrival at N oumea of 
Amiral Charner. On Monday 23 September Ballard was instructed that the 
situation 'appeared to be deteriorating and required prompt measures to 
eliminate those factors which were jeopardizing the stability of the colony 
and its whole-hearted adhesion to Free France ' .  He was instructed, therefore , 
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to suggest to Sautot that the latter should ask Showers for protection, 
which would immediately be accorded, against any attempt to interfere 
with the internal control of New Caledonia and against any vessel 
hostile to Free France . 3  This well-meant instruction did not seem to Ballard 
and Showers to be helpful. Such a guarantee of protection, if it became 
publicly known, as it infallibly would,  would jeopardize Showers's 
negotiations with Quievrecourt , then at a promising · stage. Showers had 
already been asked by the Naval Board to report whether there were 
prospects of Sautot 's gaining control within the next few days and whether 
the use of force against Dumont d 'Urv£lle would resolve the situation.  He 
replied , in a signal drafted jointly by himself and Ballard, that th� prospects 
were most hopeful . It was essential, he submitted , to prevent the arrival of 
A miral Charner, and the situation would not be stable until Dumont 
d 'Urville left , but he considered the use of force inadvisable because of the 
great risk of nullifying the progress he had already made . Later on the same 
day he was able to report further progress. Quievrecourt had sent him 
another letter , which he rightly interpreted as encouraging, seeking renewed 
reassurances that his ship would be provisioned if it left New Caledonian 
waters, and the British consul had been able to give Quievrecourt the 
guarantees he had sought that the persons and property of dissenting 
military personnel would be protected.  Accordingly he and Ballard decided 
against any excess of zeal in executing Canberra's new instructions to issue 
a virtual ultimatum to Quievrecourt . Though not privy to the latter's 
exchanges with Vichy and Sigon, they assessed correctly that he was 
sufficiently conscious of the consequences of any attempt to use force . 
On the morning of 24 September the pattern carefully built up by 
Showers, Ballard and Johnson over the past five days fell neatly into shape . 
Showers received the following letter from Quievrecourt : 
I thank you for the measures which you have taken on behalf of the military 
personnel of the colony who have remained loyal. 
I request you to be good enough to assure me that none of the officers will be 
interned or left at Noumea against his will and that the Pierre Loti will sail for 
Saigon with all the personnel to be repatriated. If I am granted this assurance, 
I consider that the presence of my ship at Noumea is no longer necessary and I 
will sail as soon as I have been able to embark the 1 8  days stores which are vital 
to me to reach Indo-China without a stop . . .  
I will inform you later as to the time of my sailing . . .  
Quievrecourt and Showers later exchanged final calls, the former declaring 
himself satisfied with the assurances he had received and confirming that he 
would sail for Saigon on receiving his provisions. As soon as this could be 
arranged - which, because a local holiday was being celebrated on 24 
THE RALLIEMENT AND ITS A FTERMATH 5 1  
September with more than usual gusto , was not until the afternoon o f  2 5  
September - Dumont d 'Urville put t o  sea, 'in a most seamanlike manner' ,  
noted Showers. Before she left, Showers communicated to Quievrecourt 
a warning . that no French ship arriving in New Caledonian waters could 
be allowed to influence the free decision of the inhabitants and that the 
British naval authorities were prepared to use force if necessary to ensure 
the protection from sea attack of General de Gaulle 's regime in New 
Caledonia. 
The Gordian knot was now unloosed , and the sword had not been drawn 
between those who had so lately been allies . A m£ral Charner never reached 
Noumea. On 27 September the British authorities passed on to Canberra 
a report that as a result of messages from Quievrecourt both the Vichy 
sloops had been ordered back to Saigon. It was the effective end of any 
Vichy attempt to maintain control of the French Pacific possessions , but 
despite the Dumont d 'Urville 's departure Showers's mission was not over. 
Ashore the situation again threatened to disintegrate . On the morning of 
Thursday 26 September, giddy with success, a faction of the de Gaulle 
committee led by Verges took it upon themselves to arrest Secretary­
General Bayardelle and embark him forcibly in the Pierre Loti. The 
Commissioner of Police at once reported this high-handed action to 
Governor Sautot ,  protesting that at this rate he would soon be unable to 
maintain order. At that moment Sautot was receiving Showers , Ballard 
and ] ohnson, who had now been instructed firmly to convey to him without 
further delay assurances of British support in the event of any attack on 
New Caledonia. They took the opportunity to protest against Verges's 
action :  obviously if some members of the de Gaulle committee were going 
to behave like a revolutionary Committee of Public Safety the Showers­
Quievrecourt agreement would be undermined with upredictable 
consequences. Sautot ,  for his part, felt strongly that authority and 
responsibility to keep order now belonged to him alone, and he ordered 
Bayardelle's release. Following further consultation with Ballard and 
] ohnston,  Showers decided that the only way to curb further excesses by 
the committee members was for him to inform the committee of the 
assurances exchanged between himself and the captain of the Dumont 
d 'Urville which had brought about the ship 's departure. On 27  September 
he sought and was readily granted Sautot's permission to do this. While 
he was with the Governor, Bayardelle presented himself and made a 
lengthy statement . In Showers's own words:  
He took an hour and a half to  say the he was loyal to  de Gaulle and desired to 
serve the cause anywhere but in New Caledonia where his life was in danger -
a fact which necessitated his asking for my protection from the mob which was 
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ruling the place . He then stood up, thumbed the table, and addressing the 
Governor said in English 'And I tell you now, in two months'  time either a 
Britisher will be sitting in that chair or there will be revolution'. 
At 3 . 30 p .m .  on what must have seemed to Showers a very long day he 
arrived at Government House to meet the de Gaulle committee. The 
committee itself appeared 10 minutes later, having with difficulty been 
diverted from plans for further arrests .  In a carefully. prepared statement 
made in the Governor's presence, Showers explained to them that his 
original mission had been to provide contingent support only for the 
movement to establish a Free French regime in New Caledonia. Once . that 
regime had been set up , he had concluded with Quievrecourt a 'gentlemen's 
agreement' containing adequate assurances against the use of force by the 
latter. He proceeded to explain in detail the mutual assurances leading to 
the peaceful departure of the Dumont d 'Urville for Saigon. Showers 
concluded : 
And now, ge ntleme n, Captain de Quievrecourt having shown by his departure 
from New Caledonia his intention to honourably observe the assurances that he 
gave to me, I have the honour to request you to use all your influence towards 
facilitating the performance by your Governor and Administration of the 
assurances given to the Captain of the Dumont d 'Urville, (which, by virtue 
of my intervention, involve the honour of the British Empire and that of the 
British Consul at Noumea) . In this connexion you can be of great assistance by 
using your best endeavours towards restoring harmony among all sections of the 
community, and especially by dissuading your followers from all provocative 
or retaliatory speech or action. 
F inally, gentlemen, I have very great pleasure in placing before you a copy 
of Captain de Quievrecourt 's final letter to Captain Michel, the Senior Military 
Officer in the S.S. Pierre Loti. This copy was forwarded to me by Captain de 
Quievrecourt, and leaves no shadow of doubt in my mind that he intends to 
honourably fulfil all his assurances. 
In reply Verges gave firm assurances of the de Gaulle committee's 
complete cooperation.  For the time being, they were carried out. The 
Pierre Loti duly repatriated the dissidents and on 4 October, when it was 
clear that no Vichy ships were on the way to New Caledonia, Adelaide 
sailed from Noumea. It now remained for Sautot to consolidate the Free 
French authority in the colony and organize economic and defence co­
operation with Australia. 
The new Free French Governor had little enough to work with , and at 
every point Australian cooperation and assistance were essential .  His assets 
were the production flowing from the nickel smelter at Doniambo and the 
unorganized goodwill of the population at large. The bishop and the Roman 
Catholic clergy , though generally devoid of enthusiasm for the Free French 
movement, remained honourably neutral. On the negative side of the balance 
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sheet were a complete lack of regular infantry and artillery officers ; a 
shortage of reliable civil officials and even of gendarmes, the majority of 
whom had opted for repatriation; the illwill of certain business firms ; and 
the resentment nurtured on the one hand by some members of the General 
Council and on the other by a faction of the de Gaulle committee led 
by Verges, who had hoped to seize power for themselves. And always 
there was Bayardelle, who had now decided to be a Free Frenchman and 
continued in office as Secretary-General of the colony. (Ballard remarked 
on 30 September that he had never been able to get from the former regime 
a clear assessment of the colony 's credit needs 'probably owing to the 
Secretary-General 's intrigues' . )4 
Sautot now set about cobbling together a civil and military administration. 
Georges Dubois, who was a reserve captain, was mobilized as temporary 
commander of the troops, to be replaced a little later by the regular Major 
FClix Broche, who had helped to rally Tahiti to Free France. A retired 
surveyor, Nicolas Ratzel, became Sautot's personal assistant and contributed 
valuable local knowledge. Vice-consul Frank Puaux, having walked out of 
the Vichy Consulate-General at Sydney, came to Noumea and was appointed 
director of economic affairs in succession to Jan Bourgeau, who himself 
replaced Bayardelle when the latter finally left for London in March 1941 . 
With de Gaulle 's concurrence Sautot dissolved the General Council, which 
had visibly outlived its usefulness, and appointed a wartime advisory council 
headed by Pierre Berges. The Verges faction of the de Gaulle committee 
continued to intrigue but was firmly put in its place by the end of 1 940 . 
Rapadzi was invaluable as director of the nickel industry though, as he 
ruefully recalled recently , he was occasionally daunted by Sautot's habit 
of summarily interning needed but pro-Vichy technicians on his staff. s 
Following the rall£ement the Australian government began to study 
ways and means of carrying out the responsibility which it had accepted 
to extend economic aid and cooperation to New Caledonia in accordance 
with the Churchill-de Gaulle agreement of August 1940 . 6  Inevitably there 
were frictions, delays and difficulties in the first weeks, and ill-disposed 
elements remaining at Noumea were quick to magnify them. There was a 
good deal of grumbling, not all of it unjustified, to the effect that Australia 
was not coming quickly enough to the colony's aid. In November Ballard, 
who had been reporting on the need to dispose of New Caledonia's 
production of coffee, canned meat, hides and above all chrome ore , was 
called to Australia for consultations, and an interdepartmental committee 
studied the question of implementing the government's decision. In mid­
December it submitted comprehensive recommendations to Ministers . 7 
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Meanwhile the Australian Navy was becoming increasingly perturbed 
about the New Caledonian situation. It feared that there was an imminent 
threat of a ] apanese takeover or a Vichy counter-coup, and that the stability 
of Sautot 's regime was threatened by a 'group of mercenary opportunists '  
prepared to sell out to the ] apanese. On 30 December the elderly but force­
ful Minister for the Navy, W.M. Hughes, submitted to the War Cabinet an 
agendum dramatically entitled 'New Caledonia - importance of taking 
immediate action to prevent it falling into ] apanese hands'. He proposed a 
wide range of economic measures to strengthen New Caledonia and asserted 
that if they were not taken immediately the colony was likely to be 
'acquired ' by the Japanese 'within the next three months'. He suggested 
that any proposal to send troops abroad from New Caledonia should be 
discouraged and if possible additional Free French troops should be brought 
there to strengthen local defences. s 
This unilateral War Cabinet submission was a misguided exercise. The 
Silent Service does not appear to have consulted any other authority, and it 
admitted that the items of 'intelligence ' on which its apprehensions were 
based might 'appear of small importance in themselves '. It was a textbook 
example of the need to handle very carefully the scraps of gossip and rumour 
that have always made up so much of the raw material of what is called 
'intelligence '. On learning of Hughes 's submission the Minister for External 
Affairs, now Sir Frederick Stewart , pointed out to the Prime Minister that 
the Australian, British and New Zealand governments had already agreed in 
principle to assist the dispatch to the Middle East of a force from the French 
Pacific territories and that if Australia now opposed this action , to which 
the New Caledonians attached importance , a most unfavourable impression 
would be created and much harm would be done to the Free French 
movement. As for the economic measures recommended by Hughes, these 
were already being considered by the competent authorities,who had made 
an interim report to Ministers. 9 
The War Cabinet, meeting on 7 January 1941 ,  declined to get more 
excited than was necessary. It approved the grant of financial assistance 
to the Free French forces in the Pacific but referred to the Chiefs of Staff 
the question of whether in their opinion the proposed expeditionary force 
should be retained in New Caledonia.1° The Chiefs recommended that : 
(a) the first action should be to determine the exact state of 
defence arrangements already in being in New Caledonia, and 
to make plans to cooperate with local defence forces ;  
(b) for this purpose , de Gaulle should be asked to issue instructions 
to Sautot to enter into staff conversations immediately with 
Australian defence authorities ; 
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( c) pending the outcome of conversations and consideration of 
resultant report, no large contingents should sail from New 
Caledonia for service overseas with the exception of the 
first contingent of 600 men who were practically ready for 
embarkation. 
The War Cabinet so approved on 20 January . De Gaulle , approached 
through the United Kingdom government, readily agreed to staff 
conversations between Australia and New Caledonia and to the retention 
in the colony of troops other than the first contingent of New Caledonians 
and Tahitians forming the First Pacific Battalion . 1 1  
An Australian military mission headed by Lieutenant Colonel R.E. Fanning 
went to New Caledonia in February and spent several weeks discussing joint 
defence measures with the local authorities. It recommended the establish­
ment in New Caledonia of an advanced operational air base, including flying­
boat and land plane facilities, which 'would contribute materially to the 
defence of Australia in the event of war with Japan' ;  the supply of two 
six-inch coast defence guns for Noumea with associated searchlights ;  and 
the provision of arms, ammunition and equipment for the local forces .  
On 17 April the mission's recommendations, endorsed by the Defence 
Committee, were considered by the War Cabinet . 1 2  It was a unique occasion 
in that a French officer was present. By previous agreement Sautot had 
sent Captain Dubois to Australia to represent him at discussions resulting 
from the mission 's talks .  Dubois was instructed to maintain the guiding 
principles that New Caledonia would not be held directly responsible for 
the cost of defence measures undertaken in the common interest, and 
that no impression was to be given that French sovereignty was being 
compromised by an Australian military control. 1 3 
There were still lingering doubts in some Australian quarters as to the 
stability of the Free French regime in New Caledonia, and Dubois found 
himself being closely questioned on the local situation. With Ballard , who 
had gone with him to Australia, he was able to reply firmly and convincingly . 
As he put it in his report to Sautot, he understood from Ballard that the 
Minister . for Air had asked for a visit by a French expert on the New 
Caledonian political and military situation . The purposes of the consultation 
as seen by the Australians had not been spelled out to him, but he assessed 
them as being essentially the following, reflected in the questions put to 
him: 
( 1 )  t o  know the exact political situation, the Australian authorities 
being fearful of major disaffection or even a political change 
in favour of Vichy ; 
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(2 )  to secure agreement on the need for the immediate installation 
in New Caledonia of an advanced air base integrated into a 
general reconnaissance system for the defence of Australia 
and the neighbouring islands and under the orders of the 
RAAF; 
( 3 )  to  make sure there would be no hostile reaction by public 
opinion in New Caledonia to the establishment of this base 
with permanent RAAF personnel ; 
( 4) to make sure that forces adequate for effective defence existed 
and would be maintained in New Caledonia. 
Dubois was right. John McEwen, now Minister for Air, was keenly 
interested in integrating New Caledonia into the regional air defence system 
and anxious to be sure that a firm infrastructure existed for this effort . 
In a series of meetings with Ministers ( including McEwen) and officials, 
and before the War Cabinet itself, Ballard and Dubois maintained in unison 
that the political situation had definitely stabilized in favour of Free France , 
despite superficial tremors provoked by a minority of disaffected people 
who lacked cohesion, arms and , as Dubois said , dynamisme . Dubois noted 
that Hughes , reflecting naval trepidations, hectored him with supplementary 
questions. How many troops were under arms? What was the European 
population? How many natives? Were the troops in barracks reliable? Was 
he sure the dissident minority was not armed? (He was . )  The Frenchman 
was steadfast and War Cabinet was impressed. It recorded its agreement 
with the view that the Free French regime was 'fully established and stable ' 
in New Caledonia. Ministers, led by McEwen and the Minister for the Army 
(P .C. Spender) readily agreed with Ballard and Dubois that political stability 
must be underpinned by a sound economic situation . Economically , said 
Spender, New Caledonia should be regarded 'as part of Australia' .  War 
Cabinet indeed agreed formally , after hearing from Ballard of certain petty 
and vexatious export licence difficulties, that 'New Caledonia should be 
treated on the same basis as an Australian State or Territory insofar as 
purchases from Australia are concerned , and that export licences should be 
granted in accordance with this principle' . 
Ballard now reviewed - 'magistralement' ,  says Dubois - problems of 
ensuring markets for New Caledonian exports. War Cabinet could not take 
immediate decisions on all of them, but recorded the opinion that : 
from a political point of view it was important that outstanding economic 
questions should be immediately dealt with and finalised, otherwise considerable 
harm might be done to the cause of the Free French in New Caledonia. It was 
agreed, in principle, that an assurance be given that the economic questions that 
were outstanding between the Commonwealth and New Caledonian Governments 
would be sympathetically considered and settled without delay . 
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On specific defence measures, War Cabinet agreed to the establishment 
of the Air Advanced Operation Base (AOB) ,  to the establishment of the 
coast defence battery at Noumea, the conveyance to the Middle East in an 
Australian · convoy of the French expeditionary force's first contingent, 
and the provision, within the limits of available resources, of arms and 
equipment (including communications and transport) for local defence 
(about 1 ,200 men under arms)  at sufficient strength to deter anything less 
than a major attack on New Caledonia. Care was taken to reserve de Gaulle's 
position as leader of the Free French by specifying that official confirmation 
of the air base arrangement would be obtained from the Governor of New 
Caledonia, acting with de Gaulle 's concurrence, and that expenditure on 
approved clef ence measures would not be charged directly to New Caledonia 
but would be borne in the first instance by Australia, subject to eventual 
financial settlement between the Free French movement and the governments 
of the British empire . 1 4  (The Australian government was already aware 
from London that these were the basic principles which de Gaulle wished 
to be applied, but it did not yet have details of a new financial agreement 
which had been concluded between the United Kingdom and de Gaulle . )  
All this was mutually satisfactory, so  far as  anything could be satisfactory 
against the alarming background of the Allies' poverty-stricken situation in 
April 1941 , and Dubois recorded his general impressions for Sautot as 
follows: 
( 1 )  Australia thinks only o f  making war ; it is not interested and has never 
been interested in mortgaging New Caledonia's future : 
(2 )  Australia is  disposed to examine New Caledonia's economic problems 
as sympathetically as possible. I S  
Now defence and economic cooperation between Australia and New 
Caledonia seemed to have placed on a sound footing. On 20 May Sautot 
notified Ballard of his agreement to the War Cabinet's decisions, which he 
had submitted for de Gaulle 's personal approval . The flying-boat base was 
established on the Ile Nou, with a small permanent RAAF detachment, 
and Noumea became a link in the reconnaissance line maintained by No. 
1 1  squadron, RAAF, from Port Moresby through Honiara (British Solomon 
Islands) and Vila to Sydney. Two six-inch coast defence guns were obtained 
from New Zealand and installed on Ouen Toro hill at Noumea, a small 
Australian artillery detachment remaining to train local troops in their 
use . Shipping and other facilities were provided for the French Pacific 
Battalion which , augmented by its Tahiti component, sailed from Noumea 
for Sydney on 5 May . Sent initially to Syria, where it arrived too late to 
take part in the unhappy campaign made necessary by Vichy's pro-German 
policy in the Middle ·East , it subsequently performed excellent service in 
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North Africa (notably at the battle of Bir Hakeim in Libya) and in the 
Mediterrranean campaign for the liberation of France . 
All this added up to action on a very small scale. The moral effect of 
these defence measures far exceeded their material significance. But of 
lasting importance was the work now set in hand by the RAAF to survey 
and begin the construction of three landing fields,  for which sites were 
selected at Tontouta, 5 3  kilometres from Noumea on the west coast , at 
Plaine des Gaiacs , 200 kilometres further north, and at Koumac near the 
northern tip of the island. All three were to play a useful part in the first 
year of the Pacific war . 
New Caledonia's economic outlook was now improving as a result not 
only of Australian assistance but of a rising demand for its nickel matte 
and chrome ore which were of direct importance to the growing American 
rearmament programme . Whereas in 1940 the demand for these commodities 
had been limited (except, of course, in Japan) ,  the United States was now 
ready to buy as much as it could get, and plans were made accordingly to 
increase production of nickel matte . Ballard had reported, before his visit 
to Australia in April, that the New Caledonia authorities and the SLN were 
showing signs of dissatisfaction with existing arrangements whereby 
Australia assumed responsibility for the purchase on its own account, and 
subsequent resale , of the colony's nickel , undertaking in return to provide 
for essential import requirements. That had been all very well when nickel 
was hard to market, but now when it was an increasingly scarce commodity 
it was understandably thought equitable that New Caledonia should benefit 
directly from the valuable dollar exchange accruing from nickel sales .  This 
question of the mechanism of marketing nickel did not figure in the War 
Cabinet discussion of 1 7  April . Although, as we shall see, it was causing a 
certain amount of anxiety at Free French headquarters, that was not known 
in Canberra where the problem was not regarded as difficult and was already 
being effectively resolved on a lower level. t 6 
This year of 1 941  presents ,  indeed, a recurrent picture of matters which 
seemed simple in the Pacific but became complicated in the overheated 
atmosphere of General de Gaulle's headquarters . In J une de Gaulle approved 
by telegram from Cairo the defence arrangements made by Sau tot with 
Australia, but in doing so imposed conditions reflecting his chronic mistrust 
of British (and Australian) motives. The employment of Australian aircraft 
in New Caledonia was to be subject to the approval of the local French 
commanding officer 'since he is concerned with the island 's defence '; the 
number of Australian liaison officers was to be limited, and they were to 
have no control over the organization of the French forces or the distribution 
of Australian equipment . t 7  No serious attempt was ever made to enforce the 
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absurd provision about the use of  aircraft. (For some time to  come the 
only aircraft involved would be RAAF flying-boats calling at Naumea on 
reconnaissance flights. ) The General's grudging approval betrayed, however, 
not only his hypersensitive personal outlook as the self-appointed guardian 
of French sovereignty - ingratitude becoming a duty - but a near-paranoid 
atttitude pervading Free French headquarters in London.  It had already 
caused some trouble and would cause much more . The Cairo telegram 
foreshadows Admiral Thierry d 'Argenlieu 's unfortunate mission to the 
Pacific. 
4 The view from Carlton Garden� 
FOR THE FREE French in the European theatre the rallieme·n t  of the 
Pacific territories was one of the few cheering events in a singularly gloomy 
autumn. As one of them, General Koenig, recalled later : 
The ralliement of Tahiti came at the same time as the Dakar failure and the 
defection of Gabon. The Dakar failure was not de Gaulle 's fault - not necessarily. 
There had been a grand design ; we were to have gone straight on to Morocco, 
in the hope of changing the face of the war. Well, it didn't happen as we would 
have wished, and it wasn't much fun. De Gaulle pulled a long face. Free France 
had started badly , or rather it was not getting started at all . Then came the news 
of the Pacific ralliement. It was the dramatic event needed to give us new hope. 
The size of the population didn't amount to much but, spread over such a big 
surface ,  it was conspicuous. So we were pleased . . . 1 
For New Caledonia itself, the coup de force of 19  September 1 940 
was decisive . The colony's commitment to General de Gaulle 's leadership 
and to the Allied effort was never thenceforth to be called seriously into 
question. The population, overwhelmingly pro-Ally , had become over­
whelmingly Gaullist and was to remain so. The only threat to de Gaulle's 
personal prestige was to come from the actions of his own envoy, Rear­
Admiral d 'Argenlieu, and was transient. Above all , the population was 
sturdily French, looking toward a restored French Republic . But this 
picture was not clear to the General as he surveyed the distant Pacific 
from his headquarters at No . 1  Carlton Gardens in London, to which he 
returned from Africa on 1 7  November. The colony's ralliement, though 
undertaken with the General 's blessing, had been achieved entirely by 
local French effort , with decisive though circumspect Australian assistance , 
and some of the Frenchmen involved were known vaguely as 'autonomists'. 
No one in London possessed any first hand knowledge of the colony, and 
its sudden presentation as a gift to the Free French movement must have 
seemed to de Gaulle a phenomenon by no means free from suspicious 
elements .  He clearly determined at an early stage to look the gift horse very 
carefully in the mouth . 
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A s  the Free French regime consolidated itself in New Caledonia in the 
last months of 1 940 General de Gaulle in London was in a very weak 
position. The false dawn of the weeks following the armistice, when the 
intention to continue the struggle had been expressed by leaders in many 
parts of the French empire, had long faded away . Inda-China, Madagascar, 
the Levant, the French Antilles ,  all North Africa and the strategic point of 
Dj ibouti had remained under the sway of Vichy . French Equatorial Africa 
had rallied to Free France, but even that had been a close-run thing, and the 
fiasco of Dakar had confirmed the important West African territories' 
continued alliegance to Petain's Etat Frant;ais .  It was clear that only 
scattered fragments of the empire would provide a scanty territorial base 
for de Gaulle 's unilateral pretension to represent French legitim£te . He 
was correspondingly concerned that his trusteeship of these territories 
should be marred by no suspicion that he had allowed any weakening of 
French control over them, any improper foreign interference . His instinct 
was to impose a firm centralized control, but the task of doing so was made 
immensely difficult by the extreme scarcity of men and of knowledge at 
his disposal .  
There had been no direct contact with New Caledonia since its ralliement. 
In all the circumstances, it is not surprising that misunderstandings began 
to develop as Rene Pleven took up his new responsibilities as commissioner 
for the colonies in the French National Committee . By the early months 
of 1 94 1  Pleven was clearly suspicious that the French Pacific territories 
were not receiving a fair deal in economic matters from Australia and New 
Zealand and even that Governor Sautot might not have been sufficiently 
prudent in safeguarding French interests and sovereignty . The solution which 
occurred to him and to de Gaulle was the traditional one of centralization . 
On 22 February the Dominions Office requested the United Kingdom High 
Commissioner at Canberra to discuss with the Australian government the 
'somewhat delicate problems ' arising from the divergence between the 
French system of high centralized control from Europe and 'our system of 
decentralization coupled with the Dominion responsibilities for the Free 
French .colonies in the Pacific' .2  General de Gaulle, said the Dominions 
Office, considered a high degree of centralization vital, partly because no 
other system was known to the few colonial administrators at his disposal 
and partly - and more importantly - because it was the best answer to 
charges that the Free French movement was merely a smokescreen to 
conceal British designs on the French colonial empire . Politically , the United 
Kingdom found de Gaulle's contention valid and it thought the main 
objective must be to minimize its administrative disadvantages. Now, the 
assumption of the Dominions of 'certain responsibilities '  toward the Pacific 
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colonies, though invaluable, might easily run counter to the principle of 
centralization unless de Gaulle was enabled to express his approval br other­
wise of any contemplated operation - whether financial, economic or 
military . In these circumstances the General desired that any proposals by 
Sau tot that would previously have been ref erred to Paris should now be 
cleared with Free French headquarters. This last point, in a rather insipid 
message, which the High Commissioner communicated in its entirety to 
the Australian government , was so obvious that at first sight it seems point­
less to express it in a telegram. In any event it seems to have been taken in 
Canberra as a statement of the obvious, or perhaps as a piece of French 
formalism to which the Australian government was quite prepared to adapt, 
though satisfied itself to conclude arrangements locally with Governor 
Sautot and leave him to exercise his proper function of clearing his decisions 
where necessary with General de Gaulle . As we now know, however, the 
Dominions Office's telegram reflected deeper concerns held in London 
but obscured by the excessively tactful language in which it was couched.  
Not only did General de Gaulle fear that Sautot might overstep the mark 
in his dealings with Australia but some United Kingdom officials them­
selves were concerned lest, perhaps through 'lack of diplomatic experience' 
(a possibility suggested by a functionary in the French Department of the 
Foreign Office) , Australia and New Zealand might handle their role 
clumsily .J One Foreign Office minute of 6 May 1941  refers to the Australian 
government 's 'policy of trying to get more political control in French 
Oceania [ sic] which is so much resented by the Free French there and 
at headquarters� .  The fact that this view came to be held in the Foreign 
Office at that stage suggests a less than vigorous rebuttal there of Free 
French complaints. The air had been cleared to some extent by a personal 
conversation which fortunately took place on 7 March 1941  between 
General de Gaulle and the Australian Prime Minister, who was visiting 
London. The two leaders made an excellent impression on each other . 
Menzies described de Gaulle as 'a man· of considerable ability , dignity and 
force and . . . well regarded by Churchill . . . a rallying point for French 
opinion'.4 De Gaulle telegraphed to Sautot that he was 'deeply touched 
by the sentiments expressed for Free France and French interests by Mr 
Menzies ' ,  who had told him that 'New Caledonia and the Hebrides could 
count on the fullest economic support from Australia'. 5 In deference to 
de Gaulle 's wish to maintain the most constant and prompt means of 
communication with Sautot, in conformity with the centralized French 
system, Menzies assured him that, always provided he kept the Dominions 
Office informed on important matters , he might have direct access to the 
Australian High Commissioner in London and through him to the Australian 
Australian Prime Minister R.G .  Menzies at Noumea, May 1 94 1  
(on return journey from London where h e  had met General d e  Gaulle) .  
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government .  (This system of consultation was in fact Pleven 's idea designed 
to make the best of a bad job : if the Dominions had to be involved at all, 
which he thought undesirable , at least the French could communicate with 
them direct .) De Gaulle asked whether Australia would be prepared to enter 
into priYate military talks concerning the defence of New Caledonia. Menzies 
agreed at once, adding that Australia had not itself suggested such talks 
because it did not want to lend any colour to enemy propaganda about 
alleged Australian domination of New Caledonia. He suggested to Canberra 
that Ballard should take the matter up with Sautot ,  but his information 
was out of date. As he was speaking with de Gaulle in London, arrangements 
had already been made in Australia - with de Gaulle 's approval - to send 
a military mission to report on the defence of New Caledonia. Though 
following this meeting de Gaulle constantly maintained a high personal 
regard for Menzies, his suspicion as to what exactly was going on between 
Australia and New Caledonia, in defence matters at least, may possibly 
date from this moment. At any rate he was taking his own steps to inform 
himself of the situation in the Pacific territories. A senior colonial official, 
Governor-General Richard Brunot, was already on his way to the Pacific 
to carry out a tour of inspection on behalf of Free French headquarters. 
De Gaulle 's reasons for choosing Brunot to undertake this task must be 
to some extent a matter for conjecture . His envoy was an experienced 
colonial officer and personally acquainted with Sautot, but he had also 
been involved in partisan politics of the Third Republic in a way that would 
hardly commend him to the General and it is unlikely that he ever enjoyed 
the latter 's full confidence . (An avowed Socialist, he had served as Private 
Secretary to Marius Moutet when the latter was Minister of Colonies in the 
Popular Front government of 1 9 36 .) His adherence to Free France had been 
undistinguished . In August 1 940 he had been the administrator of the 
mandated territory of Cameroun, and he had come over with that territory 
without himself playing any active role . He was now a spare man at Free 
French headquarters and some have unkindly suggested that there was a 
plan to send him on a mission as far from London as possible . However 
that may be, de Gaulle shows no surprise in his own impassive account of  
the resounding failure of Brunot ' s  mission to  the Pacific : 
As e arly as the spring of 1 941  I had thought it well to send out on a tour of 
insp ection Governor-General Brunot, who had become available since Leclerc 
had rallied Cameroun. But Brunot had clashed, often violently, with officials 
who imputed to him, not without a show of reason, an intention to install 
himself in their place with his friends. Papeete had been the scene of tragi­
comic incidents involving the arrest on M .  Brunot 's orders of the Governor, 
the Colonial Secretary and the British consul ; while at Noumea Governor 
Sau tot breathed distrust of the inspector . . . 6 
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In fact, as  de Gaulle knew, Brunot had attempted unsuccessfully to secure 
Sautot's replacement by
. 
himself. In Noumea, however, he had behaved 
with a measure of circumspection which made it possible to avoid 4Il open 
breach with Sautot or the colonists, whose extreme suspicions of 
'metropolitan politics ' prejudiced them against Brunot. The comic opera 
which he later conducted at Papeete ,  and which led to his recall and 
premature retirement, does not concern us here , but the whole series of 
rocambolesque events confirmed de Gaulle 's view that exceptional measures 
were called for . 1 
Meanwhile , in London, Free French temperatures had been rising again . 
In April a mini-crisis ,  almost completely unknown to those of us who were 
actually in Australia or the Pacific, began to develop . Pleven, as we have 
seen , was dissatisfied with Pacific prospects� but at this point a large pinch 
of poison was added to the unwholesome brew by Bayardelle, newly arrived 
from New Caledonia. That enigmatic functionary had finally left Noumea 
in the last days of February . Just before his departure it had been reported 
in Noumea that a former member of the General Council , who was also 
a director of a Japanese mining company, had been heard saying to him 
that 'he counted on him to carry the Japanese business through'. The 
frequency with which such incidents had been occurring prompted Ballard 
to warn Canberra, which in tum warned the United Kingdom authorities ,  
that i t  would be well to treat Bayardelle with some caution : whether or  not 
he was in corrupt collusion with the J apanese , as some people believed, all 
his activity certainly favoured their interests rather than those of the Allies .8 
Indeed , as soon as he reached New York on his way to London he sent de 
Gaulle a report suggesting that measures to deny nickel and chrome ore to 
Japan were hurting the colony and threatened to provoke Japanese reprisals 
or even a coup d 'etat. 9 It was one of the first shots in his campaign against 
Sautot , but what he had to say harmonized very well with Pleven's suspicion 
that New Caledonia was being denied legitimate profits from trade with 
Japan. Earlier, Pleven had had his suspicions of Bayardelle himself, but 
these were rapidly allayed . On 23 April, confirming Sautot 's view of 
Bayardelle , Brunot telegraphed from Noumea: 'Essential stop immediately 
rumours spread by Bayardelle that he has gone to London only on mission 
and may return and even replace Sautot. Sautot confirms , of course 
without definite proof, all that Pleven and I had supposed before my 
departure especially regarding Japanese . All are afraid even of Bayardelle 
being employed in London where he could intrigue . '  Pleven sent a reassuring 
reply on 2 May , saying: 'Behaviour of person in question up to now 
satisfactory ' . 10 As soon as Bayardelle reached London he predictably set 
about assuring his own future by making mischief for others . On 24 April 
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he showed his hand to a member of the British Liaison Mission to the Free 
French , Somerville Smith , who wrote to the Dominions Office : 
This is to warn you that the French are going to ask formally that from now on 
all questions of -supply , of export and of finance ,  connected with those Colonies, 
should be settled from London. 
The French are profoundly dissatisfied with the shipping position, with the 
copra position and with the line taken by the Australian Government in 
connection with the dollar proceeds of exports of nickel , as revealed in the 
attached telegram. They are bound to be discontented over the attitude of 
New Zealand towards Tahiti. 
I had a first talk this morning with B ayardelle,  General Secretary o.f the 
Government of New Caledonia, who has just arrived in this country. I gathered 
from him that feeling on these points among the population was intensified by 
the fact that it was generally believed that Australia was responsible. Anti­
Gaullists are never tired of repeating that Australia is now in a position to treat 
them like poor relations, and is doing so. B allard apparently is notorious for 
lack of tact . . .  1  
The telegram to which Somerville Smith refers had been sent by Sautot 
from Noumea on 1 8  April . It complained that Australia was denying to New 
Caledonia the dollar exchange which ought to have accrued to the colony 
from its exports of nickel matte and that the Commonwealth was imposing 
'unacceptable '  controls on the New Caledonian economy . The explanation 
of this telegram's unwontedly plaintive tone was in fact very simple . It 
was sent at a time when Brunot, fresh from London, had begun to take a 
powerful part in the administration of the colony, and as Ballard recalls, 
had arranged to place his own personal assistant, a certain Captain Fatoux, 
in charge of the D epartment of Economic Affairs which handled foreign 
exchange questions. It may be presumed that Fatoux drafted the message 
and that Sautot, unwilling to give Brunot grounds for criticism, had hesitated 
to tone it down . De Gaulle's envoy in New Caledonia was simply echoing 
Pleven's interpretation of the new Churchill-de Gaulle agreements and their 
application to the Pacific territories . But this could not be known in 
Whitehall . The impression rapidly gained ground there that the complaints 
coming from the Free French headquarters reflected a really serious 
situation in the French Pacific . 
On 25  April Desmond Morton, as chairman of the secret Committee on 
Foreign (Allied ) Resistance , thought the problem sufficiently serious to 
engage the attention of the full committee , and not merely its sub­
committee on economic problems. He had received from Pleven an 'urgent 
plea' on the lines of Somerville Smith's letter mentioned above and believed 
that a political problem was fast developing. Pleven had represented to him 
that Ballard , as the Australian government 's representative at Noume�, was 
'creating a most unfavourable impression including the belief, however 
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ill-founded, that Australia merely desires to exploit New Caledonia in 
Australian interests'. The Free French were urging nothing less than that 
economic cooperation with the French Pacific colonies should be taken out of 
the hands of the DominioIJ.s governments concerned and reserved to the United 
Kingdom, and that urgent steps should be taken to purchase all or part of 
the Pacific copra crop . (The small but annoying problem of copra disposal 
was at that moment being sorted out on a Pacific-wide basis ; it need not 
detain us here , though it appears to have been grotesquely inflated in the 
minds of some people at Free French headquarters.) Morton felt that the 
committee should consider whether it should recommend these or any other 
measures to remedy 'the present state of acute dissatisfaction on the part 
of the Free French '. 1 2 
Over the next few days a teapot tempest raged in Whitehall . The Free 
French, invited to amplify their complaints, did so in a memorandum 
of several thousand words,  asserting that New Caledonia's economic interests 
had been sacrificed to those of the British empire , in that (notably) the 
Free French had been induced unduly to limit New Caledonia 's trade with 
J apan in nickel and iron ore , and the British government should see that 
French producers were compensated accordingly . 1 3  Voluminous minutes 
flowed from the pens of officials in the Foreign , Dominions and Colonial 
Offices and the Ministry of Economic Warfare . There was clearly some 
tendency in the Foreign Office to suspect that the Free French had grounds 
for complaint and . should be appeased . It is agreeable to record that the 
Dominions Office kept its feet firmly on the ground. 'The odds are ', noted 
one official discerningly , 'that it is the ill-famed M. Bayardelle who is largely 
responsible for this agitation and I hope therefore the committee will be 
firm' . 14 The Ministry of Economic Warfare pointed out that some of the 
Free French statistics originated in Tokyo, that the Pleven memorandum 
correspondingly inflated the size of 'normal ' trade between New Caledonia 
and J apan and that the high prices offered by J apan to the New Caledonian 
'small miners' were available only because the British empire had renounced 
nickel sales to that country . 
We are now asked to embrace this South Sea bubble, production and prices and 
all , and we are asked to do this in a memorandum whose theme is that we hav e  
discriminated against Free French territories to our own advantage. I S 
Indeed Bayardelle 's hand is clearly to be seen . in all this pointless fuss which 
Rene Pleven, the future Minister of Colonies of the Fourth Republic , had 
so lightly been persuaded to make. It led nowhere . The Dominions Office 
saw it as politically and administratively quite unthinkable for the United 
Kingdom to agree to bypass the Dominions in the way suggested from 
Carlton Gardens. The incident seems to have fizzled out with soothing 
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explanations on current issues and promises by the United Kingdom to take 
up with the Dominions any new matters in which the Free French might 
feel there was discrimination against the French territories.  That was the 
solution suggested by the Dominions Office. No significant echoes of the 
misgivings felt in Carlton Gardens seem to have reached Canberra. (Of 
course the solution of the foreign exchange question at this point removed 
a principal Free French grievance . )  
The Australian government and the allegedly tactless Ballard would indeed 
have been justifiably startled to learn the low opinion of their conduct 
held by Free French headquarters. On 25 April, as Pleven's complaints 
were being circulated to the Morton committee with its chairman's 
comprehensive comments, the Acting Prime Minister of Australia (A.W. 
Fadden) was writing to the Minister for External Affairs ( Sir Frederick 
Stewart) emphasizing the need to keep up the momentum of Australian 
assistance to New Caledonia and requesting proposals for the solution of 
current economic problems . Referring to the War Cabinet meeting which 
had taken place on 1 7 April , Fadden said : 
You will be aware that the feeling of War Cabinet wa s that, in view of the 
relative importance of the preservation of the integrity of New Caledonia to the 
defence of the Commonwealth of Australia, it was desirable that in the 
adjustment of these outstanding economic questions, the Commonwe alth 
should approach the problem in a generous spirit even if such would mean 
the final acceptance by the Commonwealth Government of some financial 
liability in connection with these problems . . .  
In view of the present international situation and the moral effect that the 
position in Greece and in the Mediterranean generally may have had in 
communities which have had confidence in an ultimate British victory, I am 
particularly concerned that the people of New Caledonia should have no cause 
to feel that the Commonwealth Government has broken faith with them. 16 
So much for 'lack of diplomatic experience ' .  
On the same day Georges Dubois , whose steadfast bearing and obvious 
good sense had so impressed the War Cabinet, anxious for reassurance as 
to New Caledonia's loyalty to de Gaulle ,  was attending the Anzac Day 
parade in Sydney before returning to Noumea to report to Sautot that he 
had encountered no difficulty whatsoever in upholding the principles set 
forth in the latter's instructions to him - principles indistinguishable from 
those being asserted as vigorously as superfluously by Free French head­
quarters in London. 
In the area concerned, in fact, all was going rather well . But de Gaulle 
was still sceptical . As he summed up the Pacific situation in his memoirs : 
[ French authority] had to be exercised on the spot in a satisfactory manner. 
This could be no easy task in view of the extreme remoteness and scattered 
nature of our islands, their lack of resources and the character of their population, 
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who were indeed much attached to France - as their ralliement had shown -
but who at the same time were turbulent and receptive to intrigues stirred up 
by local and foreign interests. Moreover many of the best servicemen had 
left Oceania on my orders to fight in Africa in the Free French forces . . .  This 
Pacific contribution to the battles for the liberation of France was highly 
significant but it made the direct defence of our possessions more difficult.  
F inally , the economic life of these distant territories was disorganized by the 
state of war. In sum, there was a clear need for as strong and centralized an 
authority as possible in Oceania. 17 
This assessment was sadly misguided , but it is comprehensible that de 
Gaulle , beset by recurring and bitter disputes with his British allies and justly 
apprehensive of American attitudes to the French empire in general and his 
own movement in particular, wished to have on the spot a loyal , trusted 
and able representative . The matter was made more urgent by the need 
to sort out Governor-General Brunot 's increasingly incomprehensible 
conduct in Tahiti, to which he had transferred his activities early in J une. 
On 9 July from Cairo , where he was in the midst of a blazing row with 
the British over Syria and Lebanon, de Gaulle telegraphed to Free French 
headquarters directing that Captain Georges Thierry d 'Argenlieu take up 
immediately the post of High Commissioner for France in the Pacific, 
his mission being 'to restore finally and without half-measures the authority 
of Free France in the Pacific , to put to work for the war all our resources 
there , and to ensure in unison with our allies the defence of the French 
territories against all possible ( and perhaps imminent) dangers' .  The High 
Commissioner was authorized to take 'such steps as he might consider 
necessary in regard to persons . . .  ' .  That, at least , is the text published by 
de Gaulle . i s  According to another French author the enigmatic dots cover 
the omission of a sentence saying more specifically 'if he considers it 
desirable he may replace Governor Sautot at Noumea as Governor of New 
Caledonia' . 1 9 However that may be , there can be no doubt that serious 
doubts were already held at Free French headquarters as to Sautot 's 
continued fitness for his task . 
De Gaulle 's chosen senior representative in the Pacific was a singular man 
indeed .  D 'Argenlieu, born at Brest in 1 889 ,  had followed a family tradition 
in entering the Navy , and had served afloat as a lieutenant in the first World 
War. In 1920 he took holy orders and later became head of the Paris 
province of the Carmelite order. Mobilized in 19 39 as a rather elderly 
lieutenant-commander, he took part in the defence of Cherbourg, was 
captured , escaped and joined de Gaulle who rapidly promoted him to 
Captain . He was an unflinching opponent of Vichy and most people , 
including that acute observer S .M. Bruce , found him impressive .20 He had been 
de Gaulle 's principal negotiator at Dakar where he had been wounded by a 
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Vichy sub-lieutenant. De Gaulle , who rarely put people on pedestals, had a 
quite extraordinarily high regard for the new High Commissioner. As he 
wrote later : 
I had confidence in d 'Argenlieu. His high-mindedness and his firmness put him 
morally in a position to dominate intrigues. His qualities of leadership gave me 
the assurance that our resources would be used vigorously but rationally. His 
aptitude for diplomacy would find good use .21 
It is one of the continuing mysteries of de Gaulle's career that he obstinately 
maintained for many years an almost unique confidence in this man who 
served him zealously but can be seen in retrospect to have done much more 
harm than good to the cause of French nationalism which the General 
himself pursued so long and skilfully . It is the stranger in that d 'Argenlieu , 
far from being the paragon of moral and diplomatic qualities suggested in 
the passage just quoted , was in fact a rather limited man,  embodying many 
of the unamiable characteristics which have of ten been imputed to de Gaulle 
himself - especially pride, vanity and above all rigidity - but which if 
taken alone would furnish a pitifully inadequate explanation of the General's 
many successes. If de Gaulle possessed these qualities he knew when and 
how to trancend them. As is well known , he could be maddeningly obstinate , 
but on occasion he could be flexible ,  and his career included some startling 
changes of course .  D 'Argenlieu was , as General Patch wrote later, 'vain , 
meticulous , devious and ambitious', but he lacked de Gaulle 's breadth of 
vision. The distinguished French journalist J ean Lacouture put it very well 
when surveying the failure of d 'Argenlieu's later mission in Indo-China : 
'd' Argenlieu , a man of small stature and lofty pride, was never anything 
more than an executant of de Gaulle's policies' . 22  His all too literal inter­
pretation and execution of de Gaulle 's instructions frequently led him into 
excesses of zeal which might have been thought calculated to annoy the 
intolerant General . But they did not, or at least not until very much later . 
( 'Remy' describes de Gaulle in 1 94 7 as wishing aloud that 'that monk would 
go back to his cloister' ) . 2 3 
Perhaps the explanation of de Gaulle's  partiality to d 'Argenlieu is to be 
found in the undoubtedly firm and loyal encouragement he had received 
from him during the dismal retreat from Dakar when the General , as he 
recalled later, was 'learning to the full just what reactions fear can cause 
both in opponents revenging themselves for having been afraid and in allies 
suddenly dismayed by defeat' .24 Anyway de Gaulle's  confidence in him and 
in his ability to unscramble what seemed to him the difficult internal and 
external situation of the Pacific territories was unshakeable . 
At this point Sautot learned of Brunot's intrigue to have him replaced on 
the grounds that his health was failing. On 2 3  July he sent de Gaulle a long 
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and emotional telegram asserting that his health was completely restored, 
that he remained devoted to de Gaulle but that he would oppose Brunot 's 
return to N oumea, by force if necessary . If the worst came to the worst 
he was prepared to hand over his functions to a 'clean ' man but not a 
'disreputable politician ' like Brunot . He demanded to be informed whether 
he still had the General 's confidence . He implied clearly that the French 
population of New Caledonia and the New Hebrides was making common 
cause with him.2 s 
Here was a pretty mess . On 30 July de Gaulle sent Sautot a soothing 
telegram from Brazzaville to the effect that he had appointed d 'Argenlieu 
as High Commissioner with full civil and military authority but with the 
special task of putting the Pacific colonies on a better defence footing. He 
assured Sautot of his confidence, asked him to be calm and told him that 
steps were being taken to curb Brunot .26 Indeed, he had already sent a 
second message to d 'Argenlieu from Beirut on 26 J uly , saying: 
Go at once to the Pacific, where the situation must be restored. When you have 
formed an opinion on the spot you will take or propose all measures you 
consider useful. Please telegraph on my behalf to Sautot that he has my 
confidence but that he should stay calm but above all pas de zele. Please tell 
Brunot from me that he is to keep quiet until your arrival.27 
D 'Argenlieu duly telegraphed to Sautot on 5 August but his message 
was not of a nature to reassure Sautot fully .2 8 It gave the impression that 
Brunot 's allegations were indeed the source of the changes being made , 
though Brunot was now himself discredited , and d 'Argenlieu repeated the 
General 's assurance of confidence in Sautot,  which was beginning to .have 
a rather hollow ring. Sautot in fact took it well , but he was then under the 
impression that d 'Argenlieu's headquarters would be at Papeete .29 When, 
later in August ,  he learned that d 'Argenlieu was in fact coming to Noumea 
with a large staff he was inclined to suggest to de Gaulle that Noumea 
was too small to hold both a High Commissioner and a Governor and to 
submit his own resignation. On 25 August the Administrative Council of 
New Caledonia unanimously decided to submit to de Gaulle that 
d 'Argenli.eu's appointment was welcome but that it should be subject to the 
following conditions : 
( 1 )  the authority and prerogatives of Sautot as Governor of New 
Caledonia should remain unimpaired ; 
(2 )  the functions of the High Commissioner should be confined to 
matters of defence and external relations; 
( 3) no part of the expense of the High Commissioner's organization 
should be borne by New Caledonia; 
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( 4) the authority of the Council in economic matters should remain 
unimpaired ; 
(5 )  in no circumstances should Bayardelle return to New Caledonia. 
Talking to Ballard next day, Sau tot seemed satisfied with this solution. 
While obviously hurt , reported Ballard, he was prepared to put the national 
issues involved before his personal feelings, but he repeated that if de 
Gaulle wanted to combine the two offices he was quite prepared to offer 
his own resignation.3o 
Meanwhile the Australian government and British representatives at Suva 
and Vila, already concerned at Brunot's now widely known campaign against 
Sautot ,  and thinking - probably rightly , despite repeated denials from 
Carlton Gardens - to detect the continued influence of Bayardelle, 
unanimously protested against what seemed to them to be a plan to super­
sede Sautot,  however it might be presented . On 9 August Menzies ,  having 
learned from Bruce that d 'Argenlieu had notified him of his appointment 
as High Commissioner with headquarters at Noumea, telegraphed to express 
concern. Ballard , he said , had reported that the administration of New 
Caledonia was running satisfactorily and that the political position, unlike 
that of Tahiti, was quite stable . Sautot was popular and d 'Argenlieu's 
appointment would be a blow to his prestige and to New Caledonian pride . 
Our aim, apart from maintaining economic position, has been to promote 
political stability in French Oceania and in our view the appointment of high 
officials from outside who are not conversant with local conditions and with 
the characteristics of a people who differ greatly from those in metropolitan 
France and other parts of the French colonial empire does not assist us in this 
objective .31 
Similar protests reached London from Luke in Suva and Blandy in Vila . 
They were not based on d 'Argenlieu 's personality , the less amiable features 
of which were still to be revealed , but on the damage to Free French morale 
in the area held likely to result from Sautot 's demotion or supersession . 
Unfortunately , but no doubt inevitably,  they were counterproductive, in 
view of de Gaulle 's attitude . On 1 2  September Professor Rene Cassin wrote 
in bland terms to Somerville Smith referring to Menzies's representations :  
General de G aulle indeed received from M.  Sautot a telegram offering his 
resignation as Governor but he instructed me to reply to him that he retained his 
confidence in him. 
Captain d 'Argenlieu 's role is much wider than that of local government and, 
while possessing wide civil functions, he will be concerned especially with 
the defence organization of the French possessions in the whole Pacific area, as 
is shown by the assignment to that duty of almost all the staff accompanying him . 
Iii these circumstances Governor Sautot 's situation in his island remains 
intact. No one forgets the signal services which he has rendered to Free France 
and to the cause of the alliance with the peoples of the British Commonwealth. 32 
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O n  22 August Bruce reported to Menzies that there was no question of 
annulling d 'Argenlieu 's appointment but that profuse assurances on the 
lines indicated by Cassin had been given by Free French headquarters.33 
On 8 September, indeed, Sau tot told Ballard that he had received a 
'comforting ' telegram from de Gaulle but he was clearly apprehensive at 
the impending arrival of the High Commissioner and a large staff and at 
the prospect of being subjected to the day to day supervison of which he 
had had a distasteful experience during the Brunot mission. He settled down 
uneasily to await their arrival .34 
A letter addressed to Sautot by d'Argenlieu from Honolulu on 1 6  
September gives a significant foretaste of the spirit in which he was 
approaching his mission to 'restore the authority of Free France' .  Among 
the military questions to which he would be giving his attention, he said , 
would be that of an agreement between Australia and Free France on 
military assistance to New Caledonia. 'We have never known in London 
what action was taken on our message of J une last in this regard . '  Clearly 
a new look was about to be taken at the whole subject of the French 
territories ' relations with their 'Anglo-Saxon' neighbours .3s 
It was already plain to de Gaulle in London that the most redoubtable 
of these neighbours was the still neutral United States. War clouds were 
obviously gathering in the Pacific, to which the Americans would have to 
give increasing attention, and it was in the Free French interest to organize 
cooperation with the Americans on a more systematic basis than that of the 
'episodic and local arrangements' which they had hitherto been prepared 
to make with this or that French authority . In de Gaulle 's own words , 
'in proportion as the United States saw war approaching, Washington showed 
more attention to us . . . The United States' entry into the war made it 
necessary for them to cooperate with Free France . '36 He was right to discern 
a situation offering favourable possibilities ,  and d 'Argenlieu's mission was 
essentially to make the best use of it . Unhappily, as we shall see , the Admiral 
was to attack the question with his usual excess of zeal and in doing so to 
cause much unnecessary offence to the Americans and the other Allies. 
At this stage , though, one of the complications in the problem of Free 
French relations with the United States was the Americans'  obstinate belief 
in the importance of safeguarding their links with Vichy . On the eve of 
d 'Argenlieu's assignment to the Pacific , Pleven, at the conclusion of a visit 
to the United States ,  had reported himself 'shocked by the disastrous effect 
of Vichy policy on the position of France in America' . 37 He was not 
exaggerating. 
5 Vichy, the United States and the French Pacific Territories 
IN THE PERSPECTIVE of the 3 7 years which have passed since the demise 
of the Vichy regime, little good can be said of it. The apologiae produced 
by its surviving partisans, the obvious difficulties which can be seen to have 
confronted it, even the undoubted goodwill of some who in 1 940 allowed 
themselves to be swayed by Marshal Petain's enormous prestige - none 
of this can change , or excuse, the facts that the armistice regime began by 
wilfully abstracting from the armed struggle thousands of trained soldiers , 
important naval forces and vast territories that remained outside the Nazi 
grasp ; that it sought to destroy republican government in France, and that 
under the guise of 'neutrality '  it pursued policies marked by an increasing 
content of complicity with the Axi s  powers. 
Vichy's foreign policy from 1 940 to 1 942 was essentially a gigantic 
confidence trick, a diplomacy of bad faith practised by a government with 
no real power base or bargaining counters except the constantly implied 
threat of behaving even more malevolently if it were not handled with kid 
gloves .  It worked . The United States Secretary of State , Cordell Hull , said 
on 2 1  J anuary 1 942 (as reported by the new Free French delegate in 
Washington, Adrien Tixier) that while the United States had no sympathy 
for most of the men of the Vichy government nor for that mediocre regime 
in general , it wished above all to avoid the intervention of the French fleet 
against the Allies and the use of North African bases by the Axis. During the 
past months this policy, he claimed , had borne fruit . Vichy had not yielded 
up the fleet nor the bases. 'It seemed to be putting up a greater resistance , 
thanks to United States pressure . ' 1 (During the preceding months , in fact, 
Darlan had been energetically pursuing efforts to achieve a thoroughgoing 
alliance with Germany . )  
The Secretary of  State 's contention was hotly refuted by Tixier and later 
by de Gaulle himself, who wrote for Hull 's eyes a note seeking to recall him 
to the larger issues involved : 
The consideration shown by the United States for those French authorities 
whose raison d 'etre is to prevent France from fighting constitutes for the French 
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nation a most dangerously demoralizing factor. I t  i s  the more harmful in that 
it is the opposite of the attitude - at least equally discreditable - adopted by 
the United States towards the only Frenchmen carrying on the war alongside 
the Allies . . . 2 
It was all to no avail, though Hull was deluding himself in thinking that 
the United States exercised any significant influence on Vichy policy .3  
The Petain government kept the fleet and the bases out of German hands 
for reasons of its own : old-fashioned imperialism, fear of the effect which 
all-out collaboration might have on French public opinion, but above all 
because it could never get a good enough deal from the Germans . For Hitler 
the Vichy government was a convenience , a labour saving device : he was 
never prepared to recognize it as a partner in full collaboration. 
Adrienne D .  Hytier , an author who strives to be scrupulously fair to the 
men of Vichy, remarks on the 'stubborn will to collaborate ' with Germany 
which prevailed at Vichy at the end of 1 941  and early in 1 942, when 
Admiral Darlan, in a talk with Admiral Raeder, looked forward explicitly 
to the time 'when France would be on Germany's side' and there would 
be a 'European navy '.4 More recently, examining Vichy policy in the light 
of German as well as French records, Robert 0 .  Paxton has described 
Darlan's 'visions of a French naval and imperial power within a new 
continental system', a vision which was dissipated only because Hitler and 
Ribbentrop were unwilling to pay any significant price for total French 
association with the Reich. s  Secretary Hull, however, remained obstinately 
convinced of the value of seeking to keep Vichy in play , witness his warning 
to Roosevelt of 'ominous and serious developments ' likely to follow de 
Gaulle 's seizure in December 1941  of the tiny colony of Saint Pierre and 
Miquelon, off the Canadian coast , about which in fact Vichy could and did 
do no more than lodge empty protests.6 Hull would not recognize that this 
emperor had , in fact, no clothes - that , as an American diplomat said later, 
the Vichy regime was 'a banana republic without any bananas'. 1 It had 
neither the will nor, finally, the power to satisfy American desiderata . 
Vichy policy toward the French Pacific territories is an interesting case 
study of the Petain regime in action, but it was one instance in which Vichy 
encountered a stiff American reaction . 
We have already surveyed the abortive Vichy attempt in 1 940 to preserve 
nominal control of New Caledonia at the expense of facile concessions to 
the Japanese. Until December 1 941  there was a lull , broken only by 
minatory noises from the nearest 'legitimate ' French authorities in Indo­
China and for a time by the occasional disruptive efforts of Vichy's 
acting consul-general in Sydney ,  M. Tremoulet .  At the end of 1940 there 
were rumours of a new Vichy expedition against New Caledonia, but it 
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seems doubtful whether such an expedition in fact set out from Saigon. 
A story occasionally heard that one of the naval vessels on the Indo-China 
station sailed for Noumea but was intercepted by HMAS A ustralia is clearly 
unfounded . 
Then came Pearl Harbor. This unparalleled disaster to American arms , 
and the J apanese assault on the Philippines, seemed to Vichy to presage a 
decisive J apanese victory in the Asia-Pacific region. It occurred simultaneously 
to Darlan and to Admiral Decoux at Hanoi that the new situation might well 
present an opportunity to fish in the troubled waters of the Pacific . By a 
decree of 1 9  pecember 1 94 1  Petain appointed Decoux 'High Commissioner 
for France in the Pacific' and purported to invest him with authority over 
all the French territories in the area. At the same time Darlan instructed 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to consult the Japanese embassy at Vichy 
to see whether it might not be appropriate to extend the agreement for j oint 
defence of Indo-China to the Pacific colonies. If so , French aircraft and a 
detachment of French troops could take part in the event of action against 
New Caledonia. 8 
The same idea had presented itself to Admiral Berenger, commanding 
the French naval forces at Saigon. On 2 1  December he telegraphed to 
Vichy : 
The impending fall of the Philippines and Singapore will radically change the 
situation in the Pacific, the China Sea and even the Indian Ocean. In order 
to safeguard our interests and keep up with events I should like to draw your 
attention to the real possibilities, which of course all depend on the agreement 
and support of the J apanese government . . . 9 
One of the proposals which Berenger proceeded to outline was for the 
recapture of New Caledonia by the Vichy French , who would offer the 
J apanese preferred access to the island 's nickel 'which they need so much 
that they will occupy New Caledonia themselves if we do not do so our­
selves'. He was preparing forthwith, he added, a plan for the reconquest of 
New Caledonia, which seemed to him to be quite practicable using only the 
forces available in Indo-China. ( Later Decoux and Berenger decided that 
reinforcements from Madagascar would be needed . )  
The Vichy Navy Ministry appears initially to have been attracted by 
Berenger 's scheme . On 30 December i t  approved the preparation of  an 
operational plan , warning at the same time that its execution would be  
subject to  a further decison taking account of  the political and strategic 
situation, and instructing him to keep in touch with Decoux, who would 
be receiving separate instructions. 
Decoux himself, in his apologia for his stewardship in Indo-China, where 
he gives a misleading impression of firmness in dealing with the J apanese , 
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passes lightly over his ephemeral Pacific appointment, saying only : 
At the beginning of 1 942 I had to concern myself with the situation in New 
Caledonia, our great island in the South Pacific, which seemed likely at any 
moment to be included in the J apanese operational area. In agreement with the 
naval commander in Indo-China I thought briefly of sending out a small naval 
squadron which , arriving in New Caledonia before the J apanese forces, would 
have affirmed our permanent sovereignty, acting in the name of the Marshal 's 
government, the only French authority recognized by Tokyo . The development 
of the strategic situation in the South Pacific, an unfavourable reply from the 
Vichy Ministry of Colonies and finally , and especially, the Americans' arrival 
in force at Noumea, caused this idea to be abandoned very quickly . From that 
moment New Caledonia was sheltered from any danger. lo 
This was hindsight. Decoux was evidently delighted with the new hat 
which Vichy had invited him to wear,  and he had no intention of regarding 
his new appointment as a merely symbolic one . He prided himself on being 
an old Pacific hand, having served two commissions on the Pacific naval 
station ,  one of them ( 1 925 -2 7 ) as commander of the small naval forces in 
the area. He was a reactionary anti-republican who believed that the Pacific 
territories had been woefully mishandled by the 'demagogues' of the Third 
Republic ; he dreamed of conferring on them the blessings of Petain's 
'national revolution', and to this end he was quite prepared to accept a 
Franco-] apanese relationship in the Pacific analogous to that which already 
prevailed shamelessly in Inda-China. On 2 3rd J anuary 1 942 he telegraphed 
to Vichy an appeal for approval 'in principle' of the naval operation 
proposed a month earlier , which he considered should be undertaken 'as 
soon as the Japanese zone of action came sufficiently close to New 
Caledonia'. Rabaul seemed likely to fall shortly : the question, he submitted , 
was urgent. On the evening of the same day,  apparently looking forward to 
the approval of his plan, the 'High Commissioner' chose to lecture the 
Pacific colonists direct in a lengthy radio broadcast blending threats , 
cajolery and adulation of the aged Marshal in a style sadly characteristic of 
the regime he served : 
Of course, to err is human. But perseverance in error becomes criminal. You 
have erred ; you have excuses for that. There would be no excuse if you 
waited any longer to change your ways. The Marshal, in his great wisdom and 
immense goodness, will be able to tell who are the criminal instigators of 
dissidence and, having punished them, will open wide France 's doors to her 
lost children. What, therefore, is your duty now? It is not, of course, to engage 
at once and individually in conflict with the authorities which, though illegal, 
dominate you by force at least. 
You must, however, attempt to group all sound and loyal elements and hold 
yourselves ready to take advantage of any propitious circumstances to shake off 
the odious yoke which you bear. Try by every means to get in touch with us 
and keep us informed ; be ready to welcome and help those who, I hope, will 
shortly restore to your isles the undefaced [ i.e. of course undefaced by the 
Gaullist Cross of Lorraine] and glorious flag of eternal France . . . l l  
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This tirade seems the more astonishing in that Admiral Decoux had after 
all some first-hand acquaintance with New Caledonia and the New Caledonian 
French . In his memoirs published in 1953  he describes the latter as 'vigorous , 
active , headstrong, very patriotic but attached above all to "their island" ' . 1 2  
At the time , however, carried away by his zeal for the Petainist 'national 
revolution', he appears to have deluded himself that he was going to be able 
to teach the errant colonists a sharp lesson . For a moment at Noumea, where 
there was yet no sure sign of massive reinforcement or direct American support 
as the fate of the Allied cause hung in the balance,  people wondered whether 
the Admiral might yet be able to execute the in absentz'a sentences freely 
handed down by the Saigon courts in the preceding months. 
Such fears were unjustified . On 23  J anuary 1942 ,  as Decoux was 
preaching Petain's gospel from Radio Saigon, several more important things 
were happening. A hastily-assembled American task force was sailing from 
New York, bound for New Caledonia. (But for security reasons the French 
were not informed until much later . )  The State Department had already 
been aroused by earlier signs of Decoux 's Pacific ambitions,  and on the 
day of the notorious broadcast the Vichy Ambassador at Washington , 
Gaston Henry-Haye , was being warned against any attempt to extend 
Decoux 's influence into the Pacific or Indian Oceans.  Henry-Haye undertook 
'on his own initiative to emphasize with his Government the importance of 
maintaining the present status quo of French possessions in the Pacific ' . 1 3  
Colonel J .  Legrand, in his refutation of Decoux 's apologia, suggests 
that this expression of American anxiety was not relayed to Vichy until 
27 January . 14 However that might be ,  the Vichy government took, on 
26 January , a decisive step to restrain the 'High Commissioner' .  Through the 
Naval Ministry it warned him that, while the Japanese embassy in France was 
eagerly collecting maps and information on New Caledonia and J apan's 
early intervention there seemed certain , Vichy had no intention of being 
drawn into belligerence on the Japanese side .  It went on : 
Already the United States government " is alarmed at the idea of a Franco-Japanese 
operation in New Caledonia. The French government 's policy must be to spare 
no effort to remain aloof from the Pacific conflict, in which an attempt to 
retake the colony would certainly involve us. The operation would bring us 
into conflict with the Australian troops assigned to its defence. The ensuing 
Japanese pressure would alienate from us the maj ority of the 1 5 ,000 loyal 
French, of whose close links with the neighbouring Commonwealth you are 
aware. Even though we attained mastery of the island we should be incapable 
of supplying it, and we should not forget that it was mainly the supply problem 
which led to its dissidence. Finally, the United States would not fail to 
retaliate by taking severely coercive measures such as seizing our American 
colonies and suspending the seaborne traffic currently permitted between 
the Antilles and North Africa. They might, moreover, encourage the Chinese 
to pursue their plan for a blow against Tonkin, whereas we have precisely 
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been seeking to have them exert a moderating influence in this regard. 
These considerations, together with the Navy 's inability to provide , even on 
a limited scale, the reinforcements needed for the recovery operation, support 
our decision not to act in present circumstances but to await more favourable 
developments before restoring our sovereignty in the Pacific. 
This prudent instruction did not reach Hanoi in time to prevent Decoux 
from despatching a long telegram tortuously expounding the supposed 
advantages of a Franco-] apanese coup . But Vichy had had enough . No more 
was heard of it, despite the Admiral 's best efforts to deserve the Order of 
the Rising Sun ( first class) with which he was invested on 2 5 January . 
On 5 February the American consul at Noumea, reporting to Washington 
that an Australian officer had mentioned to him an intercepted Japanese 
message asserting that Decoux had agreed to cooperate with the J apanese 
in taking possession of all French territory in the Pacific added : 
In this connection d'Argenlieu recently gave me to understand that he believed 
the State Department had come to some agreement with Vichy whereby no 
protection would be given by the United States to French possessions in the 
Pacific. He inferred that this belief was also shared by General de Gaulle . 
The State Department immediately instructed him to assure d 'Argenlieu 
that no such agreement existed, remarking that it had assumed that the 
latter would already have received indications to the contrary from London. 1 s 
Indeed d'Argenlieu was, or ought to have been, well aware that American 
help was on the way . As early as 25 J anuary Free French headquarters 
had transmitted to him a message from Washington in this sense and had 
instructed him to continue to assist and cooperate with the Americans . 1 6  In 
the absence of any testimony of his own, 1 7  it seems likely that he was 
seeking to extract an unequivocal statement of American respect , for the 
French National Committee's authority in the area. Four days later Tixier 
sought such a statement from Assistant Secretary of State Berle , remarking 
that while he himself knew Decoux 's claims that 'the United States 
recognized him as the authority in the Pacific' to be unjustified, their public 
expression was calculated to have undesirable effects.  He was persuaded to 
put aside for 'a couple of weeks or so' his request for a public declaration of 
Americai:i intentions. On 1 7  February d'Argenlieu tried agam. Consul 
MacVitty telegraphed from Noumea: 
The High Commissioner, in connection with the probable defence of New 
Caledonia by United States forces, requests that he be assured that the American 
Government recognizes that French sovereig-J!ty of the French Pacific possession 
is exercised by General de Gaulle 's Comit� National Fran<;ais. Also whether 
an attack by Vichy adherents from Indochina in joint action with the J apanese 
would be resisted by the American forces. 
Two days later he was authorized to convey to d'Argenlieu the carefully 
limited assurance that ' in all matters connected with the defense of New 
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Caledonia [ the United States] Government is prepared to recognize that 
the French National Committee has authority over the Island'.  He was 
to add that the United States had already warned Vichy against any inter­
ference in the Pacific. 1  s 
On 22 February Tixier returned to the charge in Washington, asking 
the State Department, on instructions from de Gaulle, that the National 
Committee's authority over the French Pacific possessions should be 
explicitly recognized . This time the Americans were more forthcoming. 
They responded by preparing and sending to Noumea 'for whatever use 
[ the High Commissioner] may choose to make of it ' a statement reaffirming 
the 'local authorities' policy but with a new emphasis befitting the United 
States ' belligerent status,  and obviously more satisfactory to the Free 
French : 
The policy of the Government of the United States as regards France and 
French territory has been based upon the maintenance of the integrity of 
France and of the French Empire and of the eventual restoration of the 
complete independence of all French territories. Mindful of its traditional 
friendship for France, this Government deeply sympathizes not only with the 
desire of the French people to maintain their territories intact but with the 
efforts of the French people to continue to resist the forces of aggression. In 
its relations with the local French authorities in French territories the United 
States has been and will continue to be governed by the manifest effectiveness 
with which those authorities endeavour to protect their territories from 
domination and control by the common enemy . 
With the French authorities in effective control of French territories in the 
Pacific this Government has treated and will continue to treat on the basis of 
their actual administration of the territories involved. This Government 
recognizes, in particular, that French island possessions in that area are under 
the effective control of the French National Committee established in London 
and the United States authorities are cooperating for the defence of these islands 
with the authorities established by the French National Committee and with no 
other French authority. This Government appreciates the importance of New 
Caledonia in the defense of the Pacific area. 19 
This statement, made public in Noumea on 28 February and in Washington 
on 2 March , evoked a protest from Vichy which the Acting Secretary of 
State , Sumner Welles, summarily rejected, saying to Henry-Haye on 5 March 
It was inconceivable that the Vichy Government would expect us to discuss 
with it arrangements covering military and naval co-operation with the French 
in French islands in the Pacific over which the Vichy Government had no 
control whatever and much less to discuss those questions with the French 
Commissioner in Indochina who was engaged in a policy of all out and open 
collaboration with the J apanese.20 
All this was satisfactory enough to the Free French , so far as the Pacific 
was concerned . But a residue of suspicion remained from the United States' 
generally reticent attitude toward the French National Committee. As the 
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first Allied commander of  the South Pacific area, Vice-Admiral Ghormley, 
was to write on 2 August 1 942 to Maj or-General A.M. Patch , commanding 
the first American task force in New Caledonia, who had been at odds with 
d 'Argenlieu: 
One thing we must both remember, the Free French resent very much that our 
Government through some of its diplomatic leads, plays both ends against the 
middle more or less. We might call that the 'grand diplomacy ', that is , they do 
deal [ s] with Vichy and they do deal with the Free French. The Free French 
resent this. In other words, this is a very ticklish situation.21 
It was indeed . D 'Argenlieu 's conduct as de Gaulle 's envoy in the Pacific 
represented a reductz'o ad absurdum of Free French misgivings, and it was 
the source of serious inter-allied differences as the Americans became 
involved on the spot in a way quite unforeseen only slightly earlier. 
6 The A merican involvement in the South Pacific 
IN THE LATTER part of 1 94 1 ,  but still some time before the United States ' 
entry into the war, Australia's efforts in coope.ration with the Free French to 
strengthen New Caledonia's air defences were seen to mesh with new 
American plans to strengthen the defences of the Philippines . 
As late as July 1 941 the United States had no plan for large scale rein­
forcement of its Philippines dependency in the event of war or imminent 
threat of war with J apan.1 The contingency plan known as RAINBOW 5 
drawn up in April 1 941 , in the light of British-American staff talks held at 
Washington between J anuary and March, provided for a holding operation 
only in the Philippines area . In land, sea and air forces the Army and Navy 
commands at Manila would have to make do with the resources which they 
had .2 In February the War Department had discouraged aspirations by the 
Air Corps to promote airfield development in the Pacific, on the grounds 
that 'neither the War or the Navy Department [had] any plan for operations 
that would require the movement of long-range army bombardment aviation 
to the Orient , nor [could] the need for such a plan be foreseen' .3  
From July the situation changed with great rapidity . The United States' 
political attitude to Japan was stiffening and a complex of factors was 
leading to a new determination to reinforce and defend the Philippines 
and if possible to make it a springboard for a counter-offensive against 
Japan.4 
At the operational level, the new approach to the defence of the Philippines 
was based to an appreciable extent on a new conception of the use of long 
range bombers to supplement the weak American and British Commonwealth 
naval forces in the Far East and neutralize J apanese offensive capacity. The 
American high command, traditionally extremely conservative on the uses 
of strategic aviation, became extraordinarily air-minded as it contemplated 
the possible role in an island war of the Army Air F orces ' e.xcellent new 
bomber, the B l  7 Flying Fortress, now coming off the production lines in 
fair numbers. In August the Secretary of War approved an upgrading of the 
Philippines'  priority for modem aircraft .s The only practicable way of 
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delivering heavy bombers , a s  they became available, was to  fly them to 
their destinations ; and in the Pacific there was a notable lack of airfields 
capable of accommodating B l  7s in transit or of serving as bases from which 
they could protect sea communications with the Philippines .  The first 
Fortresses flown to Manila went by way of Midway and Wake islands , 
far north of the equator, a perilously exposed route in the event of war . 
A safer alternative route was urgently needed and the War Department, 
reversing its previous decision, now gave a very high priority to the develop­
ment of South Pacific ferry routes. 
Through the British J oint Staff Mission in Washington (on which Australia 
was represented by the three service attaches at the Australian Legation) 
the War Department requested cooperation by the British , Australian and 
New Zealand authorities in the development of facilities for the transit of 
heavy bombers through the South Pacific islands and Australia. The 
Australian government, gratified by this active American involvement in 
its area, replied on 26 September that it would be glad to reconnoitre and 
survey any sites which the Americans wanted to investigate in the Solomons, 
the New Hebrides and New Caledonia. It recommended. strongly that any 
trans-Pacific reinforcement route should pass through New Caledonia, where 
three aerodromes were already being developed by the RAAF, whereas in 
the Solomons and the New Hebrides a start would have to be made from 
scratch . In New Caledonia there were, or soon would be, fuel stocks , radio 
communications and repair facilities. Moreover , regular passage of American 
aircraft through New Caledonia would have a helpful effect on the morale 
of this Free French territory .6 
On 1 5  October the United States government submitted a formal request 
for cooperation in the development of the Pacific landing fields to the 
British , Australian and New Zealand governments and to the Netherlands 
government in exile in London.? It did not approach the French National 
Committee in London. The State Department, in accordance with its 
policy of dealing only with local authorities in the various parts of the 
divided French empire, instructed the American consul at Noumea to 
take the matter up with High Commissioner d 'Argenlieu (who in fact had 
not yet reached N oumea from Tahiti) . 
On 22 October, MacVitty pointed out to the State Department that 
three airfields, one of which was near completion, were already being 
constructed in New Caledonia under arrangements made by the Australian 
government. He suggested that the War Department 's needs would be best 
served by cooperating with Australia in improving the projects already 
started .s The State Department, still anxious to keep its contacts with 
the Free French to a minimum , readily agreed and the matter was passed 
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back to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian D epartment (Major 
General Walter C. Short) to be taken up with technical authorities in 
Australia.9 But in practice this deliberate avoidance of contact with the 
French National Committee at the policy level or even, for the time being, 
at the level of its representative in the Pacific, was bound to lead to 
complications . Captain d 'Argenlieu, who was very shortly to be promoted 
to Rear-Admiral, was on his way to Noumea with firm instructions from de 
Gaulle to assert or , as the General put it, to reassert Free French authority 
there . One of his first assignments , as we have seen, was to sort out the 
defence arrangements already made with Australia, about which de Gaulle 
complained that he had not been adequately informed. Any new move by 
the Americans,  especially one that might appear to be covert, was sure to 
provoke d 'Argenlieu . It was a tempting idea to use the Australian backdoor 
to secure a base in New Caledonia,  but with the sensitive Free French 
things were not so simple . 
The Hawaiian Department, lacking political guidance , did not look before 
it leapt .  It sent two officers (one from the Air Corps and one from the 
Engineer Corps,  which at that stage was responsible for Army airfield 
construction) to carry out a reconnaissance on the ground .  All the arrange­
ments for this investigation were made through the New Zealand and 
Australian Service authorities . From d 'Argenlieu 's point of view, to use a 
favourite expression of his, this was a maladresse . On 1 November the 
Department of External Affairs , assuming wrongly that 'appropriate action ' 
had already been taken by the American consul at Noumea, instructed 
Ballard to inform d 'Argenlieu that Australia was cooperating fully in the 
air route project and to express the hope that he would do likewise in 
respect of New Caledonia and the New Hebrides. For his own information, 
Ballard was told that two United States Navy flying boats,  one of which 
was carrying the Director of Works from RAAF Headquarters , would arrive 
at Noumea from New Zealand shortly to investigate the possibility of 
strengthening the airfields sufficiently to take heavier United States aircraft . 1 0 
The aim was to have this work done ostensibly for the RAAF,  without 
the neutral United States figuring as a party principal.  The reconnaissance 
team arrived early in November without securing advance approval from the 
French authorities and,  although they were able to carry out their task , 
d 'Argenlieu ,  as MacVitty reported later , 1 1 showed deep resentment of the 
Hawaiian Department's unilateral action . 
The American officers '  main recommendation was that Plaine des Gaiacs , 
between Pouembout and Poya on the west coast, should be developed as 
the main landing field for heavy bombers, with Tontouta, closer to Noumea, 
as an emergency field . Technically this was sound advice and was a gratifying 
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vindication of the development efforts previously made by the RAAF 
and Australian civil engineers (with excellent cooperation from the colony's 
Director of Public Works) .  But politically the Americans seemed to be 
painting themselves into a corner . 
The reconnaissance party's findings, as reported to the War Department 
by General Short on 22 November, reflected bewilderment at the unfamiliar 
situation encountered during this sudden foray into French territory . 
The local situation in New Caledonia is at the present time rather confus�d. 
The population is apparently overwhelmingly Free French, but there has been 
considerable intrigue among the various local people to secure leadership. The 
Australians have a very small garrison (about 1 00 men) which includes their 
air corps personnel, in the vicinity of Noumea. The population at the Noumea 
end of the island is predominantly native, and a large part of the French and 
other racial groups are in this vicinity. According to a very hurried estimate , 
about 903 of the population on the other end of the island is J apanese and 
amounts to about 20,000 people . Since the new site is located in the part of 
the island where the J apanese population is predominant, very careful 
consideration must be given to the interior defence of this field . .  . 12 
The true number of Japanese present in New Caledonia (as MacVitty 
had reported on 4 November in a lengthy despatch replying to a War 
Department questionnaire on the military situation in New Caledonia) ,  
was 1 ,430 , 1 3  but the 20,000 phantom Japanese in the Hawaiian Department's 
report were to haunt War Department thinking for some time. Whether they 
were exorcized in time to prevent them from being a significant element in 
the later American decision to garrison the island with American troops 
does not appear clearly from the records ,  but at this stage , as in most 
countries,  liaison between the military and civil authorities was imperfect, 
and neither knew very much about New Caledonia . General Short pointed 
out to Washington that interior defence was a complicated problem on 
which he was in no position to make a snap recommendation . 
a dependence upon the Australian government, to defend an installation of the 
United States in a territory where both are aliens will present an anomalous 
situation. It is therefore recommended that very careful consideration be 
given to this matter in the War Department before a decision is reached as 
to whether the Australians should be requested to defend this installation 
.(Plaine des Gaiacs] or the responsibility for defence assumed by United States 
forces. 14 
De Gaulle, doubtless alerted by d'Argenlieu, now instructed the Free 
French Delegation in the United States to negotiate with the American 
authorities to secure acceptable conditions for the use by the latter of 
facilities in French territory on the trans-Pacific air route . On 1 2  November 
he informed the United Kingdom that he had asked the Delegation to 
secure exact information as to the United States proposal and had informed 
d 'Argenlieu that pending further instructions he could authorize American 
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officials 'to trace emplacements and to prepare technical plans' .  The United 
Kingdom authorities understood de Gaulle 's attitude to be that all questions 
of principle should be negotiated direct between the Free French Delegation 
and the United States government, and they warned Canberra that for their 
part they would think it difficult and impolitic to seek to prevent such an 
approach . 1 5  On 2 1  November de Gaulle set out his conditions for cooperation 
in a message transmitted to d 'Argenlieu via the British and Australian 
authorities, who were thereby put on notice . They comprised an elaborate 
set of safequards for French soverignty , authority and long-term interests , 
providing inter alia that the command of aerodromes should be in the hands 
of French officials . 1 6 
D 'Argenlieu appears to have already received instructions direct from 
London, since on 2 1  November he told MacVitty that he considered any 
improvement of the airfields should be the subject of an agreement between 
Free France, Australia and the United States and that he was averse to any 
work being done unt£l such an agreement was made. He insisted that the 
matter should be handled in Washington and not at Noumea.1 7 
This stand by the High Commissioner reflected his rejection of the view 
put to him by MacVitty and Ballard in the previous few days,  viz . that 
no new principle was involved in the United States War Department 's plan 
to cooperate with the RAAF in strengthening Plaine des Gaiacs aerodrome 
to take B l  7 s. D 'Argenlieu had already given similar approval for Tontouta 
which , however, was thought unsuitable for the B l  7 s .  D 'Argenlieu remained 
adamant . He suggested that a radical change of plan for Plaine des Gaiacs 
might result in an undesirable delay : he wanted to have a field ready to be 
used by at least some types of aircraft as soon as possible . 1 1� It was a rather 
rigid interpretation of his instructions,  but d 'Argenlieu was always inclined 
to be more royalist than the king. 
Secretary of State Hull could be rigid too . On 2 7  November the State 
Department told MacVitty firmly that the Australians were 'proceeding with 
construction at Noumea in accordance with the general plan ' ,  that the 
Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department was in charge on the 
American side and had been authorized by 'all o ther governments ' to deal 
directly with local authorities. 'We feel that he should deal directly with the 
Free French government in Noumea or some particular person designated 
by it .  It is the State Department's policy to deal with local Free French 
authorities in the territories which they administer . ' 1 9 
It was no use. On 1 December d 'Argenlieu told Mac Vitty that he proposed 
to await confirmation that an agreement had been concluded between 
the War Department and the Free French Delegation at Washington. Until 
he received it he had instructions not to permit  any new work on the airfields 
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to  be  undertaken by  either the Australians or the Americans . D 'Argenlieu 
requested that the Hawaiian Department be instructed not to send any 
equipment or personnel to New Caledonia without consultation with him. 2° 
Lieutenant Sauer of the Engineer Corps was already carrying out a survey 
on the spot , which he was allowed to continue, but no construction work 
was to begin until agreement had been reached in Washington . The American 
consul was now in a singularly unhappy position . The Army authorities at 
Honolulu did not seem t� have grasped the idea that New Caledonia was, 
after all , foreign territory . He wrote on 3 December 
It is my opinion that the Hawaiian Department, in ignoring the fact that New 
Caledonia is under a foreign Government by sending personnel and equipment 
here without advance permission, has greatly complicated the situation. . . As 
an instance of the ignoring of the rights of a foreign government, the Department 
is informed that Lieutenant Sauer, shortly after his arrival received a telegram 
from the District Engineer's office at Honolulu to the effect that equipment and 
personnel for a complete radio communication station was being sent here , 
and instructing him to have this station erected and placed in operation without 
delay.21 
From 2 1 -23 November the new commander of the United States Army 
Air Forces in the Far East , Major General L.H. Brereton, visited Melbourne 
from Manila to discuss the ferrying project with the Chief of the Air Staff, 
and a few days -later a representative of the District Engineer at Hawaii also 
discussed the New Caledonia sector with RAAF Headquarters. General 
Brereton, of course , was mainly concerned with operations west of New 
Caledonia, but the Australian Chief of Staff (Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles 
Burnett) thought it well to emphasize to him the special value which 
Australia attached to New Caledonia. On 23 November he said in a letter 
to General Brereton: 
When considering the strategic aspect from the point of view of Australia/New 
Zealand/Netherland East Indies and the Philippines which, to my mind, form 
to a great extent one problem, the position of New Caledonia has, I have no 
doubt, been considered by U .S.A. authorities. 
From Australia's point of view, we would welcome assistance by heavy bombers 
in this area, and if U .S.A. are in agreement, action should, I think, be taken 
to co-ordinate plans and institute an Advanced Air Base in New Caledonia. The 
Australian Air Force has already an Advanced Flying Boat Base in existence , 
and is preparing an aerodrome for medium bombers (Hudsons) some 30 miles 
from Nournea, the capital. I understand that this aerodrome is insufficient for 
B l  7s but a survey of the neighbouring ground has been made. This latter 
. aerodrome will take some time to convert. There is also the question of control, 
· if it should be used by U.S.A.  aircraft.22 
In the light of this emphasis on the strategic unity of the area including 
the island chain around Australia, the reasons given later by the American 
Chief of Naval Operations , Admiral King, for his wish to include the 
Solomon Islands in General MacArthur's Southwest Pacific area seem the 
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more astonishing. (He 'felt it was essential to engage the attention of 
Australians to the defence of the approaches to their country and shake 
them out of their isolationist attitude ' . )23 D .M. Horner, however, has 
pointed out that in early ] anuary 1942 ,  the United States naval attache in 
Australia was reporting to Washington that 
the major idea among Australian chiefs of defence departments, except the 
Navy, is that the first mission of defence personnel and equipment is to protect 
areas not at present threatened, instead of forwarding them for offensive 
operations in areas already under attack or threatened. 24 
At this time the full extent of the Army Air Force 's requirements in 
New Caledonia were being made clear to Australian authorities by the 
American representative from Hawaii, Lief Sverdrup . It was a question of 
providing a 5 ,000-foot runway at Tontouta by 1 5  January 1 942 for ferrying 
purposes and constructing an even larger operational base at Plaine des 
Gaiacs . He · explained that he was also under instructions to seek bases 
with 7 ,OOO-foot runways in the New Hebrides and the Solomons, but he 
first had to dispose of the difficult New Caledonian situation (5 ,000 feet 
was the minimum length of runway required for the original model of the 
B l  7 Flying Fortress: new models being developed at the outbreak of war 
needed 7 ,OOO feet) . The Australian authorities viewed the American involve­
ment in the South Pacific area with enthusiasm and were eager to cooperate 
in this formidable project. At the same time, they were aware of the possible 
complications . In view of New Caledonia's importance to Australia they 
were anxious to keep in close touch with any defence arrangements there , 
and they did not see how they could do this if everything was to be left 
for negotiation with the Free French Delegation in Washington. They 
recognized that any suggestion that American authorities should conduct 
negotiations through Australian channels was not feasible because ,  as the 
Secretary to the War Cabinet had written on 1 7  November, 'although the 
United States might be prepared to do so, the Free French would not ' .  
In the circumstances the best solution seemed to them to have negotiations 
in Noumea between the Americans and the Free French authorities there , 
where the Australian point of view could be most effectively put . This 
was very much like an Australian version of the State Department's local 
authorities policy , and as such was highly objectionable to General de 
Gaulle . There was no evil intent. Australia had no wish and no motive 
to quarrel with the French National Committee. But Canberra had become 
used to its easy-going relationship with Governor Sautot , whose pre­
dominant concern was to cooperate as effectively as possible in the Allied 
war effort. It was not realized that from now on it was going to be even 
more difficult to deal with d'Argenlieu in Noumea than with the notoriously 
prickly de Gaulle in London.  
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In Washington an Army view on New Caledonia was formulated in the 
War Plans Division on 4 December and passed informally to the State 
Department. It was short and simple : 
(a) · The Army desires to use the airdrome at Plaine des Gaiacs, New Caledonia, 
and through the Division Engineer, Hawaii, has contracted with the Australian 
Government to improve the field. 
(b) The population of that portion of the Island ( 100 miles north ofNoumea) is 
estimated at 20 ,000 of which 90% are J apanese . The field is believed to be 
very near the shore. It is within the sphere of J apanese influence and could 
easily be reached by J apanese raider or aircraft. 
( c) To avoid dispersion of forces, the Army is opposed to providing the 
necessary defensive garrison. 
( d) The Army desires the Australian Government to assume responsibility for 
defense.25 
At this point the War Department had just become aware of the ultimatum 
delivered to MacVitty by d'Argenlieu on 1 December, but the full impact 
of the French National Committee's attitude clearly had not yet been felt .  
The War Department still preferred to operate under cover of a new 
Australian-French agreement and expressed this view in a telegram of 5 
December requesting a further report from General Short in Honolulu .26 
Two days later the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor and d 'Argenlieu 's 
narrow, though legitimate, concern became insignificant . 
The way out of the deadlock was provided by de Gaulle himself. On the 
day after the outbreak of war he telegraphed to d 'Argenlieu, who had 
already been given jurisdiction over all Free French diplomatic representatives 
and colonial authorities in the Pacific and Far East , instructing him to 
inform Allied authorities in the area that the French National Committee 
was 
placing at the disposal of the Allied Forces all the facilities that may be offered 
by bases in the New Hebrides, Tahiti and New Caledonia. You will consult with 
these authorities concerning the measures to be taken for the defence of our 
own possessions. As soon as a state of war exists between Great Britain and 
J apan you will consider yourself at war with the latter. 
You will henceforward resist by every means all possible attacks by J apanese 
Forces. You will inform me of the decisions taken. 
I am communicating above instructions to the British, Chinese, American, 
Australian, Netherlands and New Zealand Governments as well as to our 
representatives in the Pacific and Far East.27 
On receiving this notification the State Department promptly wrote 
to the Free French Delegate in Washington,  Adrien Tixier , asking him to 
ensure that d 'Argenlieu was specifically requested to permit the Australians 
and Americans to go forward with any construction of airfields which they 
might be in a position to carry out .28 On 14 December the Hawaiian 
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Department reported to Washington that all objections to the construction 
of airfields in New Caledonia were now settled.29 This was true - in 
principle . Some difficult discussions with d'Argenlieu lay ahead as he came 
to feel himself increasingly ill-used by the Australians and Americans, but 
at least he did not hold up the essential work on the airfields which were 
soon to play their part in the conflict . 
In the first days of the Pacific war, with the Japanese thrust constantly 
gaining momentum in Southeast Asia, the outlook for New Caledonia and 
the South Pacific communication route remained momentarily uncertain . 
On 9 December the State Department took a non-commital attitude with the 
First Secretary of the Australian Legation in Washington ,  Alan �att. Since 
New Caledonia was so close to Australia, Watt was told, and since any 
landing there by J apan would obviously constitute a threat to Australia, 
the Americans must  assume that Australia would take responsibility for 
its defence . The United States would naturally do 'all that might be feasible 
in all the circumstances' to contribute to the protection of New Caledonia, 
but the immediate and primary responsibility rested with Australia and the 
State Department did not know what American assistance , if any , would 
be feasible.3o The Australian Minister, R.G. Casey , suggested to Canberra 
that Australia should take any futher necessary military steps at once on 
its own initiative . If, he said, he could be given details of action taken and 
advice as to any specific form of American aid required, he would be in a 
better position to press the matter ,  but he could hold out no real hope 
that the United States would be able to give effective assistance (other 
than the supply of construction materials for airfields) until the strategic 
position in the Pacific had improved .3 1 
There was little enough that Australia could do from its available 
resources. The Chiefs of Staff had indeed recommended, in an appreciation 
submitted to the War Cabinet on 1 1  December, that 'the j oint United 
States-Australian proposals for the establishment of an operational base for 
United States and Australian aircraft at New Caledonia should be given a 
high priority and measures should be taken for the protection of such a 
base ' .  A minimum of a brigade group was considered necessary for this 
purpose . 
The capture of any of the outlying islands (New Guinea, Timar , New 
Caledonia) , said the Chiefs of Staff, would provide the enemy with a base 
for the development of attacks against the mainland of Australia. As for New 
Caledonia in particular, its occupation would deny Australia and the USA a 
link in a chain of communications and a valuable base for the protection of 
sea communications. Further, it was important for us to deny to J apan the 
nickel deposits of New Caledonia.32 
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War Cabinet, however, was unwilling immediately to  reinforce outlying 
bases on the scale considered necessary , though it approved the despatch of 
one independent company to New Caledonia. It called for a supplementary 
appreciati�n , with special reference to the defence of (a) the New.castle­
Sydney-Kembla-Lithgow area of eastern Australia; (b ) Darwin, and ( c )  
islands to  the northeast of  Australia. The Chiefs of  Staff were constrained 
to recognize,  in their new appreciation submitted on 1 5  December, that, 
after provision was made for the vital mainland areas, land forces adequate 
for a serious defence of New Caledonia could not be spared , though the 
island's threefold importance continued to be acknowledged. Nor were 
the necessary air forces available to meet strong carrier-based Japanese 
aviation. Arrangements were in hand for No.  3 Independent Company to 
leave Sydney on 1 6  December 'to enhance the morale of the Free French 
Forces and for demolition purposes ' .  War Cabinet agreed that the question 
of New Caledonia's defence would be kept under review 'so that when 
existing priorities are completed a garrison should be sent there if the 
situation has not changed for the worse'.33 
Horner, considering Australian strategy in the first weeks of the Pacific 
war, has highlighted the 'crippling limitations' - lack of naval and air forces ,  
of engineer organization and equipment and of  trained ground forces -
which led inexorably to the decision not to reinforce Australia's north­
eastern approaches. 
There is no reason to believe that such a course [reinforcement of island bases] 
would have delayed J apanese operations against the mainland had that been 
their intention. It would only have reduced the forces available in Australia 
for defence against a J apanese attack. 34 
No one could reasonably dissendrom this ,  though the feelings of d 'Argenlieu 
in Noumea, offered a reinforcement of 300 men and denied knowledge of 
high-level allied discussions, can be imagined . 
In Washington , however , thinking had already begun to move in the 
direction of New Caledonia's integration into American strategic planning, 
which was to lead inevitably to the reluctant assumption by the United 
States of responsibility for garrisoning the island. On 1 0  December the 
Australia desk officer in the State Department, thinking over the cheerless 
conversation with Watt on the previous day , minuted 
I don't believe we can assume anything about what our Army and Navy may 
be doing to aid in the defense of New Caledonia. It seems evident . . . that our 
Army and Navy do not have information on the state of New Caledonia's 
defenses. I believe we ought to call somebody's attention to the fact that 
according to our latest information Australia has not taken over its defense. The 
loss of New Caledonia to thej apanese would, of course, constitute a considerable 
blow to our whole war effort. 35 
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'Somebody ' was , inevitably ,  the War Plans Division of the War Department, 
whose attention was directed to the problem on 1 1  December.36 Brigadier 
General Dwight D. Eisenhower had just been appointed Deputy Chief of 
the War Plans Division with responsibility for Pacific and Far East planning. 
On 1 4  December he reported to the Chief of Staff, General Marshall, who 
gave him an outline of the dismal military situation in the Pacific, concluding 
with the question: 'What should be our general line of action? '  Eisenhower 
asked for a few hours to formulate his recommendations. It was painfully 
clear to him that the Philippines themselves could not be reinforced directly 
by land or sea forces. It would not be possible to send any major reinforce­
ments until the United States Navy had been sufficiently rehabilitated to 
enable it to operate safely in the Philippines area. There was no telling how 
long this would take. Meanwhile some vitally needed items might be shipped 
by submarines and blockade runners and, if the necessary lines of 
communication could be kept open, something could be transported by air . 
For this purpose Australia was the nearest suitable base to the Philippines .  
If Australia were to be used as a base it was essential to procure a line of 
communications leading to it .  This meant that the United States must 
instantly move to save Hawaii , Fiji ,  New Zealand and New Caledonia as 
well as making certain of . the safety of Australia itself. Presenting his 
conclusions to Marshall, he said 
It will be a long time before major reinforcements can go to the Philippines, 
longer than the garrison can hold out with driblet assistance , if the enemy 
commits major forces to their reduction. But we must do everything for them 
that is humanly possible . . . Our base must be Australia, and we must start 
at once to expand it and to secure our communications to it. In this last we 
dare not fail. We must take great risks and spend any amount of money 
required. 
The tone of the Chief of Staff's brief and instant agreement led Eisenhower 
to think, correctly , that he had been set the problem as a check to an answer 
which Marshall had already reached for himself.37 The Chief of Staff and 
Secretary of War Stimson had already been speaking on the same lines ; 
and President Roosevelt, overriding naval objections, had that day approved 
their concept of 'aggressive defence ' and an all-out attempt to reinforce 
MacArthur. 38 This moment, with the enemy triumphant everywhere and 
the Philippines already doomed, marked the beginning of an immense 
and - despite all the confusion and apparent muddle inseparable from swift 
action over such a vast field - a strikingly effective American effort in the 
Pacific that was to begin to roll back the Japanese while they were still in 
the first flush of their success in the Philippines and Southeast Asia. 
On 1 7 December Casey was instructed to explain to the United States 
authorities Australia's inability to provide in a reasonable time the 
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considerable forces needed for the effective defence of New Caledonia. 
There was nothing for it but to ask the Americans to provide a garrison for 
the island .39 This was a startling suggestion at that stage , since the Americans,  
while now prepared to commit themselves to a crash programme of rein ­
forcing the Allied effort in the Dutch East Indies and above all the 
Philippines, had as yet no thought of spreading large contingents of ground 
troops around the Pacific . The whole thrust of American strategic policy 
was directed toward supporting the main effort against Germany . The 
hasty efforts now being mounted in the Far East were an essentially 
temporary departure , in desperate circumstances,  from an order of 
priorities on which Eisenhower himself was to insist with renewed force 
when, a little later, it became clear that the Allies were powerless to 
keep any part of the ABDA area out of the Japanese 'co-prosperity 
sphere '.4o The decision to commit American ground troops to the defence 
of Australia was not to be taken until 14 February 1_942, and then in the 
context of underpinning efforts in the ABDA area.4 1 New Caledonia, how­
ever, was a special and urgent case and, pressed vigorously in Washington 
by Casey and his staff, the United States was led to decide on a relatively 
massive commitment there . 
Contemporary American and Australian records show vividly the rapid 
and radical change in the United States attitude . As late as 8 January 1942 
an officer of the War Plans Division noted that efforts were being made to 
have Australia take reponsibility for defending the island . Less than a week 
later the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by now in possession of the Australian 
government's convincing demonstration that it lacked the means to carry 
out this task , decided that 'the United States should as a temporary measure 
furnish forces for the defense of the island, after meeting the emergency in 
the ABDA area'.42 
Once the decision was taken it was executed with remarkable speed -
though in an enevitably makeshift fashion. A force of 1 7 ,000 men, including 
infantry and service troops (to be j oined by 1 ,500 Army Air Force personnel 
from a pool being formed in Australia) was earmarked for the defence of 
New Caledonia and sailed on 23 January from New York for Melbourne , 
where it . was to be transhipped . It had some of the characteristics of a 
reinforced infantry division, and indeed it included most of the elements of 
what was later to be named the America! Division and under that name 
was to campaign from Guadalcanal to J apan. But it was not yet a division , 
even in name. It included one brigade headquarters and two infantry 
regiments . For the rest, to quote the American official historian, it was a 
'military stew' of hastily assembled units which had not previously worked 
together and did not know their commander, Brigadier-General Alexander 
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M. Patch , Jr, whom they would see for the first time at their destination . 
When arrangements for the transhipment of the convoy were being discussed 
with the naval attache at the Australian Legation in Washington he was told 
among other things that the convoy 'was not tactically stowed' .  This ,  not 
surprisingly , was a masterpiece of understatement. The transhipment at 
Melbourne, say the US Army historians, was 'attented by great confusion'. 
For once , however, there seems to have been no complaint about the 
performance of the Australian dockers who,  working in mid-summer heat, 
had the convoy reloaded in eight days after its arrival in Melbourne on 26 
February . I t  sailed straight away for Noumea where it arrived on 12  March .43 
(Even while it was being assembled in the United States, the possibility had 
been envisaged that it might have to be reallotted to the ABDA area, but 
so complete was the Allied disaster in that area that its diversion would 
clearly have served no purpose . )  
Although General Patch had been instructed originally to plan 'on the 
assumption that additional forces would not be immediately available ' ,  
reinforcements for New Caledonia numbering some 5 ,000 men were sent 
from the United States before the end of March . In part, this reinforcement 
comprised a regiment of heavy artillery needed to bring Patch 's force up to 
divisional strength, such as the War Department had earlier hoped to draw 
from the ABDA command . In addition the War Department sent a third 
infantry regiment, the 1 64th , which was later to be the first Army unit 
committed to Guadalcanal .44 
Even before the first American troops reached New Caledonia, Admiral 
King was pressing for the reinforcement of Efate in the New Hebrides. He 
was already thinking in terms of a counter-offensive , and in a memorandum 
submitted to President Roosevelt on 5 March he summed up his proposals 
in three short phrases :  hold Hawaii ; support Australasia ; drive northwest­
ward from the New Hebrides.45 But the use of French territory under de 
Gaulle 's trusteeship could not be taken for granted . Before the American 
landings mutually satisfactory conditions had had to be negotiated with 
the French National Committee . 
On 24 December 1941  Tixier communicated to the State Department 
the general conditions under which the French were prepared to make 
base facilities available to the Americans in New Caledonia, the New 
Hebrides and Tahiti . These conditions , which closely followed those set 
forth by General de Gaulle on 2 1  November, were accepted by the State 
Department in a memorandum of 15 January 1942 , with the exception of 
an obviously outmoded provision for the bases to be effectively under 
French command . This omission does not seem to have offended de Gaulle , 
who mentions the memorandum approvingly in his memoirs,46 but the 
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message did not seem to be reaching d'Argenlieu who, the Americans found, 
continued to insist on committments which seemed to go beyond those 
exacted by the French National Committee itself. The High Commissioner, 
in fact , was rapidly losing patience with both the Americans and the 
Australians, who seemed to him unwilling to contribute any significant 
defence assistance to the territories under his command even while they 
were demanding bases there . In December 1 941  he had sent a team of 
officers to Australia with a list of requests for reinforcements and equipment. 
He had asked for three Anson aircraft for his use . No equipment had been 
sent and no reinforcements beyond the independent company now under 
his command . In late J anuary he was publicly denying rumours that Noumea 
was to be declared an open town . He had been told only in the most general 
terms that the United States was taking steps to provide for New Caledonia's 
defence , and suspected that in one way or another the Allies were up to no 
good. He was sufficiently annoyed to consider using the airfields and 
shipments of strategic metals as bargaining counters with the Americans.  On 
20 J anuary he summed up his feelings in a telegram to de Gaulle . 
Military situation . . . is only fair. The mission sent to Australia was given a 
courteous welcome and obtained liaison personnel but no equipment nor air 
support . . .  
From the United States we have obtained only the appointment of a liaison 
officer. No reply to our urgent request for equipment . . .  
. . the population [of Tahiti] is seriously disturbed at the prospect of joint 
action by J apan and Vichy, especially in view of Washington's attitude on the 
ralliement of Saint-Pierre and Miquelon . . .  
The United States seem determined to extract from us all they need without 
any compensation. I have already requested you to give them nothing without 
countervailing contribution to our means of defence. The despatch of tonnage 
to lift ore and the construction of the aerodrome give us our only means of 
effective pressure . . . unless officially instructed to the contrary I shall suspend 
loadings unless I receive assurance of delivery of the necessary armaments. 
I apprehend, without having any firm confirmation, a secret combination 
between America and Australia to impose on us, without prior consultation, the 
landing of American troops. You have instructed me not to accept such a thing. 
I shall carry out your orders by every means. 47 
D 'Arg�nlieu 's state of mind at this stage is interesting. De Gaulle depicts 
him as sending to London 'reports full of energy but not of illusions ',48 of 
which the telegram just quoted is presumably an example. But in fact the . 
Admiral had by no means shaken himself free of the illusion that he was , 
or should be,  an important regional commander, subject only to the general 
jurisdiction of General Wavell , Commander in Chief of the ill-fated ABDA 
area. On 1 2  J anuary he had sent an angry telegram to the Australian Prime 
Minister protesting that despite repeated assertions of respect for French 
sovereignty, Australia and the United States were , as he had good reason to 
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believe , discussing the defence of New Caledonia without any consultation 
with the Free French authorities. He demanded that the Australian Minister 
at Washington be instructed to make it clear to the Americans that Australia 
had no objection to direct negotiations between the United States and the 
Free French .49 
On 1 4  January Curtin sent a soothing reply . 
I have received your message regarding defence of New Caledonia. Am giving 
careful consideration to the questions you have raised. We appreciate fully the 
difficulties with which you are confronted in problems of defence. I venture 
to point out that it is not correct that we are studying New Caledonian defence 
independently of yourself; it is correct that we are endeavouring to obtain 
additional aid for New Caledonia from United States sources. 
You know that it is not possible for this country alone to adjust differences 
between the Free French Movement and the United States of America. However, 
we sincerely hope that the time will shortly come when your courage and 
determination will be fully recognised. 
It was all the Australian Prime Minister could do, in the circumstances . 
But d'Argenlieu was not appeased. On 2 1  January he again urged that 
Australia should stand out of the way and let the Free French get on with 
direct negotiations for American military assistance . His second telegram 
caused some consternation in Canberra, and the Department of External 
Affairs was in favour of meeting his wishes . The Chiefs of Staff, however, 
pointed out that whereas Australia had earlier supported the idea of seeking 
American equipment for the Free French troops in New Caledonia, the 
United States was now doing everything in its power to ensure the defence 
of the island . As for d 'Argenlieu 's insistence on direct negotiations with the 
Americans, that aspect was already being sorted out in Washington. It 
seemed unnecessary for Australia to intervene . The only action deemed 
necessary was to make 'a diplomatic reply' to d'Argenlieu 's message . 
Basically the Chiefs of Staff were right. On 2 1  January the Australian 
embassy at Washington reported to Canberra that at a meeting of State , War 
and Navy Department representatives attended by General Patch and by 
Australian service attaches 1it had been · agreed to recommend , as 'the best 
means of reassuring the Free French , consistently with security ' ,  that 
General de Gaulle be given an immediate assurance that substantial American 
support would be forthcoming as soon as possible and asked to 'instruct 
the Free French representative in New Caledonia to co-operate fully both 
in future and as regards projects already under way' . so The message finally 
sent to the French National Committee, on 23 January, read 
The British and United States Chiefs of Staff appreciate the importance of New 
Caledonia and have initiated measures for its defence in general accordance with 
the conditions stipulated in my [i.e. the State Department 's] memorandum of 
J anuary 1 5 .  It is requested that you so inform the High Commissioner at Noumea, 
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and impress on him the necessity for absolute secrecy . We hope the splendid 
assistance and cooperation rendered by the High Commissioner in the past will 
be continued in the future. 
It was relayed on 2 5 January to d 'Argenlieu with �n instruction to accord 
the requisite cooperation to the Americans.s 1 D 'Argenlieu, however, 
continued to drag his feet ,  and as late as 9 February Assistant Secretary 
of State Berle told Tixier that he had no reason to believe that the message 
had ever reached Noumea.s2 One element in d 'Argenlieu 's dissatisfaction 
may have been the delay before he received on 1 February from the 
Australian Prime Minister the 'diplomatic reply ' recommended by the Chiefs 
of Staff in Melbourne . Bound by the security embargo on Task Force 6 1 84 ,  
by now entering the Pacific, Curtin sent him an encouraging but studiously 
vague message , between the lines of which he probably thought to read 
further Australian-American collusion at his expense . He maintained a some­
what churlish attitude , seeking to insist in particular that he be given full 
details of proposed American support and that any American forces going 
to New Caledonia should be placed under his command . On 23 February 
the State and War Departments agreed that it would be expedient for Patch , 
who was then flying to Hawaii en route to Australia, to call at Noumea to 
confer with d 'Argenlieu , while still maintaining a considerable degree of 
discretion . 'I consider such a visit as most desirable ', wrote General Marshall , 
'since the French are very worried as to whether they are going to get any 
help from us or not. General Patch will be able to reassure them without 
divulging the size or composition of his force or probable date of arrival . '  
Could d 'Argenlieu have known i t ,  this decision represented a significant 
advance on the original War Department intention, which had been that 
Patch should confer fully with the A ustralian authorities - held responsible 
in principle for the defence of New Caledonia - before having any contact 
with the French authorities at all .S3 It satisfied de Gaulle , who,  on 25 
February , telegraphed to d 'Argenlieu:  
I am informed by Washington that General Patch, commanding American 
army forces in the Pacific, has been ordered to visit you. His instructions are 
reach an understanding with you, directly and in the most friendly spirit, for 
the organization of the command. 
Moreover the United States Consul at Noumea has b ;en instructed to state 
publicly that his government recognizes in the French Pacific islands no 
authoritv but that of the French National Committee. 
Under these conditions, which are satisfactory, we have no objection to the 
landing of American forces on our territory. If this landing takes place it will 
indeed be appropriate to give it maximum public emphasis. 
At the same time in the arrangements which you make with General Patch 
you are to take all steps to ensure that the command of the immediate defence 
of our colonies is held by yourself. On the other hand, if Patch is to have a 
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defined sphere of action and if he has reserves at his disposal I see no 
inconvenience in your agreeing to depend on him so far as concerns general 
inter-allied action in this theatre of operations. 54 
Now d 'Argenlieu had no grounds for withholding or attaching conditions 
to his cooperation with the Americans. On 1 2  March he reported to de 
Gaulle : 
On Sunday 9 March Brigadier-General Patch, commander designate of the allied 
troops in New Caledonia, arrrived at Noumea . . .  substantial troops are expected 
shortly. 
Contact is now established between Patch and myself . . . it seems clear that 
the command of the allied forces in New Caledonia can be held only by Patch, 
whose forces and resources are overwhelming in comparison with ours. Having 
requested him to communicate his instructions to me , I assured him that he 
would exercise, as  his orders provided, the tactical command of all forces in 
New Caledonia. He appreciated this decision and assured me that he would keep 
me informed of all his activities . . . ss 
On the same day Task Force 6 1 84 arrived in Noumea harbour, abruptly 
increasing the population of the Grande Terre by nearly 50 per cent. Since , 
miraculously , the strength and the itinerary of this force had been kept 
secret until the last moment, no significant preparations had been made for 
their reception and maintenance . The American troops were landing on a 
friendly but unknown and unreconnoitred shore . General Patch 's mission 
was , in extenso,  'in cooperation with military forces of the United Nations , 
hold New Caledonia against attack' .  The difficulties , both technical and 
logistic ,  with which he was faced in carrying out this deceptively simple task 
must have seemed overwhelming. The lines of battle still had to be drawn in 
the Western Pacific and the eventual combat role of his troops was utterly 
uncertain . Topographical information, local supplies,  communications, 
adequate port facilities - all were lacking. Even the weather was against him, 
for the rainy season was about to set in as a vast and miscellaneous quantity 
of stores and equipment, much of it unsuitably or inadequately packed, 
began to accumulate on Noumea's congested wharves and in hastily selected 
dumps . Not the least creditable feature of the way in which order was 
brought out of this chaos was the performance of the supply and engineer 
troops in distributing supplies and equipment, including crated aircraft , over 
what came to be known as the 'little Burma road' which formed Noumea's 
only link with the uncompleted airfields and more northerly defence 
positions. It was obviously a matter of months rather than weeks before 
deployment and training of ground and air forces would reach anything like 
a satisfactory stage . But as Patch assumed his herculean task there were two 
bright spots on his horizon. 
In the first place , he was not building entirely from the ground upward , 
though alarmingly close to it. He had at least the benefit of the modest but 
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creditable preliminary work done by the Australian forces. Airfields had 
been surveyed and partially constructed ; there was a working flying-boat 
base at Noumea; he had under his command a tiny but highly trained and 
useful contingent of Australian troops who were temporarily responsible 
for the land defence of the north; the RAN was operating a Port War Signal 
Station at Noumea, and his shortage of intelligence on New Caledonia was 
at least partially made up by the assignment to his staff of the three 
Australian service liaison officers (Lieutenant-Commander H.S. Barnett , 
RAN , Captain C.H. Carty-Salmon and Flight-Lieutenant E .  McColl , RAAF) 
who possessed useful local knowledge and with whom he was to develop 
relations of confidence. 
The second ray of light on the horizon was to prove deceptive. Amid 
so many uncertainties it seemed at least that the misunderstandings between 
the United States government and the Free French had now been cleared 
up . D 'Argenlieu had assured Patch of his cooperation. But the High 
Commissioner's widely publicized handshake with the American commander 
on 9 March had merely disguised his continuing and indeed growing 
resentment at finding himself the fifth wheel of a coach obviously destined 
to be driven by Americans through his own French domain . 
7 The d 'Argenlieu crisis 
WHEN THE NEWLY promoted Rear-Admiral d 'Argenlieu arrived at Noumea 
on 6 November 1 94 1  he had received a loyal and even enthusiastic welcome 
from the Gaullist majority of the population. The fear that he had been 
sent out to supplant Sautot, the hero of the ralliement,  had been fairly 
well dissipated . Perhaps, after all, someone more martial, less incurably 
civilian and down to earth than Sautot was needed to preside over the 
defence of the Pacific territories . The Japanese threat was visib ly increasing, 
and de Gaulle had sent out his close confidant to take charge. And, not­
withs�anding all said previously about d 'Argenlieu, he was impressive . He 
had put aside temporarily but firmly his ecclesiastical quality - at his first 
reception of local personalities he coldly rebuked someone who addressed 
him effusively as 'mon Pere'. He had been wounded at Dakar; he seemed 
full of military virtue . He spoke an almost unbearably classical French 
with great eloquence . 'Now we have a real leader', some people said . But 
soon he wore out his welcome . 
D 'Argenlieu had put aside his monkish habit without becoming a real 
political or military leader , for which he was too limited . He was that sad 
figure in public life , one whose qualities are unequal to the opportunities 
opened to him by events . We have already followed his obtuse dealings with 
the Australians and Americans as the Pacific war exploded and spread. He 
went on as he had begun , like a caricature of de Gaulle. In his zeal for the 
protection of French interests and sovereignty he made every possible 
mistake , whereas de Gaulle, who rarely gave offence unintentionally , was 
also capable of compromise in the interest of Realpolitik . As has be.en 
said , 'There comes a time in every public man's life when he has to know 
how to rise above principle' .  De Gaulle knew this very well , but d 'Argenlieu 
did not . He went ruthlessly ahead in the predestinate grooves of his 
instructions from de Gaulle, regardless of what he might meet on the way . 
The events of 1 942 were unpredictable in 1 94 1 , and he proved unequal 
to them . 
• 
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D'Argenlieu was accompanied by a large civil and military staff. They 
were a motley crew, drawn from the miscellaneous floating population to 
be found at Carlton Gardens, where de Gaulle was scarcely in a position to 
choose ideal assistance . (One writer on his London days quotes him as 
meeting criticism of a subordinate with the words,  'I am used to having 
to work with scum'. ) t There was a former right-wing deputy who was 
d 'Argenlieu's principal civil assistant, there was a variegated collection 
of military officers , at least one of whom was a disguised secret policemfill:, 
and , strangest of all, there was a British liaison officer wearing the brand 
new uniform of a lieutenant-commander in the Royal Naval Volunteer 
Reserve . The green backing of the wavy gold rings on his sleeves seemed 
to indicate intelligence duties, but his functions were obscure, to no one 
more than the Australian and British representatives on the spot. As Ballard 
was to point out a little later to Canberra, he was completely in the High 
Commissioner's confidence and handled many confidential defence matters 
for him,  but it was not clear just who had lent him to d'Argenlieu or whether 
he reported to any British authority : he should be regarded for all practical 
purposes as a Frenchman.2 The new High Commissioner's staff did not 
consist entirely of dug-out officers and freeloaders, though that was the 
general impression which the local population soon came to hold . One of 
them, Commander Cabanier , was an already distinguished officer who,  
in command of a French submarine in an English port at the time of the 
armistice , had joined de Gaulle with his entire crew, and who was to end 
his career as Chief of Staff of the French navy . Loyalty was to oblige him 
to assume a major reponsibility in the conflict which soon developed 
between the d'Argenlieu mission and the population. 
During the first months of 1 942 d 'Argenlieu and his staff increasingly 
provoked the New Caledonians' resentment by their obvious determination 
to lead a privileged and indeed luxurious life in this rear area and by their 
scarcely concealed contempt for the local inhabitants . Houses and cars 
were requisitioned for the mission on a generous scale, and even 3 0-odd 
years later its 'exactions' (a recurrent term) were vividly remembered at 
Noumea. So far as anyone could see, this behaviour was not balanced by 
any notable contribution to the improvement of the colony's defences ,  
which had been alleged to  be d' Argenlieu's main purpose .  Local resentment 
was increased by the fact that hundreds of New Caledonians were fighting 
with General Koenig's Free French brigade in North Africa while 
d 'Argenlieu 's entourage seemed prepared to stay indefinitely in the distant 
Pacific . When General Patch's American forces arrived in New Caledonia 
early in March the local political situation was already quite tense : the 
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population would have been even more incensed if it could have known that 
only a few weeks before d'Argenlieu had been threatening to forbid the 
Americans to land in New Caledonia at all. In the context of an Allied 
effort in the Pacific there was no reason for the mission to stay . But for 
d'Argenlieu it was not so simple . The Japanese were not the only enemies 
visible to him. He obviously felt, and de Gaulle unfortunately agreed , that 
his presence was now more necessary than ever to deal with the 'turbulent' 
local population which was directly exposed to foreign influences.  The 
logical end of this kind of reasoning was that Sautot rather than d 'Argenlieu 
should be removed . His relations both with the population and with the 
Allies were suspect. It was so decided . On 29 April de Gaulle telegraphed to 
d 'Argenlieu his decision to 'invite ' Sautot to come to London where he 
would be given a new assignment.3 Sautot acquiesced , but a wave of popular 
protest against his removal began to rise as soon as the position became 
known , as it did immediately . Sautot's enemy Verges seems to have been 
partly responsible . He was for some unfathomable reason in d'Argenlieu's 
confidence . Sautot plausibly asserts that d 'Argenlieu communicated de 
Gaulle's decision to Verges who proceeded to boast in his cups that he had 
at last managed to 'get rid of Sautot' . In any event de Gaulle 's telegram 
and Sautot 's reply were read on Noumea radio at noon on 1 May. A 
committee of five New Caledonian notables, led by Berges, which had been 
secretly formed some time earlier now sought out General Patch and asked 
him to forward to de Gaulle a protest against Sautot 's removal , which 
they claimed was opposed by 90 per cent of the population . Patch declined 
to intervene. On 1 May Sautot told d 'Argenlieu that he had withdrawn 
his decision to leave New Caledonia in view of the serious popular reaction 
to it. He sent through d 'Argenlieu a message to de Gaulle - which caused 
grave offence - respectfully asking him to reconsider the matter. For the 
moment d'Argenlieu bided his time, while the 'Caledonian committee' set 
about mobilizing bush support for a possible coup on the lines of the 
September 1940 manifestation. On 3 May a widely respected local doctor ,  
Edouard Trubert, reluctantly allowed himself to be persuaded to wait on 
d 'Argenlieu with a mandate from the committee to try to persuade the 
Admiral to leave New Caledonia. Trubert duly interviewed d 'Argenlieu 
and was satisfied that the latter had agreed to leave , though professing to 
be unable to understand the population's grievances against him. 4 Trubert 
was a modest and unassuming man, but intelligent and entirely reliable , 
and it cannot be thought that he misunderstood d 'Argenlieu. Nonetheless 
the Admiral had no intention of leaving . The situation remained unresolved 
until 5 May , which happened to be the first anniversary of the Pacific 
contingent 's departure for the front. A service , attended by both d 'Argenlieu 
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and Sau tot ,  was held at the cathedral at 8 a .m. , followed by a ceremony at 
the war memorial at which Sautot spoke ( d 'Argenlieu did not attend) 
and Captain Dubois took the salute . The crowd was orderly , but continuing 
tension was obvious. Something had to give . The d 'Argenlieu mission had 
clamped very like a state of siege on the town of Noumea, but the population 
was visibly stirring and might at any moment get out of hand. Meeting 
Sautot at the cathedral earlier that morning I had taken the opportunity 
to ask for a personal interview with him - my own chief Ballard was in 
Australia - and had been invited to call on him at 3 o'clock that afternoon. 
When I did so he explained that he was awaiting a reply from de Gaulle to 
his request for permission to stay on in N oumea. If de Gaulle remained 
adamant he would ask to be mobilized - 'I am a sergeant, you know, a 
sergeant in the artillery', he said surprisingly - and if that too were refused 
he would demand to be retired . He invited me to return in 24 hours to be 
told de Gaulle's decision , which he was sure he would know by then. Neither 
of us knew that on de Gaulle's orders he was about to be kidnapped and 
forcibly removed from New Caledonia. At 6 o 'clock that evening d 'Argenlieu 
spoke on the radio emphasizing the need for everyone to have confidence 
in de Gaulle's decisions. 'Vive de Gaulle ! Vive Sautot ! '  he ended . As he was 
speaking, troops were surrounding the Governor's residence and Commander 
Cabanier was telling Sau tot he must prepare at once to go on board the sloop 
Chevreuil. Four local leaders , Berges,  Mouledous , Pognon and Solier , had 
already been invited to see the High Commissibner at 5 p .m.  and had been 
arrested on arrival at his office . They too were taken on board Chevreuil, 
which left the wharf and anchored in the harbour. 
One leading personality who had escaped arrest was Georges Dubois, and 
he was perhaps the most important of all since he was in command of the 
local militia, who were intensely loyal to him and opposed to the mission . 
He was understandably worried and went to see Patch . ( It should be 
remembered that at this stage no one had any idea how far d 'Argenlieu 
was prepared to go . He had already been indulging in arbitrary arrests . As 
one of his prisoners recalled later, they had reason to fear that their very 
lives might be in danger. )  Patch told him to go home and arranged for an 
American guard to be placed around his house . This action seems to be the 
source of later accusations that Patch interfered in French internal affairs . 
They were not j ustified . Patch 's concern was to remain aloof and get on 
with the war. But he could not contemplate serious local disturbances , to 
which Dubois 's arrest would certainly have led . On 10 May the RAAF 
liaison officer at Noumea, Flight Lieutenant McCall , noted that he had 
just  called at d 'Argenlieu 's headquarters and found junior officers there 
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I 
High Commissioner d 'Argenlieu and Governor Sautot outside Noumea Cathedral, 
a few hours before Sau tot 's arrest, 5 May 1 942. 
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furious with the Americans and General Patch in particular as they considered 
he should have used force to help them. They also accused him of aiding the 
other side. 
During the whole dispute I was most of the time at American Staff Head­
quarters. I have access to everything in G .2 office and state quite definitely, 
not once did I see or h_ear anything which would give the slightest credence 
to any report that the General gave material help to either side . The General's 
repeated insistence on non violence actually favoured the Mission as they would 
never have been able to take away the prisoners on the 'CHEVREUIL ' if the 
Militia had not been restrained by Dubois. 
The people here have a high regard for General Patch whose democratic 
manner appeals to them and they realize the position in which he was placed. 
I have had many discussions with both the British Consul and Maj .  Oughton 
[a British ex-regular officer representing the Chrome Company in New 
Caledonia) who feel that a very difficult situation was handled admirably.5  
Patch indeed was now in a most difficult position . A major battle was 
impending to the north of New Caledonia, which itself might be attacked 
at any time . He thought for a moment of forcibly preventing Chevreuil's 
departure , but decided net to do so. The sloop sailed on the morning of 6 
May . Its first call was at Walpole , a desolate island 200 kilometres from 
Noumea, where the four New ·caledonian leaders were unceremoniously 
disembarked (and where, as one of them recalled later, the Melanesian 
sergeant of the escort, remarking, 'C 'est pas ban, ces manieres !  ' , offered 
to arrest the metropolitan asp£rant in charge of the landing party) . It then 
proceeded to Auc�land where Sautot was landed with a 'liaison officer' 
to keep an eye on him on his j ourney to England. 
At this point d 'Argenlieu 's single-minded concentration on ridding himself 
of Sautot involved him in a particularly discreditable incident. Two hours 
after Chevreu£l sailed from Noumea she heard distress signals from a Greek 
merchant ship , Chloe , which was being attacked by a Japanese submarine 
some 30 miles south of Noumea. She held on course and made no attempt 
to intervene . Later that day Patch wrote to d 'Argenlieu complaining that 
a request for Chevreuil to take part in a search for the submarine had been 
refused and asking urgently that she be instructed to return to Noumea to 
cooperate in anti-submarine patrols , pointing out that three other ships 
carrying American personnel and supplies were within this danger zone 
near New Caledonia. In reply d 'Argenlieu declined to offer more than 
minimal and conditional cooperation. He was prepared to divert Chevreuil 
'for a few hours' if given details of the movements of the ships in question , 
but protested that the sloop 's cooperation would be 'only of the most 
insignificant military value '. This was nonsense . Chevreuil had been from 
26 February to 24 April in Sydney being fitted with the latest anti­
submarine devices. In the words of the British liaison officer on board,  she 
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was equipped to the highest degree for a ship of her size to carry out an 
anti-submarine search . But d 'Argenlieu had recalled her from Sydney to 
serve his own political ends and had no intention of allowing her to be 
diverted for Allied purposes.6 
As soon as Chevreuil had sailed, a general strike was declared at Noumea, 
popular demonstrations broke out and many bushmen, alerted by telephone, 
began to converge on the capital . On the same day Patch reported to 
Washington that d 'Argenlieu had asked him to use force to assist in main­
taining order but that he had refused to intervene . He expressed anxiety 
about the consequences of d 'Argenlieu 's 'surreptitious and devious ' action. 
In a second message sent on 7 May he reported that open violence seemed 
more imminent and that the resulting disorders could be highly favourable 
to the enemy . Demonstrations could be expected to grow in intensity until 
the source of the trouble , which he considered to be d 'Argenlieu and his 
mission, was removed . The latter, Patch went on, 'sought and expected ' 
the use of American troops against the population , but if his troops were 
so used he would 'lose the military support of the local militia and the 
entire population , which is important to us militarily '. He asked whether 
the international political situation permitted a delegation to him of 
authority to place d 'Argenlieu and his staff under protective arrest 'as the 
disorders grew into an immediate and dangerous military threat ' .  General 
Marshall in Washington asked the head of the B ritish Military Mission there , 
Sir J ohn Dill, to have Patch 's messages brought to de Gaulle's attention .7  
The British authorities acted promptly. On 8 May the acting British 
representative to the French National Committee , Charles Peake, spoke very 
firmly indeed to Pleven and Rene Dejean at Free French headquarters .  He 
was , he said , instructed to express 'the gravest disquiet both of the Common­
wealth government and of the United Kingdom government at what was 
going on' .  It seemed 'utterly inexcusable '  that d 'Argenlieu should have 
taken any action that might even risk the possibility of disorders in the 
existing circumstances .  Late that evening Peake was told that de Gaulle 
had concurred in the despatch of a strong telegram adjuring d 'Argenlieu 
to act in harmony with Patch . On the following morning an Assistant Under­
Secretary at the Foreign Office, William Strang, reinforced Peake's 
representations when Dejean came to see him to complain about British 
policy on Madagascar .  D 'Argenlieu's behaviour, Strang said, seemed 
incredible . New Caledonia was on the very edge of the battle and might be 
an early objective for the enemy. But at this very moment he had chosen 
to dismiss the Governor who had brought the island over to de Gaulle and 
who had worked in harmony with both the British and the Americans. Only 
the presence of American troops had made it possible to take this high-handed 
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action and , even so , there had been disturbances which gravely embarrassed 
the American commander in his task of providing for the clef ence of New 
Caledonia. Dejean admitted that d 'Argenlieu had acted unwisely ; de .Gaulle , 
he reiterated , had sent him a strong telegram, and Tixier in Washington 
had been instructed to explain matters to the State Department. 
Later on the same day (9  May)  Admiral Stark, at that time the senior 
American Services officer present in London, saw de Gaulle and concluded 
with him an agreement guaranteeing liberty of action for Patch in his 
defence role . D 'Argenlieu's safety was also guaranteed and he was to remain 
free to communicate with de Gaulle , but the local administration was to 
act in accordance with Patch 's wishes. De Gaulle in fact had little choice 
in the matter. The British Chiefs of Staff, with Ministerial approval, had 
already informed their American colleagues through Dill that in their view 
the important thing was to see that Patch had a free hand to deal with the 
local situation in the interests of the island's security and defence. If to this 
end he found it necessary to 'circumscribe d 'Argenlieu 's contacts or his 
contacts with the population', he should be authorized to do so . 
Patch was now strengthened by firm support from the governments of 
both the major Allies ,  and indeed it was urgent that no unnecessary 
obstacles should be placed in his path . On 1 0  May a Japanese aircraft carrier 
was reported making toward New Caledonia and an air alert was declared . 
This was in fact a part of the confused movements following the Coral 
Sea battle, and the carrier soon turned north again, but it was obviously 
a situation in which chances could not be taken . New Caledonia was still 
a specific J apanese objective . By this time local events had taken a new 
turn. On 8 May d 'Argenlieu had set out on a visit to the west coast centres 
of Paita and La Foa - 'in order to rally the population which had been 
disgracefully misled by foreign-concocted propaganda' , according to a 
report to de Gaulle from Cabanier .s At La Foa he was detained by a crowd 
and imprisoned.  Under pressure from Patch , who was anxious to see order 
maintained without having to use his emergency powers, the bushmen 
allowed the Admiral to return as far as his country house at Paita (described 
in his correspondence with de Gaulle as 'my bush command post') . Sub­
sequently he allowed the popular committee to negotiate with him an 
agreement for the release and exculpation of the Walpole prisoners , 
d 'Argenlieu himself being understood to undertake to leave New Caledonia 
as soon as possible . The prisoners' return to Noumea on 1 7  May marked the 
effective end of the acute stage of the crisis . 
In yielding, with a rather poor grace, to local demands and so ceasing 
actively to obstruct Patch , d 'Argenlieu seems to have been moved rather by 
awareness of his weak position locally , where he had few supporters outside 
Sautot and Georges Dubois (behind Sautot, his chef de cabinet Nicolas Ratzel) inspecting home guard, 5 May 1 942.  
I-" 
0 00 
� 
:::i:: 
f:rj 
n 
� 
0 IJ} IJ} 
0 
l-%j 
t""4 
0 
� 
� 
> 
z 
tr:I 
z 
� 
:::i:: tr:I 
IJ} 
0 
e 
� 
:::i:: 
""d 
> 
n 
....... 
l-%j 
....... 
n 
THE D 'ARGEN LIEU CRISIS 109  
his own staff, than by the 'strong instructions' which Free French head­
quarters had supposedly sent him. The relevant telegrams to d'Argenlieu 
reproduced in de Gaulle's memoirs give a rather different impression from 
that conveyed by the British Foreign Office 's records of the incident. They 
contain no suggestion that d 'Argenlieu had acted unwisely, and only the 
gentlest of admonitions to him to make an effort to re-establish relations of 
confidence with Patch in the national interest, despite the 'American inter­
ference ' which de Gaulle joined d 'Argenlieu in deploring. De Gaulle himself 
saw the British Foreign Secretary , Anthony Eden, on 1 1  May and was far 
from conciliatory . His main grievance at that moment was Madagascar, but 
he took the opportunity to denounce Allied conduct on several other 
matters ,  including New Caledonia in his list .  His own correspondence with 
d'Argenlieu and his narration of the May incidents is only rather distantly 
related to the dismal reality of events. In his memoirs the story of d 'Argenlieu 
and his wrecking crew is transmuted into a Carnelian drama in which the 
Admiral , like a latter-day Cid , behaves with unfailing nobility and virtue is 
finally rewarded . 
After three days of incidents good sense resumed its sway and d 'Argenlieu took 
command again. . . In face of the imminent danger the population, deploring 
the recent disorders, rallied round the French authority. Various troublemakers 
were sent away to serve in Syria. [This is doubtless a reference to Dubois, of 
whose role de Gaulle was specially critical. ] Patch , for his part, went to see 
d'Argenlieu to apologize for the 'misunderstandings in which he had been 
involved . . .' .9 
The text of the Patch-d ' Argenlieu exchanges attests to both the correct­
ness and the firmness of the American General 's attitude . He did feel obliged , 
as Dubois's commanding officer, to apologize formally for indis�retions 
charged against the latter , but these were both minor and inevitable, 
consisting merely of open discussions of the Sau tot affair, which was on the 
lips of everyone in New Caledonia. Patch 's formal apology was coupled 
with an equally formal request that no action be taken against Dubois , 
whom he described as 'a most valuable officer in my command'. Milton 
Viorst , in Host£le All£es (New York 1966 ) ,  quoting General de Gaulle and 
Admiral Stark 's exchanges with him , gave new currency to the idea that 
Patch had improperly taken sides in a local political dispute. The editors of 
General E isenhower's papers ( 1 9 70)  have unfortunately followed Viorst . 10 
At the time, at all events, things appeared very differently in New 
Caledonia. The d 'Argenlieu mission remained sullen and uncooperative , 
and at least one of its officers worked actively with disparate local elements 
at the dissemination of viciously xenophobic propaganda. As late at 1 9  May 
Lieutenant-Colonel Matheson ( commanding No. 3 Australian Independent 
Company) and F light Lieutenant McColl, having received first hadn evidence 
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that the ineffable Vergh was accusing Pognon of being an agent paid by 
the Australian Army , went to see d 'Argenlieu 's British liaison officer to 
ask if this blatant rumour-mongering could not be stopped. The officer said 
he had 'seen evidence ' that Pognon was or had been an Australian agent. 
He went on at once to ask whether Matheson would agree to bring 
Australian troops to Noumea in the event of further disturbances. Matheson, 
a blunt and outspoken man whose patience had already been strained by 
the spectacle of a British officer echoing Verges's absurd allegation, retorted 
that of course he would do nothing of the sort, for two cogent reasons : 
first he was under Patch 's command and could not act without the latter's 
orders, and secondly he himself believed that in the recent incidents the 
mission had been entirely in the wrong. i 1 
D'Argenlieu himself lived from now on in relative seclusion , from which 
he emerged briefly on 20 May to receive the new South Pacific Area 
Commander , Vice-Admiral Ghormley - in transit to his headquarters at 
Auckland - and hand him a memorandum of ill-founded complaints against 
Patch . Ghormley was predisposed to be sympathetic to Free French 
grievances, but fortunately for Patch ,  who had borne the brunt of his 
attitude , d 'Argenlieu 's claws had been clipped . As Ballard noted on his 
return to Noumea, the circumstances surrounding the deportation of Sautot 
and the local leaders had made it clear to all that his word was not to be trusted . 
Patch confided to Ballard late in May that he remained prepared to put the 
d 'Argenlieu mission under protective arrest if they gave any more trouble . 1 2  
The crisis point was not, however, approached again . The mission faded 
away gradually as various of its members were sent off to Tahiti and to 
London. D'Argenlieu himself remained , and he was incorrigible, but at least 
Patch could henceforth be confident that he would not be allowed to 
cause any major problems . 
In various annoying smaller ways d'Argenlieu could still be a nuisance , 
and he seized every opportunity . Almost up to the eve of the Guadalcanal 
landing in August he kept up an acrimonious correspondence with Patch 
on various petty grievances, and maintained repeatedly that he was not 
himself responsible to Ghormley , Nimitz or indeed any Allied authority 
except de Gaulle . 1 3 
The French Administration under Governor Montchamp , who replaced 
Sautot at the end of July and remained in sole charge after d'Argenlieu's 
departure , did not make a good impression on the Americans. Admiral 
Halsey later commented severely on Montchamp 's aloof attitude . 14  The 
American naval historian says 'The French governor kept sulkily (but not 
silently ) aloof in his "palace " on the hilltop '. 1 s  That , i t  would seem, was 
not entirely Montchamp 's fault. He had made a good impression on Luke 's 
Georges Dubois addressing gathering at War Memorial, Noumea, 1 8  May 1 942.  He is flanked by d 'Argenlieu 's 
just-released prisoners (from left, E. Solier, P. Berges, E. Moul�dous, R. Pognon) . 
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successor , Sir Philip Mitchell. But he was bound by instructions from 
d 'Argenlieu , who retained responsibility for Pacific affairs even after his 
return to London, and even suspected the Admiral of tampering with his 
reports to de Gaulle . Great events were taking place but d 'Argenlieu was 
unable to rise to their level. His last chance to make significant trouble 
was found in the New Hebrides, where it was necessary to make a tripartite 
agreement for the use by the Americans of condominium territory in what 
was now an increasingly important operational base area. On 2 September 
Mitchell reported to London that he had discussed the New Hebrides 
situation with the American Under-Secretary of the Navy, James F orrestal , 
then passing through Suva on his way home from Noumea, who 'stated 
that difficulties with the French were increasing and spoke with some 
irritation' . 1 6 This emotion was widely shared .  On 1 0  September Mitchell , 
visiting Vila, noted that 'the French Resident Commissioner Kuter is liked 
and trusted by Blandy and the United States commanders but d 'Argenlieu 
distrusts, obstructs and stultifies him as far as he can' . 1 1  He remained con­
vinced , like others before him, that d 'Argenlieu 's retention in the Pacific 
might lead to grave trouble. Fortunately the Admiral-monk left the Pacific 
finally in November 1 942 . We may leave him at Washington where he saw 
Secretary Hull on 8 December and spoke of his 'most happy impressions of 
his cooperation with the American forces in the Far East ' and of the 
'distorted rumours of friction between himself and General Patch ' . 1 s 
The need to discuss the local consequences of d 'Argenlieu 's levity has 
caused us to leave Governor Sautot marooned on the shores of New Zealand . 
From Auckland on 1 1  May he wrote to Luke giving his own heated version 
of events . 'It is indeed shocking', commented a Foreign Office official 
primly , 'that Frenchmen should behave and speak of one another in this 
way' . 1 9 Nevertheless Sautot's version is accurate . On his arrival in London 
he encountered an icy reception from de Gaulle who spoke in bitterly 
critical terms of the qualities of the New Caledonian population in general 
and of Dubois in particular . Though ·keenly disappointed at finding his 
leader so ill-informed as to the true situation, Sautot deceided ,  once de 
Gaulle's attitude had seemed to soften somewhat, to accept the new post 
offered to him, which proved to be not Madagascar but Oubangi-Chari in 
central Africa. He thus passes out of the wartime story .2° 
The larger events of 1 942 now claim attention . 
8 'Drive northwestward from the New Hebrides '  
THE LOCAL POLITICAL troubles which confronted General Patch in May 
1942 could scarcely have happened at a worse time or place . New Caledonia 
was directly in the path of the enemy advance, destined in the minds of 
the Japanese strategic planners to serve, like Fij i  and Tonga, as  an air base 
directly threatening Australia and helping to interdict its communications 
with the United States. But at that precise moment the turning point was 
being reached . The naval battles of the Coral Sea - fought while d 'Argenlieu 
was distracting Patch's preparations to meet an apparently imminent attack 
- and above all of Midway were about to disrupt the Japanese plan. Thence­
forth New Caledonia and the New Hebrides, fortuitously situated a thousand 
miles nearer to the scene than the initial South Pacific area headquarters 
at Auckland , would play a role as the bastions of the counter-offensive , 
conceived and mounted by the United Sates Navy, which by the beginning 
of 1 943 was beating back the left prong of the Japanese thrust into the 
Australasian region . 
Japanese naval planners had long held the view that Rabaul should be a 
stepping-stone to the conquest of the northeast coast of New Guinea and of 
the Solomons , preparatory to the seizure of Fij i ,  Samoa and ' strategic 
points in the Australia area'. 1 As soon as Rabaul had fallen on 23 January 
they proposed an advance into the Solomons, to Lae and Salamaua on the 
New Guinea coast and even to Port Moresby. The occupation of Lae and 
Salamaua was delayed by a long-range American raid,2 but on 8 March 
they were taken . A second strike carried out by two carriers from the 
Gulf of Papua - a part of an operation designed to cover the transit from 
Melbourne to Noumea of General Patch 's task force - did little damage 
but seems to have convinced the Japanese naval commander in the area, 
Admiral Inouye, that he should await the return of naval forces from the 
Indian Ocean before attacking Moresby and Tulagi. Meanwhile he advanced 
into the southern Solomons, from which fighter aircraft were within reach 
of Tulagi and Guadalcanal.3 A plan to isolate Australia by occupying 
Moresby and Tulagi as soon as possible and then reducing New Caledonia , 
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Fiji and Samoa had been approved in Tokyo on 28 April. That was the 
position as the United States moved to organize defence in the Pacific Ocean 
in the new situation created by the loss of the entire Southeast Asian area.4 
Before the end of March, with the Australian government's approval, 
General Douglas MacArthur, evacuated from the Philippines, had become 
Supreme Commander, Allied forces in the Southwest Pacific area, which 
extended east of Australia to the l 60th meridian of longitude with a north­
easterly bulge to include the whole of the Solomon Islands as well as New 
Guinea and the Bismarcks. The whole of the rest of the Pacific (with the 
exception of a zone east of the 1 1  Oth meridian , near the South American 
coast, which constituted the Southeast Pacific area) was placed under the 
command of Admiral Nimitz in Hawaii , who became Commander-in-Chief 
Pacific Ocean Areas as well as Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet. Nimitz 's 
command was divided into three areas under naval commanders. The one 
which concerns us here is the South Pacific Area, which stretched from the 
equator to the south pole , bounded on the west by the Southwest Pacific 
area and on the east by the 1 1  Oth meridian. It thus included New Zealand, 
New Caledonia, the New Hebrides, Fiji  and Samoa. 
On l 7th April Vice-Admiral R. L. Ghormley , USN, was put in command 
of this area, with headquarters in Auckland . He was warned that the 
resources allotted to him would be inadequate but that it was hoped 'in 
time, possibly this fall' to start an offensive from the South Pacific . s As if 
to emphasize further the naval bias of the South Pacific operations, Rear­
Admiral ] .R. McCain was appointed Commander Aircraft South Pacific 
with operational control over army as well as navy aircraft in the area. The 
Joint Chiefs of Staff kept overall strategic direction. 
Before Ghormley could take up his command the Japanese had begun 
to execute their plan for the reduction of Moresby, southeast New Guinea 
and Tulagi , and had collided with an American carrier task force in the 
Coral Sea (6 -8 May ) .  American losses were relatively greater than Japanese ,  
but Japanese occupation of  Moresby was postponed , a s  it proved for ever, 
though Tulagi had been captured on 3 May. Japanese air losses in this action 
proved in the long run decisive . 6 
The ] apanese strategic plan remained unchanged, though parts of it had 
had to be delayed . It had, indeed , become more ambitious , since the 
American raid on Tokyo on 1 8  April had shown the need to seek out and 
destroy the US fleet in Hawaiian waters . Midway and the Aleutians now 
took top priority on the Japanese programme. The second objective was 
the New Caledonia-Fij i-Samoa area, and Port Moresby the third . 7  
Early in May American intelligence became aware of Japanese plans. The 
commander of the ] apanese combined fleet, Admiral Yamamoto, deprived 
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o f  the advantage o f  surprise, duly attacked the American fleet at Midway 
and was decisively defeated on 4 June , losing all his four fast aircraft 
carriers.8 The American victory marked,  in the largest strategic sense, the 
turning po�nt in the Pacific war. It made Hawaii secure and opened the way 
to Allied offensive action. But for the moment the difficulties of exploiting 
this opportunity were formidable. 
In the first place the ever-increasing demands of the Pacific theatre had to 
be balanced against the needs of the European-Atlantic theatre which 
throughout retained top strategic priority , despite brief episodes of 
emergency action to strengthen the Pacific forces. The directives issued 
to both MacArthur and Nimitz had made it clear that their first role was 
defensive , though the idea of taking the offensive at the earliest possible 
moment was always prominent in the minds of Nimitz and his chief, Admiral 
King. MacArthur, too, preached an offensive doctrine, in his own language , 
saying to the Australian Advisory War Council on 1 7 June, shortly after 
Midway: 
From the strategical point of view we should take the initiative and not await 
results in other theatres. Our aim should be to strike at J apanese bases in the 
islands to the north and throw the enemy bomber line back 700 miles. 
The greatest weakness of the present setup is that there is too much strategical 
control in London and W ashington. . . . if the decision were left to [ me,  I]  
would attack now, even in the face of a tactical defeat, in order to destroy 
the J apanese psychology of initiative. 
But his strategic concept was too grandiose and unrealistic to be acceptable 
to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As he said on the same occasion, 'he did not 
agree with the strategy of defeating Germany first . . .  the best way to help 
Russia would be to establish a second front in the Pacific '. 9 The American 
admirals, on the other hand, were prepared to undertake, even with slim 
resources, the tough slogging 'up the ladder' of the Japanese-held South 
Pacific islands , which they saw as the necessary beginning. 
The inescapable need to set about this task was soon imposed by the force 
and direction of Japanese action. There were now disposed in the Pacific 
unpalatably large numbers of troops, in the view of Army planners devoted 
to the objective of beating Germany first. 1 ° The Army build-up , however, 
had been a clear necessity in face of the Japanese thrust and the best of use 
would be found for all these men and planes. At this point, indeed , aircraft 
in particular were still painfully scarce . King's insistence on garrisoning the 
New Hebrides as well as New Caledonia in strength now began to pay off. 
Patch's subordinate , Brigadier-General Chamberlain , had taken command 
in the New Hebrides and had begun to push the construction of a second 
airfield there , on Espiritu Santo , which was very soon to assume primary 
importance . 
1 1 6  THE CROSS O F  LORRAINE I N  THE SOUTH PACI FIC 
On 1 1  June , a week after Midway, the Japanese strategic plan was radically 
altered . The idea of direct attacks on New Caledonia , F ij i  and Samoa was 
postponed indefinitely and the amphibious operation against Port Moresby 
cancelled in favour of an overland drive southward across the Owen Stanley 
mountains for which General Horii 's South Seas Detachment, previously 
under orders for New Caledonia, was to be used . 1 1 The Japanese , however, 
could not fail to press the advantage which they still retained in the 
Bismarcks-Solomons area, and an Allied counterstroke was urgently 
necessary if there was to be any chance of throwing them off balance . On 
2 July King and Marshall issued a joint directive for an offensive to be 
mounted at once , 1 2 with the ultimate objective of seizure of . the New 
Britain-New Ireland-New Guinea area. It was to comprise three 'tasks ' .  
Task One ,  the occupation of  the Santa Cruz islands, Tulagi and 'adjacent 
positions' , was to be commanded by an officer designated by Nimitz and 
its target date was set at 1 August. Task Two (the occupation of Lae, 
Salamaua, the north west coast of New Guinea and the remainder of the 
Solomons) and Task Three (the occupation of Rabaul and adjacent positions ) 
would be carried out subsequently under MacArthur's command. (The 
latter two tasks are outside the scope of this work and are mentioned only 
for the sake of completeness . )  For Task One MacArthur was to provide 
necessary naval reinforcements and land-based air support. Army forces 
from the South Pacific were to be used to garrison the Tulagi area. 
On 6 J uly the Joint Chiefs' opinion that the Japanese advance must be 
stopped promptly had been strengthened by reports that the Japanese 
had begun to develop an airfield at Lunga Point on Guadalcanal, from which 
they would be able to threaten the New Caledonian and New Hebridean 
bases directly . The way ahead was now clear. It lay first through what has 
been feelingly called 'this faecaloid island of Guadalcanal' .  On 1 0  July 
Washington confirmed the orders for Task One and the target date for it, 
set back in the event to 7 August, which happened also to be the date 
due for completion of the J apanese airfield . 1 3  On 1 August the boundary 
of the South Pacific area was moved west to run south from the equator 
along the 1 59th meridian . It now included all the objectives of Task One .  
Before the end of July Ghormley, who had taken up duty as  COMSOPAC 
at Auckland in June, moved his headquarters up to Noumea. New Caledonia 
and the New Hebrides now assumed the first importance as supporting bases 
for the preliminary reconnaissance of Guadalcanal and for the operation 
itself. In particular the airfields in these islands began to play a real part. 
Plainc des Gaiacs was operational, with a 7 ,OOO-foot strip ; so were Tc!ltouta 
and Efate. Koumac near the northern tip of New Caledonia was ready by 25 
July and Santo could take fighter planes, though not yet heavy bombers ,  
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by 2 8  July . There were already seaplane bases at Noumea, Efate and Santo, 
and McCain established his operational air headquarters at Santo in the 
tender USS Curtiss . This was the fruit of months of intensive work by US 
Army Engineers, Navy Construction Battalions (Seabees) , Australian civilian 
workers and local labour. In a slightly longer perspective , it was also - with 
the exception of the Santo airfield , which was an entirely American achieve­
ment - the result of more than a year of survey and development efforts 
by the Australians, whose direct role in the South Pacific was now coming 
to an end , but who,  after all , ' isolationist' or not, had started the whole 
thing. 
The decision to launch the Guadalcanal operation was logical and necessary 
but the means of executing it were meagre. Anglo-American talks early in 
July led to confirmation of plans for a landing in North Africa late in 1 942 ,  
and few resources could b e  spared from this zone o f  primary concentration . 
In the South Pacific Guadalcanal came to be known unofficially as 
'Operation Shoestring'. 
Many are the official and unofficial histories that have been written on 
the grim campaign of Guadalcanal . It is not my purpose here to try to do full 
justice to this desperate and ultimately decisive struggle, but simply to 
recall some salient features of the New Caledonia-based operation and its 
significance . 
'Long time in even scale the battle hung.' The initial Marine landing 
was a success , and Tulagi and Henderson Field (as the Guadalcanal airfield 
came to be called ) were seized at once . But there had been no time for 
adequate planning or rehearsal of the amphibious operation . The premature 
withdrawal of Admiral Fletcher's carriers left the amphibious fore� , in the 
memorable phrase of its commander, Admiral Turner, 'bare arse' . 14 The 
Marines ashore on this unpleasant island were in a similar plight when the 
remnants of Turner's own force , smashed by Admiral Mikawa at the battle 
of Savo Island (where naval losses included the Australian cruiser Canberra) ,  
withdrew with the partly unloaded transports on  the afternoon o f  9 
August . 1 s  For nearly three months, painfully and inadequately reinforced 
(at first by aviators and Seabees) and supplied from New Caledonia, they 
stayed locked in dubious battle for possession of the airfield . At first the 
Japanese, underestimating the vigour of the American drive on Guadalcanal, 
had maintained the simultaneous objective of a landward assault on Port 
Moresby, but as August and September dragged on without a decision in 
the Solomons (and as they were held by the Australians at Milne Bay in 
Papua) they were obliged to retract the righthand claw of their advance . 
On 23  September came the decision to stand on the defensive in mainland 
New Guinea, with the point of the Japanese-held territory at Kokoda. 1 6 
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On 8 October the first Army unit, the 1 64th Infantry Regiment of the 
America! Division , sailed from New Caledonia to reinforce the Marines . 
In October a determined and, as it proved , final Japanese attempt to retake 
Henderson Field was mounted and in Washington the President had become 
sufficiently concerned to ask the Chiefs of Staff, on 24 October , 'to make 
sure that every possible weapon gets in that area' to hold and keep 
Guadalcanal. 
The turning point of the campaign came in the middle of November, 
when the naval engagement known as the Battle of Guadalcanal resulted 
in a clear Japanese reverse , with the loss of two battleships and 1 1  transports . 
The Americans remained firmly in possession of Henderson Field . A day 
or two later President Roosevelt was able to say , justly enough: 'It would 
seem that the turning point of this war has at last been reached' . 1 7  
The Japanese had still not given up hope of  expelling the Americans 
from Guadalcanal , and it was not until 4 J anuary 1 943 that Imperial 
GHQ decided to fall back on New Georgia. But from November the 
Americans were over the hump . On 9 December General Patch moved up 
from Noumea to assume command, and on the same day the First Marine 
Division began to be phased out of this grim island after four months of 
continuous combat . American reinforcements flowed in, and on 9 February 
Patch was able to report the end of the Guadalcanal campaign . l g 
In the immediate South Pacific con text the way ahead was still hard 
enough . Japanese bases in the northern Solomons and on Bougainville were 
being strengthened and reinforced and new airfields built. But in the six 
months' struggle on Guadalcanal the Japanese had not only lost two­
thirds of the 36 ,000 ground troops committed there , but also their lead 
in air power, and above all the strategic initiative, which they were never 
to regain . New Caledonia, the New Hebrides, Fij i  and Samoa were firmly 
retained in Allied hands. 
The battle is the payoff. Even the best-prepared forces, obviously , can 
realize their potential only to the . extent that they are effectively 
concentrated and brought to bear against the enemy at the right place and 
the right time . Guadalcanal was the point of concentration, but New 
Caledonia was the immediate background to the battle scene. 'The nerve 
center of this campaign', says the naval historian S .E .  Morison , 'was not 
. . .  at Washington or Pearl Harbor, but at Noumea, where Admiral Halsey 
and his chief of staff . . . with about 1 5  seasoned staff officers and 5 0  
blue-jackets ran the entire South Pacific Force of Navy, Army, Marine 
Corps . . .  ' . 1 9 
Noumea's atmosphere of feverish improvisation at that time is not easy 
to recreate, even for one who was there . Morison, writing from the seaman's 
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Major General A.M . Patch, USA, at Noumea. 
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viewpoint , has reached back two thousand years to find the best description 
of the 'feeling of immediacy at Noumea on the last night ashore '-
o fortes pejoraque pass£ 
mecum saepe v£r£, nunc v£no pell£te curas: 
eras £ngens £terab£mus aequor. 
An extraordinarily wide range of military and naval activities were , suddenly , 
being carried on in this under-developed tropical country and above all 
in its small and sleepy capital . The congested port of Noumea - on one day 
toward the end of September 1 942 it held 86 ships,  some of which might 
have to grow barnacles for three months before they could be unloaded, 
despite the arc-lights blazing on the docks all night - and hastily improvized 
ports on the west coast were the channel for the troops, equipment and 
supplies moving up to Guadalcanal, the aircraft ( all too few) being relayed 
to the scene of operations and the wounded and sick being ferried back, 
often in damaged ships ,  to the hospital ship Solace and the field hospitals .20 
On 1 8  October 1 942 Admiral W.H. Halsey succeeded Ghormley as 
COMSOP AC at Noumea and presided over an intensive reorganization 
of the command structure of the South Pacific area, with a Service of 
Supply , a Service Squadron and a fully-fledged Air Force ( the 1 3th, under 
Brigadier-General Twining at Santo) . The New Caledonia base itself became 
I Island Command , with its own logistic organization . Gradually, ordered 
activity replaced improvisation . Port congestion long remained a serious· 
problem, but it was reduced to manageable proportions by a large increase 
in dock personnel, using local civilians and Melanesian labour as well as 
Army troops and Seabees . At one stage , at the beginning of December 
before the main body of the America! Division moved off to Guadalcanal, 
there were considerably more than 1 00,000 American and New Zealand 
personnel on the island . It seems likely that even after the departure of 
Patch's division the local population w�s outnumbered by the men of the 
43rd US Division , the 3rd New Zealand Division, the Navy, Marines and 
Air Forces. The American presence was overwhelming. The local population , 
both white and Melanesian , was increasingly and profitably absorbed into 
various American work forces,  and relations between Americans and locals 
were on the whole remarkably good . 
For the fighting men the pleasant island of New Caledonia was not only 
a base but a haven which , viewed from Guadalcanal and the perilous waters 
around it, must have seemed like an unattainable paradise. 'Noumea itself' , 
says Morison , writing shortly after the war, 'is a ramshackle unpainted town, 
but the climate and the surrounding scenery are superb . . .  New Caledonia 
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i s  the one island i n  the South Pacific that Americans wished they could 
keep ; but President Roosevelt had promised France to restore her empire 
intact,  so that could not be . '2 1  ( It is now well known that in 1 943 and 1944 
President Roosevelt repeatedly asserted that New Caledonia should not 
remain French after the war ,2 2  but that i s  another story, soon forgotten 
and mercifully unknown at the time in New Caledonia. )  
Above all ,  Noumea became a humming and effective support base. Its 
role is well symbolized by the story of the great carrier USS Enterprise , 
limping badly damaged into Noumea after the Santa Cruz engagement late 
in October 1 942 and steaming north again not many days later, with welders 
and riveters from the naval base still at work on her decks, to join in the 
decisive November ha ttle off Savo . 
Ci falt la geste - a triumph of courage in adversity wrought by men assigned 
to fight in an under-equipped secondary theatre . The situation offered a 
striking contrast to the muddled conduct of affairs in the Southwest Pacific 
area , where the Australian forces at least were to be locked into an 
ultimately pointless jungle campaign on mainland New Guinea. 
New Caledonia was the fulcrum on which the great American lever had 
rested as it was brought to bear in this first phase of the counter-offensive . 
It was the territory of a small, self-constituted and misunderstood ally , 
Free France, and had already been the site of useful anti-] apanese defence 
works before the Americans became involved . At the end of December 
1941 the British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, had said of the Free 
French 'They are in every sense an Ally ' ,  pointing out that their forces were 
now collaborating with the Americans and the British in many places of the 
highest strategic importance , particularly in New Caledonia. 23 
The frivolous conduct of one misguided French patriot, Georges Thierry 
D 'Argenlieu , does not diminish the value of the alliance forged by Australia 
and the Free French in the Pacific while the United States was still formally 
neutral . It could easily have been otherwise . Without straying unduly into 
the realm of conjecture it is possible to reflect on the complications that 
would have arisen if a Vichy regime, destined inevitably to toe the Japanese 
line , had been allowed to take hold in the South Seas. In 1 940 the rall£ement 
of New Caledonia had been a close-run thing, but fortune had favoured 
the brave - and skilful .  One of Australia's first genuine foreign policy 
decisions had been forced on it, with the happiest results , but the harmonious 
merging of this modest beginning into the great events of 1942-45 should 
not obscure the fact that the successful execution of Menzies's bold decision 
to cooperate with the Free French was the achievement of a tiny group of 
men on the ground - Australian , British and French . In this corner of 
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the world Allied cooperation was a reality and , whatever may be thought 
of New Caledonia's history as a French colony, no man of goodwill can 
fail to rejoice in that, nor in the way thus prepared for the territory 's 
reunion with a liberated France . 
Appendix 
No. 3 Independenc Company, AIF, in New Caledonia 
AS WE HAVE seen in Chapter Six, the only Australian force available to strengthen the 
defence of New Caledonia following the outbreak of the Pacific war was a small guerrilla 
unit , the recently formed No.3 Independent Company of some 300 men. As things fell 
out this company, which was later to make a distinguished record in New Guinea, did 
not experience combat in the South Pacific area, but the part which it played in the 
first months of the war deserves to be remembered. 
The Australian Chiefs of Staff were of course aware that such a tiny detachment 
could not significantly affect the outcome of any major J apanese attack on New 
Caledonia, and had defined the purposes of its dispatch as morale-strengthening and if 
need be demolition (having in mind especially the need to deny the valuable New 
Caledonian mines to the J apanese for as long as possible) . The formal instruction issued 
on 1 5  D ecember 1 941  to the company 's commanding officer, Major (later Lieutenant­
Colonel) D .G. Matheson, a Western Australian engineer who had won the Military Cross 
and Military Medal in the first World War, made it clear that his unit was expendable . 1 
His role, he was told, was to place himself under Admiral d 'Argenlieu 's command and 
cooperate with the Free French forces in the defence of New Caledonia, while taking 
care himself to retain control of the company and maintain mobility 'in order to inflict 
the greatest damage to enemy forces by harassing and guerrilla tactics' .  Since a Japanese­
occupied New Caledonia could be used as a base for operations against Australia and 
against the sea lanes between Australia, New Zealand and the United States, it was 
vital to deny the island's anchorages and aerodromes to the enemy as long as possible. 
In the event of a J apanese attack and the occupation of New Caledonia Matheson was 
to continue guerrilla operations against enemy shipping, air and land forces until he 
assessed that further resistance was unlikely to gain results of value. He was warned that 
there was slight prospect that his force would be reinforced or - eventually - evacuated, 
and he was accordingly instructed to plan for the use of 'any local craft which , as a last 
resource , could be used to withdraw personnel when guerrilla tactics become no longer 
effective '. 
Within weeks of its arrival at Noumea on 23 December the company 's presence was 
being felt in many parts of its allotted sector (from the Bouloupari-Thio road to the 
northern tip of the island) throughout which it was dispersed by sections, company 
headquarters having been established at B ourail on the west coast. The New Zealand 
Chie f of Air Staff, visiting N ew Caledonia at this time,  noted that 'the principal stay of 
[ the French authorities'] morale was the small Australian unit for which they have a 
very high regard'.2 
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D uring this first phase, in the words of the company 's operations report,3 
our sections lived in concealed camps, mostly composed of huts built for us  by the natives.  
All tracks, native and wild food resources, and possibilities of using local inhabitants and 
pack animals in harrying operations against the enemy were fully explored. Preparations for 
the destruction of roads, mines and installations useful to th.e invader were made, and 
prepared charges cached in readiness. 
In mid- 1 941  an Australian commando officer, Captain T .P. Kneen, travelling incognito , 
had unobtrusively reconnoitred New Caledonia and had reported to Army Headquarters 
in Melbourne that the terrain was ideal for independent company operations. The idea 
of encouraging the formation of French guerrilla units, favoured by Kneen, could not 
be pursued, but the section commanders of No.3 Independent Company were made 
responsible for the training and tactical employment of the French Home Guards � their 
areas. 
Kneen had noted in his report 
The natives are a fine race, intelligent and strong. 
They are loyal subjects, of whom more wish to enlist than can be accepted. . . In some 
districts, however, notably in the far North, they have always at the back of their minds 
the fact that the French came and took their land only 80 years ago .4 
In practice the second consideration did not override the first ; the Australian military 
mission led by Colonel F anning had been impressed favourably by Melanesian troops 
they had seen, and Matheson 's instruction said 'The natives of New Caledonia are 
reported to be keen and of a good type and should be capable of being organized into 
independent detachments for guerrilla operations'. So it proved. The acting CO 's report 
records that 
some sections raised and trained native detachments of their own. Our men came to be 
held in high regard both by the New Caledonian French and the natives, which latter gave 
us the greatest assistance wherever we went. This gave the lie to the earlier reports that 
the natives of New Caledonia were treacherous and cunning. 
The origin and nature of these earlier reports to which Captain Dennis attaches a 
definite article remain obscure. They certainly did not emanate from Australian Army 
Headquarters or its secret agent Captain Kneen. A former officer of the company can 
only conjecture that the dark warning was to be found in such scanty publications 
as members were able to read when they were ordered at short notice to this unknown 
territory. In reality the company 's stay in the French colony was as cheerful an incident 
as can be found in military history. 
In March 1 942 the company passed under the tactical command of the newly arrived 
American General Patch , who found this small detachment of by now expert troops 
extremely useful in the training of his green (largely National Guard) units :  
detachments of approximately one infantry company were sent out to each of our sections 
to learn the country and be instructed in our methods of operation. Thus each of the 
section leaders found himself in charge for the training, and tactics in the event of an 
enemy attack, of a company which included officers of higher rank than himself and troops 
trained on different lines from his own men. The section commanders carried out this 
task with admirable tact and enthusiasm. 
As the American presence was consolidated the company was concentrated, in May,  
in a smaller area comprising the northernmost zone of the Grande Terre (north of a line 
through Ouaco and Cap Colnett) where 'a re-training programme including weapon 
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training, landing practice and battle practice was carried out '. The writer's military 
informant recalls that the American officer in command of the neighbouring sector, 
preparing to resist the J apanese at the water's edge, found it disconcerting to have no 
support on his right flank except a unit whose training and tactical doctrine would 
encourage them to take to the hills with a view to annoying the enemy from there . 
No doubt some practical compromise was reached ; by J uly Matheson had under his 
command a company of United States infantry and another of tanks as a holding force 
at Koumac airfield. By the end of that month this last sector of the island was taken over 
by the Americans and No.3 Independent Company was withdrawn to Queensland and 
further retraining. It had had one brief direct glimpse of the enemy as Japanese forces 
moved into Guadalcanal. 
From 1 July to 4 J uly there was an island alert. Nos. 10 and 6 sections observed a KAWANSI 
4 engined flying boat, which reconnoitred the northern end of the island and No. 6 section 
O.P. later observed an enemy submarine inside the reef. Reports were also received that 
a fairly strong Japanese naval force had appeared in the southern Solomons. During the 
alert the Coy showed excellent morale and swung from training conditions into readiness 
for attack in very quick time. 
That is the official story of the New Caledonian service of what a Noumea historian, 
Henri Daly , has called 'an elite unit with an exceptional commander•. s It is balanced 
on a more homely plane by the recollections of a former private soldier of the company, 
recorded by the official historian Gavin Long near the end of the war.6 He remembered 
hard training and the struggle to indoctrinate the raw but willing American boys into 
the art of bushwalking ; but he had thoroughly enjoyed his insight into the life of the 
New Caledonian bush. He recalled appreciatively notable meals enjoyed at Voh ; the 
cheap wine and beer ; dynamite fishing in the hill steams ; deer hunting and pig shooting ; 
horseback riding with villagers ; his section commander's efforts to teach the troops 
French ; but above all the ready friendship of black and white New Caledonians. 
We made real good friends with the natives. We'd go to the village and have coffee with 
the chief. 
We got into trouble with the gendarmes for breaking into J ap shops. We never got 
into trouble with the natives, nor the French except the gendarmes. 
When the company was withdrawn d 'Argenlieu civilly expressed appreciation of its 
services, though no dou,bt Matheson's strictly correct - and therefore, in the Admiral's  
mind, blameworthy - attitude during the May disturbances was still fresh in his  memory. 
A more striking tribute was Patch 's request, to which AHQ acceded, that Matheson 
himself remain in the South Pacific Area as a member of his personal staff - in which 
capacity this remarkable officer was killed in action in 1 943 . 
Notes 
Australian official records used are in the Australian War Memorial collection and in 
the following records series in the Australian Archives ( A.C.T. Branch) : 
A5 7 1  Treasury D epartment ( 1 90 1 -76)  
A 8 1 6  Department o f  Defence Co-ordination ( 1 939-42) 
A981 Department of External Affairs ( 1 9 25-42) 
A l l  96 Department of Air ( 1 9 36-56) 
A 1 608 Prime Minister's Department, Secret and Confidential War Series ( 1 939-45)  
A 26 7 1 War Cabinet agenda files ( 1 939- 1 946) 
A2673  War Cabinet minutes ( 1 939-46) 
A2684 Advisory War Council minute files ( 1 940-1 945) 
A293 7 External Affairs Office , London ( 1 924- 1 945 ) 
A3300 Australian Legation, Washington ( 1 939-48) 
AA 1 9 7 5/2 1 5  
Australian Official Representative, Noumea ( 1 940-45)  
CP290/2 Papers from the  Records of the  Prime Minister's Office ( 1 9 38-42)  
United Kingdom records are in  the  following series in  the  Public Record Office, .London : 
FO 3 7 1  Foreign Office,  General Correspondence of the Political Departments 
DO 35 Dominions Office, Original Correspondence 
Transcripts are reproduced by permission of the Controller, H.M. Stationery Office. 
United States official documents used are in the following collections:  
Modem Military Branrh , Military Archives Division, National Archives and Records 
Service, Washington, DC 2 0408. 
Operational Archives, US Naval History Center, Washington Navy Yard, Washington, 
DC 20390.  
NOTES 1 2 7  
Translations are by the present author unless otherwise noted . 
CHAPTER ONE 
1 Wilfred Burchett, Pacific Treasure Island (Melbourne 194 1 ) ,  1 1 .  
2 Moniteur Universe[ (Paris ) ,  1 4  Feb .  1 854.  These words can be taken at face value as 
explanation of this action. 
3 Henri Rivihe , So uvenirs de la Nouvelle-Cal;do.nie (Paris 1 8 8 1 ) ,  282-8 .  
4 Pierre Gascher, L a  belle a u  bo is dormant: regards sur [ 'administration coloniale e n  
Nouvelle-Caledonie d e  1 8 74 a 1 894 (Noumea 1 9 75 ) ,  285 .  
5 J .P .  Doumenge, L 'Ho mme dans le  Pacifiq ue Sud (Paris 1 966) , 5 1 2 . 
6 Jean Guiart, 'Naissance et avortement d 'un messianisme en Nouvelle-Cal�donie ' ,  
in Archives de so ciologie des religio ns, VII ( 1 959 ) ,  25 .  
7 Pierre Benoit, Oceanie Franq,aise (Paris 1 933) , 5 .  
a As F r  O 'Reilly temperately remarks. P .  O 'Reilly, Caledoiniens (Paris 1 9 5 3) ,  1 1 3-4 . 
9 Idem, Memorial Caledonien (Noumea 1 9 76) ,  IV, 290.  
10 Doumenge, op . cit. ,  5 1 3 . 
1 1  The full text of the Bayardelle report (hereinafter 'Bayardelle report ') is published in 
Bulletin de la Soci;te · di'Etudes Historiques de la Nouvelle-Caledonie , no .20 ( 1 9 74) , 
2-48 .  A copy (without indication of authorship or provenance) is in Australian Archives 
(hereinafter AA) AA 1 97 5 /2 1 5  item 3/40. 
12 M. Lenormand, 'L 'Evolution politique des autochtones de la Nouvelle-Caledonie ' ,  
Journal de la Societe dts Oceanistes, IX ( 1 953) ,  245-99. 
1 3  Riviere, op. cit, 7 8. 
14 Ibid., 282. 
15 Alain Saussol, L 'H:rit'age (Paris 1 9  79) , 29 1 .  
16 Ibid., 300-3. 
17 Ibid., 304. 
18 Maurice Leenhardt, Gens de la Grande Terre (revised ed., Paris 1 952) , 2 19 .  
19 R.H. Leenhardt, 'Le Gouverneur Feillet et le grand chef Amane', in Cahiers d 'Histoire 
du Pacifique,  no . 7  ( 19 7 7 ) ,  1 9-34. 
The chief Amane, as viewed by Feillet and his daughter, represents an almost 
unique appearance on the New Caledonian scene of the noble savage, a phenomenon 
rarely discerned or imagined by Europeans in Melanesia though familiar in Polynesia 
and other regions. 
20 Maurice Leenhardt, 'Notes sur le r�ime de ! 'engagement des indigenes en Nouvelle­
�aleddnie, mars 1 9 1 4', Journal de la Societe dts Oceanistes, XXXIV ( 1 9 7 8) ,  9- 1 8 . 
21  Idem, Do Kam o : Perso n and My th in the Melanesian World (Chicago 1 979 ) ,  1 3 7 . 
22 Idem, 'Notes sur le r�ime de ! 'engagement . . .  ', 1 4. 
1 28 THE CRO SS OF LOR RAINE IN THE SOUTH PACI FIC 
23 Jean Bianquis, Nos devoirs envers les indig�es et nos colonies (Paris 1 906) , quoted 
by Anclr� R'oux, 'Les Protestants Fransais' ,  in M. Merle (ed.) , Les Englises chretiennes 
et la decolonisation (Paris 1 9 6 7 ) ,  2 22 .  
24 B ayardelle report, 29 .  
25 A .  Sur1eau, 'Qui etait le  pasteur Lehnbach? ' in  Bulletin de  la Socieu d 'Etudes 
Historiques de la No uvelle-Caleddnie ,  no .23 ( 1 9 74) , 46.  
26 Dumont d 'Urville signals in AA AA 1 9 75 /2 1 5 , item 3 /40. 
27 Saussol , op . cit . ,  33 1 .  
28 Lenormand, op. cit . ,  2 7 1-2 .  
29 Leenhardt , Gens de la Grande Terre, 2 2 3 .  
30 Washington ,  US Navy World W ar  I I  Report No .43 2 .  
31 Burchett, o p .  cit . ,  69- 7 2 .  
32 E . L .  Piesse , quoted i n  R . C .  Thompson, A ustralian Imperialism and the Pacific 
(Melbourne 1 980) , 2 2 1 .  
33 B .  Brou, Histoire de la Nouvelle-Caledornie - Les Temps Modernes: 1 774-1 925 
(Noumea 1 9 7 4) ,  28 1 .  
34 See Cabinet agendum of 1 4  J an.  1 9 3 7  in AA A98 1 ,  item 145 ,  Imperial Relations; 
Imperial Conference 1 9 3 7 ,  Report of Committee on the New Hebrides in AA A98 1 ,  
New Hebrides 4 ;  Submission to Minister for External Affairs 1 3  J uly 1 9 38,  in 
AA A98 1 ,  New Hebrides 22 .  
3 5  D . F .  Nicholson,  Australian Trade R elations (Melbourne 1 955) , 9 1 -3 . 
36 See M. Simington, 'The Southwest Pacific Islands in Australian interwar defence 
planning', Australian journal of Politics and History, XXIII ( 1 9 7 7) ,  1 7 3- 7 .  
37  D. Shineberg, They Came for Sandalwood (Melbourne 1 96 7 ) ,  ch .5-8 . 
38 J .P .  F aivre et al . ,  Geographie de la Nouvelle-Cal;donie ( Paris 1 95 5 ) ,  8 1 ,  1 02-3 . 
39 C. Lemire, Voyage � pied en Nouvelle-Caledo.nie, quoted by P. O 'Reilly , 'Le fran�ais 
parl� ert Nouvelle-Cal�donie ', journal de la Societe '<:itts Oceanistes, IX ( 1 9 5 3) ,  20 3 ff. 
CHAPTER .TWO 
t See Edgard de Larminat, Chroniques lrrevete11.cieuses (Paris 1 962) ,  ch .3 ,  to whose 
first hand account the present writer is indebted for the foregoing. 
2 Bayardelle report, 1 2 .  Emphasis supplied. 
3 In AA A98 1 ,  item New Caledonia l B ,  part V. Emphasis supplied. 
4 C7426/7 3 2 7  / 1 7  in London, Public Record Office (hereinafter PRO) F0 3 7 1 /24328 . 
5 War Cabinet minute 345 in AA A2673 ,  vol .3 .  
6 War Cabinet minute 365 in AA A2673,  vol .3 ;  Australian D ept of External Affairs, 
Documents on  Australian Foreign Policy 1 93 7-49 (hereinafter DAFP) , vol . III 
(Canberra 1 9 79) ,  nos 4 2 7 ,  439 & 45 5 ;  Bayardelle report, 1 4- 1 5 .  
NOTES 1 29 
7 See, e .g . ,  B ayardelle report, 4, 6, 7 ,  9, 1 0, 1 2 .  
8 Henri Sautot, Grandeur et  Decadence d u  Gaullisme dans le Pacifiq ue (Melbourne 
1 949) , 1 0 .  
9 Quoted ill F .  Broche, Le Bataillon des guitaristes ( Paris 1 9 7 0) ,  30 3 .  
1 0  The nickel story i s  pieced together with the aid of papers i n  AA A293 7 ,  item New 
Caledonia ; AA A98 1 ,  New Caledonia 1 ,  III ; AA 8 1 6  item 1 9/3 1 1 /74.  
1 1  Text in B ayardelle report, 19 .  The Australian official was B .C. B allard. 
12 Luke telegram of 26 July 1 9 40 to Prime Minister of Australia in AA A98 1 ,  item New 
Caledonia 1 ,  III .  
13 Bayardelle report, 2 1 -2 .  
14 G. B audoux, 'Mon action sur le ralliement de la Nouvelle-Cal�donie entre le  18 juin 
1 940 et le 1 9  septembre 1 940 ', in Bulletin de la Societe id fEtudes Historiques de la 
.
Nou velle-Cal;do1nie , no.24 ( 1 9 7 5) ,  1 9-25 .  
1 5  Launched 1 9 3 2 ;  three 5 .4 in. guns;  15  knots. Of the Bougainv£/le class of avisos 
coloniaux which , as Jane 's Fighting Shi"ps noted, had proved most efficient and reliable 
in service. 
16 
.Bruce's telegram 626  in AA A 29 3 7 ,  item New Caledonia. 
17 Bayardelle report, 7 .  J .  Legrand, L 'lndochine � l 'heure japonaise [Cannes 1 963] , 
40 . Lemery himself does not mention New Caledonia in his own memoirs, in which 
he asserts that during his brief tenure at the Ministry of Colonies he was opposed to 
collaboration with J apan. There is, however, no doubt as to the authenticity of the 
notorious telegram no . 7 3B of 25 Aug. 1 940. M .  Rapadzi confirmed the foregoing 
.account to the present writer in Sept. 1 9  7 4. 
18 
.Facsimile printed with Bayardelle report, 1 1 .  
19 Quoted in Broche, op.cit . ,  1 2 7 .  Internal evidence suggests that Broche 's citation is 
authentic, as his temiPignages generally seem to be. (His account of events at Papeete 
in 1 940 was confirmed to the writer by the late Dr Guy Loison, an unfriendly 
witness.)  
20 A file of Dumont d 'Urville 's signals, allegedly abstracted by a Gaullist crew member, 
�irculated ashore and a copy reached B allard. N ow in AA A 1 9 7 5 / 2 1 5 ,  item 3/40. 
21 B ayardelle report, 44. 
22 The following account of events in the New Hebrides is drawn mainly from the 
complementary accounts in Sautot, op . cit . ,  and in Resident Commissioner R .D .  
Blandy's 'Quarterly Summary o f  Events for the History of the War' , no .4 , 3 0  J une 
to 3 1 Dec. 1 940 (copy in Melbourne, Australian Navy Office records) . 
23 DA FP, vol. IV (Canberra 1 980) . 
24 AA A 8 1 6 ,  item 1 9/3 1 1 /74. 
25 See P RO F03 7 1 /2433 1 (C9 3 80/7327  / 1 7 ) .  
26 Dominions Office telegram 2 9 1  i n  AA A98 1 ,  item New Caledonia 1 ,  III . 
27 External Affairs telegram no .5 ,  AA A98 1 ,  item New Caledonia 1 ,  III .  
1 3 0  THE CROSS OF LOR RAINE IN THE SOUTH PACI FIC 
28 DAFP, vol . IV, 1 3 1n .  
29 Teleprinter message 0 1 9 2  from D ept of  the Navy to  Prime Minister's and E xternal 
Affairs D epts, ibid. ,  1 03-1 . 
30 Telegram , Menzies to Luke,  ibid . ,  1 32 .  
3 1  A A  A98 1 ,  New Caledonia 3 7 . 
32 Ibid. 
33 Submission to McEwen in AA A98 1 ,  New Caledonia 1,  III. 
34 Menzies to Chief of Naval Staff, DAFP, vol. IV, doc. 102 .  
35  C9933/7 3 2 7/ 1 7  in  PRO F03 7 1 /243 3 2 .  
36 Dominions Office telegram no.326 o f  6 Sept. 1 940 t o  Australian Govt, AA A98 1 
New Caledonia 1 ,  III  ( doc.  1 05 in DAFP, vol. IV, 1 44).  
37 Dept of External Affairs telegram 1 40 of 8 Sept. 1 9 40 to External Affairs Office 
London in AA A293 7 ,  New Caledonia (doc.  1 09 ,  ibid . ,  1 49) .  
38 External Affairs Office , London, telegram 778 of 9 S ept. 1 940 to Dept of External 
Affairs, Canberra in AA A98 1 ,  N ew Caledonia 37 (doc. 1 1 2 ,  ibid . ,  1 53 ) .  ( It was at 
this second meeting that Morton mentioned British possession of 'actual telegrams 
from New Caledonia'. 
39 Suva telegram, unnumbered, of 7 S ept. 1 940 in AA A98 1 ,  New Caledonia 37 (doc. 1 0 7 ,  
ibid . ,  1 4 7 ) . 
40 Noumea telegram 1 5  of 8 Sept. 1 940 to Dept of External Affairs, Canberra, in AA 
A98 1 ,  New Caledonia 1 ,  III ( doc . 1 1 0, ibid., 1 5 0) .  
41 Australian Govt telegram 4 7 3  t o  D ominions Office, in A A  A98 1 ,  New Caledonia 
1 ,  III (doc. 1 1 1 ,  ibid. ,  1 5 1 ) . 
CHAPTE R THREE 
1 This narrative of events leading to the ralliement draws on B landy's 'Summary of 
events for the history of the war, No.4, 30 J une to 31 Dec. 1 940',  and on 'HMAS 
A delaide, Letter of Proceeding, September 1 940', in AA CP290/ l ,  B undle 1 .  
2 Baudoux, 'Mon action . .  .' . 
3 External Affairs telegram 23 in AA A98 1 ,  New Caledonia 1 ,  IV ( No . 1 3 3  in DAFP, 
vol. IV, 1 7 5) .  
4 B allard's telegram 30 in  AA A98 1 ,  New Caledonia 3 7 .  
s Personal conversation,  Sept. 1 9 74.  
6 The Australian Govt 's telegram 4 7 3  of 9 Sept. 1940 to the D ominions Office notified 
acceptance of this committment. AA A98 1 ,  New Caledonia 1 ,  III .  
7 AA A98 1 ,  New Caledonia 2. 
8 War Cabinet agendum 2 8 2 / 1 940 in AA A 26 7 1 .  
9 Ibid., supplement 1 -2 .  
N OTES 1 3 1  
1 0  War Cabinet minute 68 1 ,  A A  A 26 7 3 ,  vol. 5 .  
1 1  Australian Govt 's telegram t o  D ominions Office no. 4 3  of 2 3  J an. 1941  in A A  A8 1 6 , 
1 9 /3 1 1 /96 .  Dominions Office telegram to Australian Govt No.  65 of 3 1  J an.  1 94 1  
i n  A A  A9_8 1 ,  New Caledonia 2 .  
. 
12 See War Cabinet minute 9 5 9  in AA A 2 6 7 3 ,  vol. 6 .  
13 A copy o f  Dubois 's report t o  Sautot i s  in the writer's possession. 
14 War Cabinet minute 959 ,  AA A267 3, vol.6 .  
1s Dubois report. 
16 See Treasury consideration in AA A5 7 1  49/2656C.  
17 AA A98 1 ,  New Caledonia 5 ;  AA A2937  Free France ; Charles de Gaulle, Memoires 
de Guerre: L 'Appel 1 940-1942 ( Paris 1 954),  363 (where the date of the instruction 
to Sautot is given incorrectly ) .  
CHAPTER FOUR 
l Broche ,  Le Bataillon des guitaristes, 2 1 4. 
2 Dominions Office telegram 1 04 in AA A 1 608,  D 4 1 / 1 /9,  part 4.  
3 Minute by R.L.  Speaight, 2 6  Apr. 1 94 1 , PRO F 03 7 1  (Z3022/ 1 45 / 1 7 ) .  
4 Menzies's telegram MIS of 1 6  Mar.  1 941  in  AA A98 1 ,  New Caledonia 1 ,  VI. 
s D e  Gaulle's telegram of 7 Mar. 1 94 1 . Text in de Gaulle, Memo ires de Guerre: 
L 'Appel . . . 3 5 8 .  
6 De Gaulle, op . cit. ,  1 8 8 .  
7 On Brunot 's mission see also Broche, op . cit., 1 59-72 an d  D ocuments annexes IV. 
8 Ballard's memorandum of 25 Feb. 1 94 1 , AA AA1 9 75/2 1 5 ,  2 1 /41 . 
9 _P RO F03 7 1 /28400 (Z2367  / 1 45 / 1 7 ) .  
1 0  Texts i n  AA AA 1 9 7 5 /2 1 5 ,  2 1 /4 1 .  
1 1  Letter, H .  Somerville S mith t o  N.E.  Archer (Dominions Office) , P RO D035 1 00 3/ 1 .  
12 Morton's paper C F R (4 1 )  1 1 3 .  Copy in P RO F03 7 1 /284801  ( Z 34 14/145/ 1 7 ) .  
13 Free French headquarters ' 'Note on French Possessions in the Pacific ' reproduced in 
_C F R ( 4 1 )  1 1 7  of 2 7  Apr. 1 94 1  (PRO F03 7 1 /2840 1) .  
14 Minute b y  P .A .  Clutterbuck, 2 7  Apr. 1 94 1  o n  file WG l l /3/90 (PRO D035 1 00 3 / 1 ) .  
15 Letter from A Lincoln (MEW) t o  F .R. Cowell ( Spears Mission) ,  5 May 1 941 . Copy 
in PRO F037 1 /2 840 1 ( Z40 7 5 / 1 45 /4 7 ) .  
16 Copy in AA A 8 1 6 ,  1 9/3 1 1 /1 0. 
17 De Gaulle, op . cit. ,  1 8 7 .  
18 Ibid. ,  474. 
19 Broche , op . cit. ,  D ocuments annexes, IV, 1 .  
20 Bruce's telegram 6 1 5  of 6 Aug. 1941  to External Affairs, Canberra, in AA 1 608 
D41 / 1 /9 part 4 .  
1 3 2  THE C ROSS O F  LORRAINE IN THE SOUTH PACI FIC 
21 D e  Gaulle , op . cit . ,  1 88 .  
2 2  Jean Lacouture, Un Sang d 'encre ( Paris 1 9 74) ,  60 . 
23 'Remy ' (Gilbert Renault-Roulier) ,  Dix ans avec de Gaulle (Paris 1 97 2) ,  4 1 0 .  
24 De Gaulle, op . cit . ,  1 09 .  
25 See P RO F0 3 7 1 /28404 (Z6280 / 1 45/ 1 7 ) .  Text quoted (with incorrect date) in Broche , 
op . cit. , Documents annexes, IV, 4. 
26 De Gaulle, op . cit. , 4 7 6 .  
27 Text i n  Broche,  op . cit . ,  Documents annexes, IV, 2 .  
28 Ibid. ,  I V ,  1 1 . 
29 See Prime Minister's telegram 443 1 of 1 3  Aug. 1941 to Bruce incorporating report 
from B allard, AA A 1 60 8 ,D4 1 / 1 /9 ,  part 4. 
30 �allard's telegram 3 9 1 of 2 7  Aug. 1 94 1 ,  AA A 1 608,D 4 1 / l /9, part 4.  
31 Prime Minister's Dept telegram 4339 of 9 Aug. 1941 to Bruce, AA A 1 608,D4 1 / 1 /9 ,  
part 4 .  
32 P R O  F03 7 1 /28406 ( Z 7865/145 / 1 7 ) .  
33 Bruce 's telegram 1 4  [ sic] o f  2 2  Aug. 1 94 1  t o  Prime Minister, A A  A 1 60 8 ,  D 4 1 / 1 /9 ,  
part 4.  
34 B allard's telegram 406 of 8 Sept. 1941  to E xternal Affairs, Canberra, AA A 1 60 8 ,  
D 4 1 / 1 /9 ,  part 4 .  
3 5  Quoted i n  Broche,  o p .  cit . ,  Documents annexes, I V ,  1 5 . 
36 De Gaulle , op . cit., 1 83-7 .  
37  Telegram of 1 J uly 1941  from Pleven ( in Washington) to de Gaulle. Text in de Gaulle ,  
op . cit . ,  47 2-4 .  
CHAPTER FIVE 
1 D e  Gaulle , Mem()ries de Guerre: L 'Appel . . .  , 5 1 7-8.  
2 Ibid. ,  5 2 3 .  
3 'The American influence in Vichy was, throughout, despite Hull 's claims t o  the 
contrary , very slight and Washington hardly ever managed to modify the course of 
the French Governemnt'. Such is A .D .  Hytier's verdict in Two Years of French 
Foreign Policy : Vichy 1940-42 (Geneva 1 95 8) ,  320 .  
4 Hytier, op . cit . ,  3 1 5 -6 .  
5 R .O. Paxton, Vichy :  Old Guard and New Order (New York 1 9 72) ,  1 1 2 .  
6 Hull memorandum t o  the President, 3 1 Dec. 1 94 1 ,  quoted in R.  Sherwood, Roosevelt 
and Hopkins ( N ew York 1 95 0) ,  484-5 . 
7 Personal conversation, Paris, 1 945 . 
8 Note by D arlan quoted in Legrand, L 'Indochine a l'heure japonaise, 1 3 2 ,  n2.  
NOTES 
9 This and subsequent telegrams quoted in ibid. ,  1 33 -7 .  
10 ) • Decoux, A la barre d e  l 'Indochine (Paris 1 949),  1 26 .  
1 1  Text in  Legrand, op . cit. , 1 26.  
12 J .  Decoux, Sillages dans les mers du Sud (Paris 1 95 3) ,  246. 
1 33 
13 Washington, Dept of State ,  Foreign Relations of the United States (hereinafter F RUS) 
1942 vol.II ,  6 8 7-8 . 
14 Legrand, op . cit. , 1 34 .  
1s F RUS 1 942 vol.11, 6 74-5 . 
16 D e  Gaulle , op . cit . ,  5 2 .  
17  D 'Argenlieu's posthumously published Souvenirs de Guerre 1940-1941 (Paris 1 9 73 )  
d o  not carry his story b eyond F eb. 1941 . 
18 Text of telegrams in F RUS 1 942 vol. 11 ,  689 .  
1 9  Ibid. ,  690-2.  
20 Welles's record of conversation in ibid . ,  6 94-5 . 
21 World War II report #432,  Report on the Franco-American Relationship in New 
Caledonia, appendix C, in Operational Archives, US Navy Historical Center, Washington. 
CHAPTER SIX 
1 Louis Morton, U. S. Army in World War //: The War in the Pacific: Strategy and 
Command: The First Two Years (Washington 1 962) , 34-45 . Russel F. Weigley , 'The 
Role of the War Department and the Army ', in D. B org and S. Okamoto, Pearl Harbor 
as History (New York 1 9 7 3 ), 1 65 -8 8 ,  is illuminating on the internal contradictions 
of pre-war United States  planning for Philippines defence. 
2 Morton, op . cit., 86-9 1 .  
3 War Plans Division memorandum of 2 1  F eb. 1 9 4 1 ,  quoted in Army A ir Forces 
Historical Studies, No .9  (Washington 1 944) ,  4-5 . See W . F .  Craven and J .L. Cate , 
The Army A ir Forces in World War II (Chicago 1 949) ,  I, 1 80 .  
4 Morton, op . cit. , 98-9.  
s Ibid. ,  9 8 .  
6 Canberra telegram 633  t o  Dominions Office in A A  A 8 1 6 ,  1 9/ 1 1 / 1 3 1 ,  file 1 .  
7 F RUS 1 94 1  vol. l ,  5 7 3 .  
8 Ibid., 5 7 7 .  
9 Ibid. ,  5 7 9 .  
l O  Canberra telegram 5 1 0  t o  Noumea in A A  A8 1 6  1 9 / 1 1 /3 1 ,  file 1 .  
1 1  Noumea despatch to State D ept of 4 Dec. 1 94 1 , copy, Washington, National Archives, 
R.C. 1 65 ,  War Plan� Division records! item WPD 3 7 1 8 .  
12 Short t o  Adjutant General, AG6 86,  in WPD 3 7 1 8 .  
1 34 THE CROSS OF LOR RAIN E  IN THE SOUTH PACI FIC 
1 3 Noumea despatch to State Dept (copy in WPD 3 7 1 8) 
14 Short to Adjutant General, 22 Nov. 1 941 , in WPD 3 7 1 8 . 
1 5 Dominions Office telegram No.754 to Australian Govt in AA A8 1 6  1 9 /3 1 1 / 1 3 1 ,  
file 1 .  
16 D ominions Office telegram 7 7 6 ,  ibid. 
17 Noumea telegram 28 in F RUS 1 94 1 ,  vol. l ,  5 82 .  Emphasis supplied. 
18 Noumea telegram No.469 to External Affairs, Canberra in AA A 8 1 6  1 9 /3 1 1 /1 3 1 ,  
file 1 .  
19 State Dept telegram 2 5  to Noumea, F RUS 1 941  vol.I , 5 82 .  
20 Ibid., 583 .  
21 Noumea despatch to  State Dept (copy in WPD3 7 1 8) .  
22 These Melbourne exchanges are recorded in A A  A 8 1 6  1 9/3 1 1 / 1 3 1 ,  file 1 .  
23 View attributed t o  King b y  S.E.  Morison, Coral Sea, Midway and Submarine A ctions 
(London 1 948) , 249 n. See also E.J .  King and W.M. Whitehill, Fleet Admiral King 
( London 1 953) ,  1 6 1 .  It was not, of course, only King who viewed Australian attitudes 
as unduly defensive and even isolationist. See C. Thorne , 'MacArthur, Australia and 
the British 1942- 1943 ; Australian Outlook, XXIX : 1 and 2 ( 1 97 5) .  
24 D.M. Horner, Crisis of Com mand (Canberra 1 9 7 8) , ch .3 ,  3 5 .  That chapter is a 
comprehensive account of Australian strategic thought at the end of 1 941 . 
end of 1 94 1 . 
25 WPD 3 7 1 8 .  
26 Ibid. 
27 External Affairs Office,  London, telegram 7 7 1  of 9 Dec .  1 941  to External Affairs, 
Canberra, reported that the Free French Commissioner for Foreign Affairs had passed 
the text of this instruction to High Commissioner Bruce. In AA A 8 1 6 5 2/302/1 1 7 . 
28 State Dept memorandum of 1 1 Dec. 1 941  in WPD 3 7 1 8 .  F RUS 1 941 vol.I , 5 8 3-4 .  
29 File note in WPD 3 7 1 8- 1 2 .  
30 F RUS 1 941  vol.I , 583-4. 
31 Washington telegram 1 1 22 in AA A 8 1 6 5 2/302/1 1 7 . 
32 AA A 26 7 1 ,  4 1 8/4 1 ,  1 4/30 1 /2 2 7 .  
33 Ibid .  
34 Horner, op . cit., 33-5.  
35 F RUS 1 941  vol.I , 5 84.  
36 Memorandum by J .D . Hickerson (State D ept) in  WPD 3 7 1 8 .  
37 D.D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (London 1 948) , 1 9-2 5 .  
38 H.L. Stimson and McG.  Bundy , O n  Active Service in Peace and - war (London n .d .) , 
1 9 8-200 . 
39 Telegram 1 54 1  from Minister for External Affairs to Australian Minister, Washington, 
in AA A 1 1 96 22/50 1 /42, II .  
NOTES 1 35 
40 Eisenhower memorandum to Marshall, 28 Feb. 1 942, in A.D. Chandler et al., The 
Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, The War Years, I (Baltimore 1 9 70) (herein­
after Eisenhower Papers) , 149-5 5 .  ABDA - American-British-Dutch-Australian ; 
this new command area under General Wavell included Burma, Malaya, the Netherlands 
East Indies and ( formerly) the Philippines. 
41 Morton, op. cit., 203.  
42 See WPD 3 7 1 8- 1 4  and WPD 3 7 1 8- 1 7 .  Australian Legation reports are in AA A8 1 6  
5 2 /302/ 1 1 7 , file no. 3 ,  and A l l  9 6  22/50 1 /42, II. 
43 Morton, op . cit . ,  208-1 2 .  Instructions to General Patch in WPD 3 7 1 8 - l  7 .  
44 M .  Matloff and E.M . Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare 1 941- 1 942 
(Washington 1 95 3 ) ,  1 5 0 .  Morton, op . cit. , 2 1 2 . 
4S King and Whitehill, op . cit . ,  1 7 5-6 . 
46 D e  Gaulle, Memoires de Guerre: L 'Appel . . .  , 1 90 ,  5 1 2 . 
47 Ibid. ,  5 1 5 . It is instructive to compare d 'Argenlieu's attitude to American development 
of the New Galedonian airfields with that taken up by his colleague Medecin-general 
Sice, High Commissioner in Free French Equatorial Africa, when faced with a request 
by the newly-belligerant United States to use the airfield at Pointe Noire ( French 
Congo) as a staging point . Instructed by the French National Committee to bargain 
the use of this landing ground against formal American recognition of the Committee 
as an ally , or at least a firm promise to supply certain transport aircraft being sought 
for French Africa - a tactic described to Tixier by Assistant Secretary of State B erle 
as ' infantile ' - Sice ,.made his own decision to accede promptly to the American request. 
The Committee acquiesced, but showed displeasure at his initiative. On 1 Apr. 1 942 
the American consul at neighbouring Leopoldville reported to the State Department 
the view of French authorities in Equatorial Africa that 'it is Pleven who is "playing 
politics " with the war effort, not de Gaulle '. See F RUS 1 942 vol.11 ,  5 68-9. De Gaulle 
himself, however, as he later recorded (op. cit . ,  1 9 2) ,  found the haggling over the 
aircraft a normal enough tactic to use with the Americans. 
48 Ibid. ,  1 90 .  
49 Canberra's consideration of d 'Argenlieu 's complaints i s  in  AA A816 5 2/302/ 1 1 7 .  
so �ashington telegram 1 22 in A A  A8 1 6  5 2 /302/ 1 1 7 . 
s1 De Gaulle, op . cit. , 5 2 1 .  
s2 F RUS 1 942, vol. II ,  503-6 . 
S3 WPD 3 7 1 8- 1 7 . 
54 D e  Gaulle, op . cit . ,  5 2 6 .  
SS Ibid. ,  5 2 9 .  
CHAPTER SEVEN 
1 A. Gillois, L 'Histo ire secrete des Fran<_Sais � Londres ( Paris 1 9 7 3 ) ,  69 . 
2 Ballard 's telegram to External Affairs, Canberra No.  5 2 3  of 26 Dec. 1 94 1 ,  in AA 
A l 60 8 ,  D4 1 / 1 /9,  part 4 .  Indexes to B ritish Foreign Office records show that there 
were papers in that department on this officer's appointment, but the present writer 
found the key paper could not be located in the Public Record Office. 
1 3 6  THE CROSS O F  LORRAINE IN T H E  SOUTH PACI FIC 
3 In de Gaulle , M;moires de Guerre: L 'Appel . . . , 5 34 ,  the date of this telegram is given 
as 8 Apr. , but this is clearly incorrect. Sautot ,  Grandeur et Decadence, 1 4 1 ,  says de 
Gaulle 's instruction was communicated to him on 30 Apr. 
4 On the events of early May see Sautot, op . cit . ,  1 4 1 -5 6 .  His account is usefully 
supplemented by General Patch 's report of 1 July 1 942 to CINCPAC (Appendix to 
US Navy historical report #432)  and a careful narrative prepared by Flt Lt McColl, 
RAAF (AA A98 1 ,  New Caledonia 1 ,  X. 
5 Flt Lt E .  McColl to Airintel Melbourne, A 2 1 0  of 10 May 1 942,  in AA A98 1 ,  New 
Caledonia 1 0 . 
6 US Navy World War II historical report #432,  which contains copy of narrative by 
the British liaison officer, Lt J .  Templeton, RNVR. 
7 Action taken in London on Patch 's representations is recorded in US Navy report 
#432 ; AA CRS A293 7 ,  New Caledonia ; and PRO F03 7 1 /3 1 84 (Z3926/14/ 1 7 } .  
8 D e  Gaulle, op . cit., 5 9 3 .  
9 Ibid., 1 9 1 -2 .  
1 0  
.�isenhower Papers, I ,  2 8 7-9.  
1 1  Flt Lt E .  McColl to Airintel, Melbourne, A l 203  of 21 May 1 942 in AA A 98 1 ,  New 
Caledonia 1 0 .  
12 Ballard's telegram 140 o f  2 7  May 1 942 in A A  A8 1 6  1 9/3 1 1 / 1 38 .  
13 US Navy report #432 .  
14 W . F .  Halsey and j .  Bryan, Admiral Halsey 's Story (New York 1 94 7 ) ,  1 3 7 .  
1 5 .s .E .  Morison, The Struggle for Guadalcanal ( Boston 1 95 0} , 1 8 6 . 
16 PRO FO 3 7 1 /3 1 885 (Z6943 / 1 4/ l  7 } .  
1 7  
.
PRO F O  3 7 1 /3 1 885 (Z68 2 1 / 1 4/1 7 } .  
18 F RUS 1942 vol.11 ,  5 50 .  
19 PRO F O  3 7 1 /32053 (Z 5 1 94/ 1 5 86/ 1 7 } .  
20 In 1 950 the present writer called on Sautot at Noumea, of which town h e  had been 
elected mayor, and expressed regret at having been unable to keep the appointment 
accorded him in May 1 942 . The ex-Governor at once began to recount, emotionally 
and at length , his j ourney to London and . the disillusioning meeting with his hero 
de Gaulle. For the most part he was recapitulating what had already been written 
in his book published a year before . But there was something new. Launched into 
an account of his London tribulations, he said, 'And then I decided I had to kill 
General de Gaulle '.  Sensing an incredulous reaction, such as he may well have en­
countered elsewhere - for no one who knew him could believe that he would wait 
seven years to recount such a story - he insisted that he had reached the conclusion 
that political assassination had become his duty , to be performed during one of de 
Gaulle 's morning walks in Pall Mall . He had been dissuaded only at the last moment, 
he said, by a French priest to whom he made his confession at W e.stminster Cathedral. 
It will never be known h ow much French history may have been influenced by the 
quick reaction of that unknown priest. 
NOTES 
CHAPTER EIGHT 
1 Morison, Coral Sea, Midway and Submarine Action ,  6 .  
2 Morton, U.S. Army in World War II . . .  , 2 1 5 ; Morison, op. cit. ,  III,  2 66-8. 
3 Morison, op . cit . ,  III, 3 8 7-9 ; Morton, op. cit . ,  2 1 6 .  
4 Morton, op . cit. ,  2 1 7 .  
s Morison,  op. cit. ,  IV, 2 5 1 ;  Morton,  op. cit., 256 .  
6 Morison,  op. cit. ,  IV ,  46-64. 
7 Morton, op. cit. ,  2 7 9 . 
s Ibid., 280-5 ; Morison, op. cit . ,  IV, 1 4 1 -5 9 .  
9 AA A 2 6 8 4  minute no. 96  7 .  
1 3 7  
10 'The Navy ', General Eisenhower had complained i n  February , 'wants t o  take al l  the 
islands in the Pacific - have them held by Army troops, become bases for Army 
pursuit [ aircraft] and bombers. Then! the Navy will have a safe place to sail its 
vessels. ' Eisenhower Papers, 1 , 1 1 2. 
1 1  Morton, op. cit. , 284. 
12 Ibid. ,  294-304. Text of joint directive in appendix E, 6 1 9 . 
1 3 Morison ,  op. cit. ,  III ,  2 64- 7 7 .  
14 Morison, o p .  cit., V ,  2 7-8 . 
15 Morton ,  The Strugg�e for Guadalcanal, 5 8-9 . 
16 Ibid., 3 3 7 .  D .  McCarthy , Southwest Pacific Area - First Year (Canberra 1 959) , 
1 46 .  
17 Sherwood,  Roosevelt and Hopkins, 656.  
1s 
.
Morton, op . cit., 3 1 6-7 1 .  
19 Morison,  op . cit . ,  1 8 5 .  
20 Henri Daly, 'Les Amerioains en Nouvelle-Caledonie ', in Bulletin de la Societe . 
d 'Etudes Historiques de la Nouvelle-Caledonie, No.  1 7  ( 1 9 7 3) .  Daly notes that cargo 
handled at Noumea amounted to 48 ,600 tonnes in Nov., 1 40 ,300 tonnes in Dec. and 
2 1 7 ,500 tonnes in J an .  1 94 1 .  (Tonnage arriving in one peacetime month nearly 30 
years later totalled 1 29 ,OOO tonnes. ) 
21 Morison, op. cit . ,  V, 1 8 6 .  
22 M. Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare 1 943·1 944 (Washington 1959) , 
3 3 9 ,  mentions remarks in this sense by Roosevelt on the eve of the Cairo Conference 
(Nov. 1 943 ) .  The President spoke in the same vein to the Pacific War Council in 
Washington at that body's last meeting on 1 2  J an .  1 944. Australian Legation's 
telegram to Dept of External Affairs, Canberra, in AA AA3 300, [ 265] . 
23 Sherwood, op. cit . ,  45 3 .  E mphasis supplied. 
1 38 THE CROSS O F  LORRAINE IN THE SOUTH PACI FIC 
1 Copy in AA A l l 96 ,  22/50 1 /42. 
APPENDIX 
2 A copy of this officer 's report, provided by the New Zealand Minister at Washington, 
is in WPD 3 7 1 8-25.  
3 Text in Canberra, Australian War Memorial (hereinafter AWM) 565/4/ 1 .  
4 Text of Kneen 's report is in AWM 565/4/2. 
5 Daly , 'Les Americains en Nouvelie-Cal�donie', 1 -30  . . 
6 AWA, Gavin Long D iaries, N 7 1 ,  7 7-88.  
Index 
Adelaide, HMAS 1 ,  36 ,  3 7 ,  41 -4, 46-53 .  
Airfields in  New Caledonia 
development by RAA F 58 ,  99 
US interest in 8 2-9 
role in 1 942 1 1 6-7 
Aleutian Islands 1 14 
Amane 1 1  
Amiral Charner, sloop 42,  47 , 49, 5 1  
Argenlieu, d '  see Thierry d 'Argenlieu 
Australia 
action to support Free French in New 
Caledonia 1 ,  4 1 -5 3 
attitude to France 1 940 2 1 -2 
attitude to French Pacific 1 85 3- 1 940 
1 6- 19  
distrusted b y  Free French headquarters 
1 941  6 1 -4 
economic support for New Caledonia 
25-6 ,  5 3 ,  5 6-8 , 68  
see also d e  Gaulle, Thierry d 'Argenlieu 
A ustralia, HMAS 7 6  
Australian Army 
No.3 Independent Coy 9 1 ,  99 ,  1 2 3-5 
Ballard, B .C. 1 ,  2 7n, 35-6 ,  38, 47, 49-50, 
55-7 . 66 , 68 ,  84, 86,  1 01 
Barnett, Lt Cdr H.S. ,  RAN 99  
Baudoux, Georges 29,  45 
Bayardelle, Andre 8, 14 ,  23-5 , 28 ,  3 1 ,  
32 ,  5 1 ,  65-7 
Benoit, Pierre 7 
Berenger, Rear Adm 7 6  
Berges, Pierre 5 3 ,  102 ,  103  
Berle ,  A .A .  79 ,  97  
Bla..--idy, R . D .  33-4 ,  7 2  
Bouarate, 1 8  
Bougainville (B .S .I . )  1 1 8  
Brereton, Maj .  Gen. L.H. 8 7 
Broche,  Lt Col. F. 5 3  
Brou, B ernard quoted 1 7 
Bruce, S .M.  69 ,  7 2-3 
Brunet, Auguste 1 1  
Brunot, Richard 64-6, 69 
Burchett, Wilfred G. 3 ,  16  
Burnett , Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles 8 7 
Cabanier, Cdr Georges 1 0 1 ,  1 0 3 
Cameron, A.G. 39  
Canberra, HMAS 1 1  7 
Carty-Salmon, Capt. C.H. 99 
Casey, Hon. R .G. 90,  92, 93 
Cassin, Prof. Rene 72 
Chamberlin, Brig. Gen. H.D. 1 1 5 
Chevreuil, sloop 1 03-6 
China 7 8  
Chloe,  S S  1 05 
Clutterbuck, A. 6 7 , n14 
Copra, marketing of  66-7 
Coral Sea,  battle of 1 14 
Curtin, J ohn 96 ,  97  
Darlan, Adm. J .L.F . 7 5 ,  76  
Deakin, Alfred 1 6  
Decoux, Adm. J ean 1 4 ,  76-9 
D ejean, Rene 1 06-7 
D enis, Lt Col. 23 ,  3 1 -2 ,  37-8 ,  44, 45 
Dill, Field Marshal Sir J ohn 1 06-7 
Doley 34 
D ubois, Georges 30,  44, 53, 55-7, 68 ,  1 03 ,  
109  
Dumont d 'Urville , sloop 1 ,  3 0-2, 36 ,  41 , 
42,  46-5 1 
Eden ,  Anthony 1 09 ,  1 2 1  
Efate 1 1 6-7  
Eisenhower, Gen.  Dwight D .  92 ,  1 09 
Enterprise , USS 1 2 1  
Espiritu Santo 1 1 5-7 
F adden, A.W. 68 
140 THE CROSS OF LORRAINE IN THE SOUTH PACI FIC 
Faivre , J .P. 1 9  
Fatoux, Capt. 66 
Feillet, Paul 5, 1 0 ,  1 1  
Fiji 1 1 3 , 1 1 4, 1 1 6 ,  1 1 8 
Fletcher, Rear Adm.  F J . , USN 1 1  7 
F orrestal, J ames 1 1 2  
France 
colonial policy in New Caledonia 3- 1 6  
post-armistice situation 20-2 1 
see also French National Committee , 
Vichy government 
French National Committee 
anxieties concerning Pacific colonies ,  
1 941 6 1 -8 
relations with USA 73 ,  74, 79-8 1 ,  
83-98 passim 
French Pacific B attalion 5 7 
French West Indies 1 ,  7 8 
Gascher, Pierre 4 
Gaulle, General Charles de 
action for ralliement of New Caledonia 
35-6 , 44 
as leader of external resistance 1 ,  2 8-9, 
6 1  
assessment of French Pacific territories 
68-9 , 1 09 
dealings with Australia 55 ,  58 ,  62-4 ,  
7 3 , 89  
dealings with USA 7 3 ,  80 ,  8 5-6 , 94-5 , 
1 09 
personal qualities 1 00 
regard for d 'Argenlieu 7 0 ,  9 5 
General Council of New Caledonia 8 ,  
2 1 ,  23-5 ,  2 7-9 , 3 1 ,  38 ,  5 3  
Ghormley, Adm. R .L. 8 1 ,  l l O, 1 14 ,  1 16 
Gomichon des Granges, Me G. 34 
Griffith , J ames 1 6  
Grimshaw, Beatrice 1 6  
Guadalcanal ( B . S  .I . )  1 1 6-8 
Guiart, Prof. J ean 7, 14  
Guyon, J oseph 7 ,  8 ,  1 5  
Halsey, Adm. W . H .  1 1 0, 1 20 
Henry-Haye, Gaston 78 ,  80  
Higginson, J ohn 5 ,  1 9  
Hitler, Adolf 
attitude to Vichy regime 75 
Horii, Maj .  Gen. T. 1 16 
Horner, D .M .  88-9 1 
Hugh es, W.M. 54,  5 6  
Hull, Cordell 7 4 ,  7 5 ,  1 1 2 
Hytier, Adrienne D. 75  
Indo-Chinese i n  New Caledonia 1 5  
J apan 
quest for New Caledonian minerals 23-6, 
30- 1 ,  65 
strategy in S.  Pacific 1 942 1 1 3-6 
J apanese in New Caledonia 1 5 , 8 5 ,  89 
J avanese in New Caledonia 1 5  
J ohnston,  W.A . 1 ,  2 7 ,  2 9 ,  4 7 ,  50 
King, Adm. E.J . ,  USN 87 ,  94, 1 1 6 
Kneen, Capt. T.P. 1 24 
Koenig, Gen. Pierre 60,  1 0 1  
Kokoda (Papua) 1 1 7 
Koumac airfield 5 8 ,  1 1 6 
Kuter , R .  l l 2 
Lacouture , J ean 70 
Lae (N.G. )  1 1 3 
Larminat, Gen. E .  de 20 
Leenhardt, Maurice 1 1 - 1 6  
Leenhardt, Raymond 1 1  
Legrand, Col . J .  7 8 
Lehnebach , Pastor S. 1 4, 24, 32 
Lem€:ry, Henri 2 7 ,  30- 1  
Lenormand, Maurice 1 5  
Luke, S ir  Harry 2 2, 2 7 ,  3 5 ,  3 6 ,  3 9 ,  7 2  
MacArthur, Gen. Douglas 1 14-6 
McCain, Rear Adm. J .R .  1 14 ,  1 1 7 
McColl , Flt Lt E. 99,  1 03-5 ,  1 09 
McEwen , J ohn 38 ,  39 ,  56  
MacVitty, K .  d e  G .  79-80, 84-7 ,  89 
Madagascar 76 ,  1 06 ,  1 09 
Marshall, Gen. George C. 9 2, 9 7 ,  1 1 6 
Matheson, Lt. Col. D .G .  1 09- 1 1 0 , 1 23-5 
Melanesian New Caledonians 
condition and attitudes 9 - 16 ,  1 24-5 
Menzies, Rt Hon. R.G. 22 ,  23 ,  3 8-9 , 
62-4 , 7 2-3 , 1 2 1  
Midway I .  1 1 3 ,  1 14 ,  1 1 5  
Mikawa, Vice Adm. G .  1 1 7  
Milne B ay (Papua) 1 1 7  
Mindia 1 2  
Mitchell, Sir Philip 1 12 
Mittelhauser, Gen. 20 
Montchamp, Gov. H.  1 1 0 
Morison,  Prof. S .E.  1 1 8-20 
Morton, Maj.  Desmond 39,  66 
Mouledous, E douard 44, 1 03 
New Britain 1 1 6 
INDEX 
New Caledonia 
adherence to Free French movement 1 
28-53 
' 
colonial regime in 3- 1 6  
a s  allied base in 1942 98-9 1 1 8-2 1 
in allied defence planning 1 94 1 -4 2 
82-98 
' 
J apanese ambitions in , 1 940-4 1  23-6,  
30- 1 , 76-8 
J apanese strategic objective, 1 942 1 1 3-6 
political developments, 1 940 22-33 
36-8 ' 
political crisis, 1 942 1 03- 1 0  
see also airfields , Australia nickel , 
United States ' 
New Georgia 1 1 8 
New Guinea 1 1 6 
New Hebrides 1 6- 1 7  
adherence of French administration to 
Free France 33-5 
tactical role in Pacific War 1 1 5-7 
New Zealand Army 
3rd Inf. D ivision 1 20 
Nickel in New Caledonia 
development 5 ,  8 
significance in 1940-41 25-6,  30, 58 ,  
65-7 
Norden , SS 39,  44 
Paddon, J ames 1 8  
Paladini, Felix 46 
Pallu de la B arriere, Rear Adm. 4 
Patch, Maj .  Gen. A.M. 70,  8 1 ,  93-4, 96- 7 ,  
10 1 - 12  passim, 1 1 8 , 1 25 
Paxton, Robert 0. 7 5 
Peake , Charles 1 06 
Pelicier, Georges, Gov. 21 , 23 ,  30-2,  3 7-8 ; 
as High Commissioner for New 
Hebrides 33-4 
Perraud, Lt. R. 46 
Petain, Marshal Henri Philippe 27 ,  6 1 ,  74 
Philippines, defence of 82- 7, 92-3 
Pierre Lo ti, SS 49 
Plaine des Gaiacs airfield 58 ,  84, 89 ,  
1 1 6  
Pleven, Rene 6 1 ,  64,  66 ,  7 3 ,  1 06 
Pognon, Raymond 29,  32 ,  35 ,  46 , 1 03 ,  
1 1 0  
Pointe Noire (AE F )  95n 47  
Port Moresby 1 1 3 ,  1 14 ,  1 16 
Puaux, Frank 5 3  
Quievrecourt, Cdr Toussaint d e  14,  
30-2 ,  41 -5 2  
Rabaul 7 7, 1 1 6  
Raeder, Adm. Erich 7 5  
Rapadzi, Albert 30- 1 ,  5 3  
Ratzel, Nicolas 5 3  
Reynaud, Paul 22 
Riviere, Capt. Henri 3-4 , 9 
Robert , Adm. G. 32 
Roberts , Stephen H. 16 
141  
Roosevelt, President F .D.  1 1 8 ;  on New 
Caledonia 1 20 • 
Saint Pierre and Miquelon 75 ,  95  
Salamaua (N.G.)  1 1 3  
Samoa 1 14, 1 1 6 ,  1 1 8  
Santa Cruz Is. 1 1 6  
Sauer, Lt, USA 8 7  
Saussol, Alain 10 ,  14 
Sautot, Henri 
French Resident Commissioner in New 
Hebrides 33-5 
in ralliement  of New Caledonia ( 1 940) 
1 ,  35-6,  38-9 ,  42-5 2 
Governor of New Caledonia ( 1940-41 ) 
5 2-7  
Free French headquarters' doubts 
concerning 6 1 ,  62-3 , 69 ,  7 1 -3 
made subordinate to d'Argenlieu 69 
personal qualities 33 
relations with d 'Argenlieu, dismissal and 
arrest ( 1 942) 1 02-5 
snubbed by de Gaulle 1 1 2  
Savo, battle of 1 1  7 
Short, Maj .  Gen. W.C. 84-5 
Showers, Capt. H.A. , RAN l', 38, 39 ,  
41 -5 2  
Sice, H .  Medecin-gen;,.at 9 5  n 4  7 
Smith , H. Somerville 66 
Soci�te Le Nickel 8, 25-6, 30 
Solace, USS 1 20 
Solier, Elie 103  
Solomon Is. 8 7 , 1 14, 1 1 8 
see also Bougainville ,  Guadalcanal, New 
Georgia 
South Pacific air ferry route 82-90 
South Pacific Area, boundaries and 
command 1 14 ,  1 1 6 ,  1 2 0  
Speaight,  R .L. 6 2 ,  n 3  
Spender , P .C. 5 6  
Stewart, Sir Frederick 5 4  
Stimson, He� L .  92  
Surleau, Andre 14  
Sverdrup, Lief 88 
142 THE CROSS OF LORRAINE IN THE SOUTII PACI FIC 
Tallec, Gov. J acques 24 
Thierry d 'Argenlieu , Rear Adm. Georges 
as French High Commissioner in Pacific 
( 1 94 1-42 )  69-70 ,  72-3 , 79-8 1 ,  1 00- 1 1 2 ,  
1 2 1  
i n  Free French movement 1 940-41 
69-70 
dealings with Australian and US 
authorities ( 1 94 1-42)  7 9-8 1 ,  84-99 ,  
103 - 12  
personal qualities 69-70 ,  1 00 
Thomas, J ulian 1 6  
Thorne, Christopher 8 8  n23 
Tixier, Adrien 74,  79-80 ,  94,  1 0 7  
Tonga 1 1 3 ,  1 1 4 
Tongking 7 8  
Toutouta airfield 5 8 ,  1 1 6 
Tow as, Robert 1 8  
Tr�moulet, J ean 7 5 
Trubert , Dr E. 1 02 
Tulagi 1 1 3 , 1 1 4, 1 1 6  
Turner, Adm. C.K. 1 1  7 
United Kingdom policy in S. Pacific 22 ,  
25-6 ,  34-40, 6 1-2, 66-8 , 1 06-7 
United States of America 
commitment of forces to New Caledonia 
93 ,  98-9 
defence interest in New Caledonian 
airfields ( 1941 ) 82-9 
difficulties with d 'Argenlieu 84- 1 1 2  
passim 
policy on French Pacific territories 
79-8 1 
strategy in Pacific 1 942 1 1 4-6 
use of New Caledonian base 1 1 7-2 1 
Verges, Michel 24, 25 ,  44, 5 1 ,  102  
Vichy government 
and USA 7 3-5 , 7 9-8 1 
Pacific policy 30-3 1 ,  7 5-9 
relationship with Germany 7 4-5 
Viorst, Milton 1 09 
Vois, Paul 25 ,  26 
Watt, A.S.  90- 1  
Wavell, Gen. Sir Archibald 9 5 
Welles, W. Sumner 8 0  
Whiskard, Sir Geoffrey 39 
Woodin, Edward 1 8  
Yamamoto , Adm . lsoroku 1 1 4 
(/) 
� 
w 
� 
§ 
� 
� 
H 
� 
� 
� 
0 
A 
� u 
A TOUS LES FRANCAIS 
La France a perdu 1.0le bataille.1 
]lfais la Prance n'a -pas pPJ'du la guerre! 
Des gouvernants da renaontre ont pu 
capituler, cedant a la panique, oub1iant 
l'honneur, I ivrant le pays a la servitude. 
Cependant_, rien n'est perCfu! 
Rien n'est perdu, parce que cette guerre est 
une guerre mondiate. Dans l'univers libre, 
des Forces immenses n'ont pas enccwe donne .. 
Unjour, ces Forces ecraserontl'ennemi. II fact 
que la France, ce jour-la, soit pre&ente A la 
victoire. Alors,elle retrouvera sa liberte etsa 
grandeur. Tel est mon but, mon &eul but! 
Voila pourquoije convie tousles francais, 
OU qu'ils se trouvent, a s'unir a moi dans 
l'action, dans le sacrifice et dans l'esperance. 
Notre patrie est en peril de mort. 
Luttons tous pour ta sauver! 
VIV.E 1A FRANCE ! 
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